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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate governance, and the role of executive pay in particular, has 
received increased attention from the media, government, and the business 
arena in recent years. The study reported in this thesis adds to our 
understanding of both the components and determinants of Australian 
remuneration packages for the top management team. It does so in four main 
ways: 
 
1. The study examines the determinants of compensation of a range of 
senior executives within the organisation, in addition to the CEO. No 
Australian research, to date, explores the structure and determinants 
of remuneration beyond the CEO; 
2. The research is conducted in a contemporary setting and timeframe, 
where corporations are subject to expanded disclosure requirements, 
when compared to the subjects of prior Australian research; 
3. It examines an expanded range of factors documented in overseas 
research as likely to relate to remuneration, some of which have not 
been previously examined in Australian work; 
4. Finally, in developing hypotheses concerning factors expected to 
relate to remuneration, the study reconciles the perspectives provided 
by both agency and managerial power theories in terms of how they 
present similar and differing propositions. 
 
The research examines both cash and incentive components of executive 
compensation disclosed by a sample of top 300 Australian companies in 
2005. The model incorporates measures of firm performance, economic 
 xii
 characteristics, board monitoring and governance characteristics, and 
ownership characteristics in an attempt to explain the level of executive 
compensation. The study extends analysis beyond the CEO to incorporate 
an investigation of both the structure and determinants of compensation of 
the top five executives, in addition to the CEO. 
 
Results indicate that the structure of CEO compensation has changed since 
prior Australian research was conducted, to include a more heavy reliance on 
incentive pay. In contrast to the US, the structure of CEO remuneration 
differs from that of non-CEO executives. As managers move progressively up 
the senior executive hierarchy, short-term cash bonus and share-based 
incentive pay both become more important as components of remuneration. 
There is also a greater reliance on performance hurdles than has been 
documented in prior Australian and international research. 
 
The expectation that remuneration is now more strongly tied to firm 
performance is supported. The size and complexity of the firm are also 
considered to be important in determining the level of various components of 
both CEO and non-CEO executive compensation. This supports the view that 
larger, more complex entities attract higher quality executives, and pay for 
such quality and expertise. Growth firms are more likely to pay higher levels 
of incentive pay and total compensation to CEOs than non-growth firms.  
 
Executive remuneration also relates to the strength of various monitoring and 
governance mechanisms, although to a greater extent for CEOs than for 
other senior executives. Managers are able to influence the remuneration-
setting process where governance structures are weak, or where they have 
greater influence. This is particularly evident, for example, where the CEO is 
the founder, or holds a greater proportion of shares; and when they have 
been incumbent in their position for an extended length of time. 
 
In some cases factors relating to CEO compensation differ from those 
associated with compensation of lower-level executives. 
 
 xiii
  
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Corporate governance has increased in prominence and importance in the 
business arena in recent years. With the collapse of Enron and, in Australia, 
other high profile companies including HIH, One.Tel and Harris Scarfe, there 
has been a call for improved corporate governance mechanisms (Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003; Lavelle, 2002; Thomas, 2002; Department of Treasury, 
1998).  
 
Executive pay, as one major component of governance mechanisms, has 
received increased attention from media and government circles. Substantial 
changes to remuneration disclosure regulations appear to have parallelled 
attitudes of the market, investors and the media. In particular, the media and 
investors have questioned the link between executive compensation and firm 
performance, and the levels of executive compensation. For example, John 
Collett reports in the Sydney Morning Herald that a study of remuneration 
packages of chief executives from 64 of the top 100 listed companies, 
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 commissioned by the Australian Council of Super Investors (ACSI), found the 
bonus portion of CEO remuneration packages had no correlation with 
company performance (Collett, 2006). In a media release commenting on the 
results, Executive Officer of the ACSI, Phillip Spathis, noted that ACSI’s 
findings over several years indicated increases in CEO pay tended to be 
driven by factors outside improved shareholder returns. He said, “CEOs 
deserve high pay for outstanding performance, however, increases should be 
driven by genuinely performance-related components” (Australian Council of 
Super Investors, 2006). 
 
The Australian government, as part of its corporate law reform process, 
passed the Company Law Review Act 1998, which required significantly 
expanded disclosures of information about remuneration of directors and 
executive officers. Recognising the need to promote “meaningful disclosure 
rather than just more disclosure”, the Minister for Financial Services and 
Regulation, in a speech to the Australian Institute of Company Directors, 
noted one of the main objectives of the new legislation as being the ability to 
“strike a balance between the need for directors to get on with running the 
company, and the desirability of allowing shareholders the chance to look 
after their interests” (Hockey, 1999). 
 
Following developments in overseas jurisdictions, including the US 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and taking into consideration recommendations 
of the HIH Royal Commission and the Ramsay Report on the Independence 
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 of Australian Company Auditors (Department of Treasury, 2002; 2004), 
CLERP 9 requirements were passed into legislation as the CLERP (Audit 
Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004, effective from 1 July 2004. The 
legislation required further, substantial changes to recognition and disclosure 
of executive remuneration information, and associated governance 
mechanisms. 
 
The current study seeks to document both the current structure and 
determinants of executive remuneration in Australia, and how, subsequent to 
recent legislative changes, they may have changed from those observed in 
prior Australian research. The next section discusses the objectives and 
contribution of the study in more detail. 
 
1.1 Objectives and Contribution of the Study 
Compensation policy is one of the most important factors in organisational 
success (Jensen and Murphy, 1990a). Not only does it influence how top 
executives behave, but it also impacts what kind of executives an 
organisation attracts (Jensen and Murphy, 1990a). The objective of the study 
documented in this thesis is to add to our understanding of both the 
components and determinants of Australian remuneration packages for the 
top management team responsible for the strategic direction of the firm, 
under an expanded regulatory regime. It does so in four main ways. 
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 1.1.1 Remuneration Practices of the Senior Executive Team 
The study examines the components and determinants of remuneration of 
the top management team, in addition to the CEO. This is an area of 
research not previously conducted in Australia. The emphasis of prior 
research that examines the structure and determinants of compensation, 
both within Australia and internationally, has been on CEO compensation 
only. The limited research that has extended the analysis to other managers 
has been constrained to the US environment (e.g., Ryan and Wiggins, 2000). 
Finkelstein (1992) notes, however, that it is the ‘dominant coalition’ of senior 
managers within a firm that is responsible for setting the policy and strategic 
direction of the organisation, not merely the CEO. In fact while the CEO is 
generally considered the most powerful member of the group, this is not 
always the case – managers with large shareholdings may be more 
influential than the CEO (Finkelstein, 1992). Changes to reporting 
requirements outlined in both accounting standards and corporations’ 
legislation which require detailed disclosure of remuneration packages of the 
top management team, also point to the importance of senior managers, 
other than the CEO, in the strategic direction of the organisation. 
Consequently, the current study examines the determinants of compensation 
for the top management team within the organisation, not just the CEO. 
 
1.1.2 Contemporary Regulatory Setting 
The current research is carried out in a contemporary setting and timeframe 
which is subject to expanded disclosure requirements, compared to prior 
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 Australian research. The corporate reporting landscape relating to executive 
remuneration has experienced substantial change over the last 10 years. The 
Australian Government instigated a corporate law reform process when the 
Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP) was announced by the 
Treasurer in 1997 (Department of Treasury, 1998). The resulting Company 
Law Review Act 1998 (CLRA98) required substantial changes to 
remuneration disclosure. The then existing requirement to merely detail the 
number of executives with remuneration within each $10,000 band above 
$100,000 was replaced by an obligation to outline the nature and amount of 
each element of pay (including cash, shares and options) for each of the five 
highest paid directors and officers of the company. In addition, the broad 
policy for determining the nature and amounts of compensation, and the 
relationship between the remuneration policy and company performance was 
also expected to be documented.  
 
Despite the requirement to disclose the relationship between remuneration 
policy and company performance, there were major concerns that companies 
were not adequately demonstrating this link (Parliamentary Joint Committee 
on Corporations and Financial Services, 2004). Recognising these 
inadequacies, and others, the Australian Government released CLERP 9, 
which proposed additional significant changes to corporate governance. The 
CLERP (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004, effective from 1 
July 2004, contained wide ranging measures to improve corporate disclosure 
and audit independence, amongst other corporate governance guidelines. In 
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 particular, CLERP 9 required the adoption of accounting standards issued by 
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) from 1 January 2005, 
expanded disclosure of director and executive remuneration, including 
performance hurdles, and the proportion of remuneration linked to 
performance targets, the presentation of a Remuneration Report within the 
directors report and the requirement to hold a non-binding shareholder vote 
to adopt the remuneration disclosures within the Remuneration Report.  
 
As a result, it is expected that boards of Australian companies are more likely 
to be vigilant in ensuring there is a tighter link between executive pay and 
firm performance. Shareholders are more closely scrutinising the 
performance hurdles in place, and how the board is assessing performance 
against these hurdles (Buffini, 2006a). The ability of shareholders to vote on 
the contents of the Remuneration Report means shareholders are now taking 
the opportunity to voice their displeasure with remuneration contracts they 
see do not demonstrate an adequate pay-performance link (Buffini, 2006a). 
Against this backdrop, it is likely that the current study will find a stronger link 
between executive pay and firm performance than that observed in prior 
Australian research (e.g., Fleming and Stellios, 2002; Coulton and Taylor, 
2002b; Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon, 2006). 
 
Resulting from convergence with international accounting standards, 
Australian corporations, from January 2005, were required to follow the 
guidelines outlined in AASB2 Share-based Payment (based on the 
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 equivalent international standard) in relation to valuing and recognising stock 
options and other share payments to employees. This represented the first 
time Australian companies had received such guidance. It also coincides with 
similar changes to legislation in both the US and the UK, where comparable 
accounting standards now exist. This has two implications for the current 
study.  
 
Firstly, this provides the opportunity to utilise a more accurate valuation of 
share-based remuneration components. Prior academic research uses the 
option pricing model provided by Black and Scholes (1973). However, the 
accuracy of share-payment measures using such a model for academic 
research purposes can be questioned (McKnight and Tomkins, 1999). One 
practical problem when using the Black-Scholes model in academic research 
is the number of parameters that must be estimated by the researchers, with 
research results being sensitive to the assumptions made by the researcher 
about the components of the valuation model (McKnight and Tomkins, 1999; 
Murphy, 1999). Valuations provided in company reports, pursuant to AASB2 
are likely to provide a more accurate measure of option values than those 
calculated by researchers using the Black-Scholes model. Company-
generated values consider firm-specific parameters relating to the likelihood 
of early exercise, the appropriate risk rate, and other firm-specific factors not 
available to academics. 
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 Secondly, all prior research, both within Australia and internationally, has 
been undertaken under regulatory regimes where share options are not 
required to be included in remuneration expenses in the income statement, 
and consequently has no impact on profit calculation. With the advent of 
AASB2, which applies to the reporting period examined in the current study, 
Australian reporting entities are required to expense stock options over the 
expected vesting period (Para. 15). It is likely that this new requirement will 
influence the selection of remuneration components used by Australian 
reporting entities to reward managers. Similar reporting requirements are 
being introduced internationally.1 As such, results of the current study will be 
generalisable beyond the Australian reporting environment. 
 
Research in Australia examining components of managerial pay (and equity 
based compensation in particular), and determinants of compensation has 
been sparse, primarily because of limited data availability. Any Australian 
research that documents components and/or determinants of remuneration 
was carried out either prior to the enactment of CLRA98 (e.g., Defina, Harris 
and Ramsay, 1994; Izan, Sidhu and Taylor, 1998; Merhebi et al., 2006) or in 
the intervening period prior to when CLERP 9 took effect (e.g., Fleming and 
Stellios, 2002; Coulton and Taylor, 2002b; Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon, 
2006; Matolcsy and Wright 2006a; 2006b; 2006c). Given the substantial 
                                                 
1 Following the issue of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) IFS2 Share-
Based Payment, The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in the US issued a 
revised statement: FAS123 Share-Based Payment in December 2004 to replace the original 
Stock-Based Payment. Similarly, the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) in the UK issued 
FRS20 Share-Based Payment in April 2004. Both standards are consistent with the 
Australian equivalent. 
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 changes to executive compensation disclosure requirements, outlined 
previously, it is opportune to reassess the components used in typical 
Australian corporate remuneration contracts. It is likely that companies have 
re-assessed their use of the range of pay alternatives available, in particular 
share-based incentives, since prior Australian research was conducted. This 
study examines the components contained in Australian executive pay 
contracts and compares these to other recent research (e.g., Coulton and 
Taylor, 2002b; Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon, 2006; Matolcsy and Wright, 
2002a) to assess if there are any systematic modifications to executive pay 
arrangements resulting from the recent changes to the regulatory setting 
faced by Australian corporations. 
 
1.1.3 Factors Not Previously Examined in Australian Research 
Factors found in prior literature to relate to the level and structure of 
executive pay could have changed as a result of amendments to the 
reporting regime. Given the increased importance placed on the disclosure of 
performance targets under recent amendments to corporations’ legislation, in 
addition to the requirement for a non-binding shareholder vote on the 
remuneration report, it is expected this increased transparency will lead to a 
reassessment of compensation, and factors used by corporate entities to 
determine appropriate remuneration levels and components. This study 
assesses whether factors previously found to relate to remuneration still hold 
under the new reporting regime.  
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 Similarly, a number of factors, including the proportion of external directors 
appointed to the board subsequent to the CEO taking office, have been 
found by overseas research to relate to the level of CEO compensation (see 
for example Conyon and Peck, 1998; Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999). 
These factors have not, to date, been examined by Australian research. The 
current study addresses this limitation. 
 
Expanded reporting requirements also mean we are now able to determine 
additional potential explanatory factors, such as the extent of experience the 
CEO and other senior managers gain from sitting on other company boards. 
Although investigated in overseas research as a likely determinant of the 
level of executive compensation (e.g., Laing and Weir, 1999), it has not been 
examined in Australian research previously, as the information was not 
generally available. Changes to company legislation mean this construct can 
now be identified and measured.  
 
1.1.4 Theoretical Framework 
Empirical investigation within Australia and internationally has, to date, 
engaged agency theory as the predominant perspective in the development 
of testable hypotheses (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990b; Izan, Sidhu and 
Taylor, 1998; Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999; Coulton and Taylor, 
2002b; Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon, 2006; Matolcsy and Wright, 2006b; 
2006c). Research using agency theory to develop testable hypotheses often 
includes a range of ‘control’ variables based on evidence from prior research 
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 without necessarily providing any theoretical justification for their inclusion 
(e.g., Mehran, 1995; Conyon and Peck, 1998; Anderson and Bizjak, 2003). 
Recently, the theory of managerial power, which emerges from the sociology 
and political science literatures, has been proposed as a theory which can 
assist in more fully considering behavioural aspects of managerial actions, in 
order to present a more comprehensive model of the determinants of 
executive compensation (Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, 2002; Grabke-Rundell 
and Gomez-Mejia, 2002).  
 
This study’s fourth and final contribution is to reconcile the perspectives 
provided by both agency and managerial power theories in terms of how they 
present similar and differing propositions regarding determinants of executive 
remuneration. Both theories are utilised in the development of testable 
hypotheses relating to factors expected to influence executive pay.  
 
1.2 Motivation for the Study 
This study is primarily motivated by the recent importance attached to 
corporate governance and regulation of executive compensation by 
government bodies, other regulatory agencies, media commentators and 
other stakeholders. No other Australian research has, to date, been carried 
out in a setting where companies are subject to the full extent of recent 
regulatory changes. Results of this study will provide additional information 
upon which to assess the success or otherwise of current disclosure 
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 regulation and the potential need for any amendments. In particular, results 
indicating any changes in the use of stock options and other equity 
instruments as part of remuneration is useful in the international context, 
given it is the first study undertaken within a new regime where options are 
required to be expensed. Identifying and measuring additional factors 
expected to impact on remuneration policy, as a result of expanded 
disclosure requirements, will serve to improve our understanding of factors 
affecting remuneration policy in Australian firms. 
 
The research also contributes to the existing literature by reconciling different 
theoretical perspectives to improve our appreciation of the factors likely to 
influence executive pay. This study introduces the emerging theory of 
managerial power to expand on our understanding of factors influencing 
executive remuneration. 
 
The work also contributes to our knowledge of components of, and 
determinants of, compensation arrangements for senior executives other 
than the CEO. This is an area previously not assessed in Australia. Recent 
changes to legislation expand remuneration disclosure requirements to 
compel companies to document the remuneration of executives responsible 
for the strategic decision-making activities of the group in addition to the 
parent entity. This implies the importance placed on the executive team as a 
whole, not just the CEO. 
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 1.3 Brief Outline of the Study 
The legislative constraints governing the disclosure of information relating to 
executive remuneration are outlined in Chapter 2. It commences with a 
review of changes to corporations’ legislation resulting from the Federal 
Government’s CLERP initiatives. Amendments to accounting standards 
resulting from convergence with international financial reporting standards 
are also documented. 
 
A review of the current body of evidence pertaining to the components of, 
and determinants of executive pay follows in Chapter 3. Studies which 
document the level and structure of executive compensation, both within 
Australia and overseas, are examined. Factors which prior literature has 
found to be associated with executive pay are also outlined.  
 
In light of the prior evidence, the factors identified from prior research that are 
expected to relate to executive pay, and to be tested in the current study, are 
examined in Chapter 4. Additional factors not previously investigated in the 
Australian context due to data or theoretical limitations are also introduced. In 
researching these factors, expectations of the relationship between the 
identified factors and remuneration design, from both agency and managerial 
power perspectives, are reconciled in order to develop testable hypotheses. 
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 Details of the research design utilised in this study are then presented in 
Chapter 5. Sample selection procedures, variable measurement, and 
statistical tests are discussed.  
 
Descriptive evidence of executive compensation methods for CEOs and 
other senior managers is documented in Chapter 6. Contemporary 
remuneration practices are compared to existing Australian, UK and US 
evidence. Results of empirical tests undertaken to assess factors 
hypothesised to relate to contemporary remuneration practices, are then 
presented.  
 
Finally, a summary of the study, together with implications for future research 
are presented in Chapter 7. How the work can inform future development of 
public policy and debate on the success or otherwise in aligning executive 
pay with firm performance characteristics is also discussed. 
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Chapter 2 
 
REGULATION OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
DISCLOSURE 
 
 
The regulations governing executive compensation disclosures within the 
annual reports of Australian companies are outlined in this chapter. A history 
of the development of executive disclosure requirements in corporations’ 
legislation, and changes resulting from the Federal Government’s Corporate 
Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP) is initially presented. Accounting 
standard requirements for disclosure and recognition of executive 
remuneration information in financial reports, and how these have changed in 
recent years as a result of convergence with international financial reporting 
standards are documented in Section 2.2. 
 
The influence of the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate 
Governance Council through its Principles of Good Corporate Governance 
and Best Practice Recommendations is then summarised. In concluding, the 
importance of the changing nature of the legislative landscape to the setting 
of the current study is highlighted. 
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 2.1 Corporate Legislative Requirements 
Prior to 1998, the only disclosure of executive remuneration by Australian 
companies was a count of the number of executives receiving compensation 
within each $10,000 band above $100,000. These requirements were 
introduced into Schedule 5 of the Corporations Regulations in 1986, and 
were consistent with requirements in AASB1017 Related Party Disclosures 
and AASB1034 Financial Report Presentation and Disclosures. 
 
The Australian Government instigated a corporate law reform process when 
its Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP) initiative was 
announced by the Treasurer in 1997 (Department of Treasury, 1998). The 
objective of the Government’s CLERP is to review and reform corporate and 
business regulation to ensure that “Australia’s corporate laws meet the 
challenges of the present and future market place in a forward thinking, 
responsible and innovative way” (Department of Treasury, 2002, p.iv). As 
part of its reform program the Federal Government introduced to Parliament 
the Company Law Review Bill 1997, which after consultation and debate, 
was passed as the Company Law Review Act 1998 (CLRA98).  
 
At the time the Bill was being debated, considerable public attention was 
devoted to senior executive salary packages, which, it was believed, were 
inconsistent with the value of shares and the performance of some 
companies (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial 
Services, 2004). During debate in the Senate, section 300A was inserted into 
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 the Corporations Act by amendment to Schedule 1 of the Company Law 
Review Bill 1997. This section required significantly increased disclosures of 
information about remuneration of directors and executive officers in the 
annual report of listed companies from 1 July 1998. Specifically, section 
300A of the Corporations Act 2001 required a discussion of the company’s 
broad policy for determining the nature and amount of ‘emoluments’ of board 
members and senior executives, of the relationship between remuneration 
policy and the company’s performance, and details and amounts of each 
element of the ‘emolument’ of each director and each of five officers 
receiving the highest ‘emolument’. 
 
In addition, section 300(1)(d), which applied to all reporting entities under 
Chapter 2M of the Corporations Act 2001, required disclosure of options 
granted to directors and executive officers as part of their remuneration. 
 
Section 300A came under a great deal of criticism after its late inclusion in 
CLRA98. Ernst and Young noted that the requirements for executives and 
directors’ remuneration were not subject to a reasonable period of public 
exposure and discussion, and found many ambiguities and inconsistencies, 
particularly in the use of its terms, for example ’officers’ and ‘emoluments’ 
(Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, 
2004). These views were supported by other submissions to the 
Parliamentary Joint Statutory Committee on Corporations and Securities 
report on CLRA98. The major criticisms were, as identified by Ernst and 
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 Young, definitional issues, and an inadequate link between remuneration 
policy and company performance (Parliamentary Joint Statutory Committee 
on Corporations and Securities, 1999).  
 
In response to concerns relating to section 300A, the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission (ASIC) issued Practice Note 68: New Financial 
Reporting and Procedural Requirements (PN 68) in order to clarify some of 
the accounting-related requirements of the legislation. In doing so, ASIC 
indicated that the new company law provisions were to be interpreted in 
accordance with the overall objectives of the legislation and that too much 
focus should not be given to words such as ‘emoluments’ and ‘officers’.  
 
Paragraph 60 of PN 68 outlined the elements of emoluments to be disclosed: 
“Salary and fees, non-cash benefits, bonuses (possibly 
separate categories of bonuses where the bonuses are based 
on different performance criteria), profit share, superannuation 
contributions, other payments in connection with retirement 
from office, the value of shares issued, and the value of options 
granted.” 
 
At that time, ASIC did not prescribe accounting valuation methods in relation 
to shares or options issued. In June 2004, however, ASIC sought to clarify 
the matter by releasing guidelines to valuing options in directors’ reports, in 
addition to other disclosure issues. The guidelines relied heavily upon 
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 accounting requirements of AASB1046 Director and Executive Disclosures 
by Disclosing Entities and on Exposure Draft ED2 Share-Based Payment.2 In 
their guidelines, ASIC made the point that companies were not relieved of 
their statutory obligation to comply with disclosure requirements outlined in 
the legislation merely because they regarded the calculation or disclosure as 
being too difficult or onerous (ASIC, 2005). 
 
The most recent changes to corporations’ legislation governing executive 
remuneration were contained within CLERP 9, which commenced with the 
development of a policy paper Corporate Disclosure: Strengthening the 
Financial Reporting Framework in June 2002 (Department of Treasury, 
2002). The draft CLERP (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Bill, which 
gave legislative form to the policy proposals, was presented for feedback in 
October 2003. The Bill recognised the inadequacies in existing remuneration 
legislation, and proposed significant changes to disclosure of director and 
executive remuneration. The Bill also proposed significant changes relating 
to continuous disclosure provisions, audit oversight, and audit independence, 
amongst other corporate governance mechanisms aimed at improving 
transparency and accountability. 
 
                                                 
2 ED2 has since been replaced by AASB2 Share-Based Payment. Section 2.2 further 
outlines accounting standard disclosure requirements. 
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 The amendments in CLERP 9 relating to executive remuneration sought to 
enhance the existing regulatory framework by: 
• extending the application of the disclosure requirements beyond the 
listed company to include the corporate group; 
• enhancing the specific disclosures made; 
• giving shareholders greater ability to hold directors accountable for 
their decisions regarding remuneration; and 
• providing shareholders with a greater say in relation to the amount of 
termination payments (Department of Treasury, 2002). 
 
In addition, the Bill proposed adoption of standards issued by the 
International Accounting Standards Board for reporting entities, for 
accounting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2005. Information which 
provides shareholders with an opportunity to assess both executive and non-
executives’ other commitments, other directorships held currently, and over 
the past two reporting periods, are also to be presented.  
 
The Bill was passed into legislation as the CLERP (Audit Reform and 
Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004, effective from 1 July 2004 and was 
influenced in its development by numerous submissions, reviews and global 
developments in corporate governance. These included the Ramsay Report 
on the Independence of Australian Company Auditors and recommendations 
of the HIH Royal Commission (Department of Treasury, 2004) and 
developments in overseas jurisdictions including the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
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 of 2002 (Department of Treasury, 2002). The report of the Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Service (PJCCFS) inquiry 
into CLERP 9 was also considered (Department of Treasury, 2004). 
 
The CLERP 9 requirements have resulted in significant amendments to 
Chapter 2M of the Corporations Act 2001, with obligations relating to director 
and executive remuneration being outlined in s300A(1). It now requires 
extensive disclosure of remuneration information in a section of the directors’ 
report identified as the ‘Remuneration Report’ (s300A(1A)). This includes: 
• discussion of the board policy for determining the nature and amount 
of remuneration of directors and executives of the company, in 
addition to other group executives of a consolidated entity 
(s300A(1)(a));  
• discussion of the relationship between remuneration policy and the 
company's performance (s300A(1)(b));  
• if an element of the remuneration of a director or executive is 
dependent on the satisfaction of a performance condition, a detailed 
summary of the performance condition, an explanation of why the 
performance condition was chosen, and a summary of the methods 
used in assessing whether the performance condition is satisfied 
(s300A(1)(ba)); 
• specific details relating to the remuneration of each director and each 
of the five named company executives who receive the highest 
 21
 remuneration, in addition to each of the five named group executives 
of a consolidated entity who receive the highest remuneration 
(s300A(1)(c)); 
• If a portion of remuneration consists of securities, and that payment is 
not dependent on the satisfaction of a performance condition, an 
explanation of why it is not dependent on the satisfaction of a 
performance condition (s300A(1)(d)); and  
• for each of the specified directors and executives:  
(i) the relative proportions of remuneration that are related to 
performance and those elements that are not;  
(ii) the value of options that are granted during the year as part of 
their remuneration;  
(iii) the value of options that are exercised during the year;  
(iv) the value of options that lapsed during the year;  
(v) the percentage of the value of the director’s or executive’s 
remuneration that consists of options; and  
(vi) if the executive is employed by the company under a contract – 
the duration of the contract, the periods of notice required to 
terminate the contract, and the termination payments provided 
for under the contract (s300A(1)(e)). 
 
The new amendments addressed some of the acknowledged definitional 
problems of the existing legislation: ‘emoluments’ has been replaced by 
‘remuneration’, ‘officers of the company’ has been changed to ‘company 
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 executives’, and has been given a more specific meaning, giving emphasis to 
the decision-making responsibility of the officer (Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, 2004). Submissions to 
the review of CLERP 9 by PJCCFS generally agreed that there was a need 
for transparency and, for the most part, supported the intention of the draft 
CLERP (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Bill to strengthen the 
disclosure requirements of executive remuneration. In doing so, a number 
referred to recent high profile cases where inadequately designed 
remuneration schemes meant shareholders were poorly informed 
(Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, 
2004).  
 
Some submissions to the inquiry were concerned that expanding the 
disclosure requirements to group executives would contribute to rising 
remuneration for executives, rather than containing increasing pay levels. 
Others, however, pointed to the existing market for executive pay information 
through remuneration consultants (Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services, 2004). Mr Shorten from the Australian 
Workers Union supported the increased disclosure. He believed that having 
more information will lead to “… a linking of performance to executive 
remuneration, which is appropriate. The Australian Workers Union are not 
against successful companies paying senior executives lots of money, but we 
do believe that … there is very little upwards accountability of directors. We 
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 think transparency will in fact add to accountability.” (Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, 2004, p.44). 
 
One of the major concerns was the ability of companies to adequately 
demonstrate a link between executive remuneration and performance. It was 
noted that this requirement is not new to the Corporations Act 2001, and 
studies have generally found a ‘negligible link’ between both fixed and 
variable compensation and firm performance. The report of the PJCCFS 
noted one study that found remuneration to be strongly correlated with the 
size and complexity of the company, but could not find any link to company 
performance in terms of return on equity and return on assets (Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, 2004, p.48). 
Respondents to the inquiry generally welcomed measures in CLERP 9 to 
improve the disclosure of the relationship between remuneration and 
performance hurdles. One such change is the opportunity for shareholders to 
vote on the contents of the Remuneration Report. This enables shareholders 
to have a greater say on how companies pay top executives, and is designed 
to overcome boards’ perceived failure to link pay to performance (Buffini, 
2006a). Commentators note that shareholders have been taking the 
opportunity to voice their displeasure with remuneration contracts since the 
Bill came into effect (Buffini, 2006a). 
 
One continuing concern amongst stakeholders is the duplication of 
remuneration disclosure requirements for listed companies, where similar 
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 disclosures must be made in the Remuneration Report contained within the 
Directors’ Report pursuant to CLERP 9 amendments to the Corporations Act 
2001 and the financial reports as a result of relevant accounting standards 
(Australian Accounting Standards Board, 2003). Corporations Act 
Regulations 2M.3.03 and 2M.6.04 (the regulations) were amended by the 
Treasurer in 2005 to allow listed companies to avoid duplication of certain 
remuneration disclosures made in their annual financial reports. The 
regulations apply to reporting periods ending on or after 30 June 2005 to 
every listed company which is required to prepare a financial report in 
accordance with Chapter 2M of the Corporations Act 2001 (KPMG, 2006). 
The regulations now allow certain disclosures required by accounting 
standards to be made in the Directors’ Report if that information contained 
within the Directors’ Report is audited. 
 
The regulations do not address the differing requirements of accounting 
standards and section 300A in relation to the identification of individuals 
subject to disclosure (KPMG, 2006). Instead, the regulations require the 
Remuneration Report to include the relevant details for the executives 
covered by accounting standards in addition to those covered by section 
300A of the Corporations Act 2001 (KPMG, 2006). The regulations do not 
permit transfer of all accounting standard executive remuneration 
disclosures, many still need to be made in the annual financial report.  
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 In summary, since 1998 there have been significant changes in legislation 
which guide corporations’ disclosure of executive remuneration. Effective 
from 1 July 2004, these regulations have expanded further to include 
additional guidance on applying accounting standards to record and measure 
the value of options, performance hurdles against which remuneration is 
determined, and remuneration for an expanded group of executives. In 
addition, shareholders have an increased input to the remuneration process 
by way of a non-binding vote on the Remuneration Report presented to the 
annual general meeting. Each of these changes has influenced the 
regulatory environment that firms in the current study are subject to, when 
compared to sample firms in prior Australian studies. They are likely to lead 
to greater alignment between executive pay and firm performance and closer 
attention to the proportion of pay which is performance-based. 
 
2.2 Australian Accounting Standards 
Accounting requirements for executive remuneration disclosure were 
originally contained within AASB1017 Related Party Transactions and 
AASB1034 Financial Reporting Presentation and Disclosures. Consistent 
with the original legal requirements introduced in Schedule 5 of the 
Corporations Regulations in 1986, disclosure was required for executives 
receiving compensation within each $10,000 band commencing at $100,000. 
AASB1046 Director and Executive Disclosures by Disclosing Entities was 
introduced in January 2004 to improve the quality of disclosures relevant to 
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 individuals governing listed entities. AASB1046 was to be applied, for the first 
time, to all executive compensation disclosures in the annual report during 
the time period reflected in the current study. At the time the standard was 
issued, there was an expectation that the requirements would be reviewed 
when considering the adoption of IAS24 Related Party Transactions as part 
of the international convergence project. 
 
AASB124 Related Party Disclosures was issued in July 2004, becoming 
effective for reporting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2005. Rather 
than amend and reissue AASB1046, the AASB preferred to include its 
requirements in AASB124 as additional disclosure items. Consequently, 
AASB124 was revised and reissued in December 2005, and is applicable to 
annual reporting periods ending on or after 31 December 2005. 
 
Also as a result of the Financial Reporting Council’s convergence directive, 
AASB2 Share-Based Payment, based on IFRS2 Share-Based Payment, was 
first gazetted in July 2004 and applies to financial years starting on or after 1 
January 2005. The standard sets out measurement principles and specific 
requirements relating to share-based payment transactions. 
 
The requirements of each of these accounting standards, and how they 
influence the setting for the current study are outlined below. 
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 2.2.1 AASB 1046 Director and Executive Disclosures by 
Disclosing Entities 
As noted previously, the aim of this standard was to improve the quality and 
comparability of disclosures by listed companies, about the remuneration of 
those responsible for its corporate governance. It was issued to incorporate 
features of overseas reporting, but adapted to accord with requirements of 
the Corporations Act 2001 (AASB1046, p.5). The majority of requirements 
were initially proposed in Exposure Draft ED106 Part 1 Director and 
Executive Disclosures by Disclosing Entities, issued in May 2002. Disclosing 
entities applying AASB1046 were exempted from applying director disclosure 
requirements in the existing AASB1017 Related Party Disclosures.3 
Requirements for banded disclosures of executive remuneration in 
AASB1034 Financial Report Presentation and Disclosures were also 
withdrawn. The standard was required to be applied throughout the sample 
period addressed in the current study. 
 
AASB1046 applied to measurement and disclosure of remuneration of 
‘specified’ directors and executives responsible for the governance of the 
entity, within the financial report. ‘Specified’ executives were defined as the 
“five or more executives (other than specified directors) with the greatest 
authority for the strategic direction and management of the entity” 
(AASB1046, Para. 4.1). They were not limited to the most highly paid 
executives. This contrasts with the requirements of section 300A of the 
                                                 
3 This requirement did not exempt disclosing entities from complying with all other 
requirements of AASB1017, however. As indicated previously, AASB1017 has been 
reissued as AASB124. 
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 Corporations Act 2001, which requires disclosure of remuneration to the 
executives receiving the highest remuneration, and within a separate section 
of the directors’ report. These requirements could lead to compensation 
details of different executives being disclosed in both the Remuneration 
Report, pursuant to section 300A, and in the financial reports in accordance 
with AASB1046. 
 
Paragraph 5.2 required disclosure of remuneration components for each 
specified director and executive comprising: 
• Primary benefits (cash salary, cash profit-sharing and other bonuses, 
separately identifying amounts attributable to long-term incentive plans 
other than equity compensation); 
• Post-employment benefits (pension and superannuation benefits, 
post-employment benefits required to be approved by members); 
• Equity compensation (value of shares and units, value of options and 
rights, increase in value of vested options); 
• Other components not already disclosed (includes termination 
benefits). 
 
Rather than disclosing the amounts actually paid during the accounting 
period, Para 6.1.3 of AASB1046 required an accruals basis to be used in 
disclosing remuneration of directors and executives. Items of remuneration 
were to be disclosed in respect of the reporting period in which the benefits 
are earned, rather than necessarily when they are paid. For instance, a 
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 bonus could be based upon a measure of performance calculated across the 
entire reporting period, but not be paid until the subsequent financial 
reporting period. The bonus was to be disclosed in the reporting period to 
which performance it relates, and not disclosed in the subsequent period 
(Para. 6.1.4). 
 
The standard also provided guidance on measurement of compensation 
(Para. 6) including both non-share-based and share-based payments. 
Guidelines for measuring share-based payments, including options and other 
equity compensation, centred on the views of the International Accounting 
Standards Board in its then forthcoming IFRS2 Share-Based Payment. It was 
anticipated that when the Australian equivalent AASB2 Share-Based 
Payment was introduced, specific guidelines pertaining to the valuation of 
share-based payments to directors and executives would be removed from 
AASB1046 (AASB1046, p.8). Principles used to determine the nature and 
amount of remuneration, and whether, and how remuneration relates to the 
entity’s performance were also required to be disclosed in the annual 
financial report (Para. 7.5). 
 
The standard also required disclosure of loans to specified directors and 
executives (Para. 9.1), and other transactions between the specified directors 
or executives and the disclosing entity (Para. 10.1). 
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 As indicated previously, AASB1046 was applied by all reporting entities 
during the time period addressed in the current study. Subsequently, 
however, many requirements of AASB1046 were amalgamated into the 
revised AASB124 Related Party Disclosures. 
2.2.2 AASB124 Related Party Disclosures 
In implementing the Financial Reporting Council’s policy of adopting 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for application to 
reporting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2005, AASB124 Related 
Party Disclosures, the Australian Equivalent of IAS24 Related Party 
Disclosures, was issued in July 2004. At that time AASB124 offered relief 
from providing disclosures pertaining to key management personnel, given 
entities were already required to comply with the more onerous disclosure 
requirements of AASB1046. The AASB, at a later date, decided it would be 
preferable to include the requirements of AASB1046 as additional disclosure 
items in AASB124 rather than retaining AASB1046 as a separate standard 
(AASB124, p.4). These requirements have been inserted as paragraphs 
Aus25.1 to Aus25.9.3. 
 
It was decided to remove the definition of the ‘specified’ directors and 
executives in favour of the definition of ‘key management personnel’ in 
AASB124. The categories of compensation, previously outlined in 
AASB1046, have been amended to align with requirements in AASB119 
Employee Benefits and AASB2 Share-Based Payment. 
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 2.2.3 AASB 2 Share-Based Payment 
Prior to CLERP 9 and the issue of AASB1046, and the later release of 
AASB2 Share-Based Payment, upon which AASB1046 was partly based, 
there was evidence that companies were not complying fully with 
requirements to disclose the use of, and value of options granted to 
executives (Coulton and Taylor, 2002b; Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services, 2004). The objective of AASB2 is to 
outline the financial reporting required by an entity when it undertakes a 
share-based payment transaction. Whilst the standard applies to all share-
based transactions, it has clear implications for the measurement and 
disclosure of share-based payments to executives. AASB2 is equivalent to 
IFRS2 Share-Based Payment. Companies are required to use AASB2 when 
valuing share-based payments and options to comply with disclosure 
requirements under section 300A of the Corporations Act 2001.  
 
In addition to recognising the value of share-based payments within the 
corporate accounts, and the recognition of share-based transactions in 
calculating the entity’s profit or loss (Para. 50), the standard requires 
disclosure of sufficient information to enable users to understand the nature 
and extent of share-based payment arrangements that exist (Para. 44), and 
how the value of equity instruments granted during the period was 
determined (Para. 46).  
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 In accordance with the standard, share-based payments should be measured 
at fair value. This is primarily determined as the fair value of the goods and 
services received (Para. 10). The standard notes that it is typically not 
possible to estimate reliably the fair value of services received from 
employees, so share-based payments are to be measured as the fair value 
of the equity instruments granted as part of the remuneration package (Para. 
11). For equity instruments that vest immediately, disclosure and recognition 
is required at grant date. If the equity instruments do not vest until the 
employee or executive has completed a specified period of service, or some 
other performance condition, the estimated fair value of the instrument 
(estimated at grant date) should be recognised over the vesting period, or the 
expected vesting period if subject to a performance condition (Para. 15).  
 
In determining the value of equity instruments granted, the entity is to take 
into account market prices and the terms and conditions upon which the 
equity instrument is granted (Para. 16). Appendix B to the standard 
documents the measurement process. It forms an integral part of the 
standard. Exemplars to assist in measurement and disclosure are provided in 
an Implementation Guidance document which accompanies, but does not 
form part of, AASB2.  
 
For shares granted to employees and executives, the fair value of the shares 
are to be measured at the market price of the entity’s shares, adjusted to 
take into account the terms and conditions upon which the shares are 
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 granted (but not the conditions upon which they are expected to vest) (Para. 
B2). The fair value of share options is estimated by applying an option pricing 
model. The model to be used is not specified in AASB 2, however, the 
standard does note the Black-Scholes formula is likely to be appropriate for 
many entities, and outlines the information that all option models require at a 
minimum: 
(a) “The exercise price of the option; 
(b) The life of the option; 
(c) The current price of the underlying shares; 
(d) The expected volatility of the share price; 
(e) The dividends expected on the shares; and 
(f) The risk-free interest rate for the life of the option” (Para. B6). 
 
The standard also documents other expected inputs to the option valuation 
formula to be: expectations about future volatility, dividends, and exercise 
behaviour. Anticipated early exercise of options should also be considered. If 
early exercise is expected, a binomial formula which uses contractual life as 
an input to the model is suggested as an alternative to the Black-Scholes 
formula (Para. B17). 
 
It is important to note that all prior research, both within Australia and 
internationally, has been undertaken under regulatory regimes where share 
options are not required to be included in remuneration expenses in the 
income statement, and consequently have no impact on the profit calculation. 
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 With the advent of AASB2, which applies to the reporting period examined in 
the current study, Australian reporting entities are now required to expense 
stock options over the expected vesting period (Para. 15). It is likely that this 
new requirement will influence the selection of remuneration components 
used by Australian reporting entities to reward managers.  
 
In addition, measures of option values calculated by companies are likely to 
be more accurate than values calculated by academic researchers in prior 
research, given they rely on actual firm-specific parameters, rather than 
broad proxies generated by academics for the purposes of research 
(McKnight and Tomkins, 1999). 
 
As a result of international convergence, similar requirements are being 
introduced progressively, internationally. The Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) in the US issued a revised statement: FAS123 Share-Based 
Payment in December 2004 to replace the original Stock-Based 
Compensation. It is effective from the first reporting period beginning after 15 
June 2005. Similarly, the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) in the UK 
issued FRS20 Share-Based Payment in April 2004. Both standards are 
consistent with the IFRS2 requirement to recognise the fair value of share-
based payments in the income statement. Results of the current study, 
therefore, will also be useful to evaluate the potential impact of regulatory 
changes in remuneration policy beyond Australia. 
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 In summary, since prior work examined Australian executive compensation 
practices, there have been significant changes to the accounting standard-
setting regime. Tighter regulations now govern the disclosure of components 
of remuneration, performance hurdles, and share-based payment disclosure, 
measurement and recognition. As such, it is opportune to re-assess 
contemporary Australian remuneration practices to determine how 
remuneration components and determinants of compensation packages 
compare with those documented in prior research. 
 
2.3 Australian Stock Exchange Requirements 
The Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), operating independently of the 
Federal Government, ASIC and AASB, also provides guidelines for improved 
corporate governance disclosure. In August 2002 the ASX convened a 
Corporate Governance Council as a central reference point to assist 
companies to understand stakeholder expectations and to promote and 
restore investor confidence in the wake of media coverage of corporate 
excesses, the forthcoming CLERP 9 legislative provisions, and the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003). 
The purpose of the Council is to develop recommendations on corporate 
governance that reflect international best practice (ASX Corporate 
Governance Council, 2003), thereby enhancing the credibility and 
transparency of Australian capital markets. The Council comprises 
representatives of industry, legal and accounting bodies, including the Group 
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 of 100, Business Council of Australia, CPA Australia, Law Council of 
Australia, Securities Institute of Australia, and Australian Shareholders’ 
Association.  
 
The Corporate Governance Council issued Principles of Good Corporate 
Governance and Best Practice Recommendations in March 2003. The 
release of the guidelines coincided with regulatory overhauls in capital 
markets around the world, and the guidelines reflect these changes to ensure 
Australia is congruent with global requirements for accountability and 
transparency (Hamilton, 2004).  
 
The guidelines use a principles-based approach, traditionally associated with 
the UK rather than the rules-based ‘black-letter’ approach reflective of US 
practice (Hamilton, 2004). As such, the recommendations are not 
prescriptions, and they do not impose a ‘one size fits all’ approach to 
corporate governance. Instead, the body has adopted an ‘if not why not’ 
approach by requiring companies to provide a statement in their annual 
report disclosing the extent to which they have followed the best practice 
recommendations. Where companies have not followed all the 
recommendations they must identify the principles which have not been 
followed and provide reasons thereto (ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3). The 
reporting requirements apply to listed companies’ first financial year 
commencing after 1 January 2003 (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 
2003). 
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The guidelines are built around 10 principles, derived from the OECD’s core 
principles of good corporate governance (Hamilton, 2004). Each principle is 
accompanied by several best practice recommendations in addition to 
specific guidance on disclosure. Broadly, the principles encompass the roles 
of the board and management, integrity and ethical decision-making, 
company reporting and disclosure, shareholder rights, internal control and 
risk management, remuneration policy, and stakeholder interests (ASX 
Corporate Governance Council, 2003; Hamilton, 2004).  
 
Whilst a number relate indirectly to executive remuneration disclosures, 
Principle 9: Remunerate fairly and responsibly is particularly relevant to the 
focus of the current study. The stated objective of Principle 9 is “to ensure 
that the level and composition of remuneration is sufficient and reasonable 
and that its relationship to corporate and individual performance is defined” 
(ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003, p.51). This implies that 
companies are to adopt remuneration policies that attract and retain talented 
directors and employees in order to encourage enhanced performance of the 
company (Hamilton, 2004). The ASX guidelines acknowledge the importance 
of a clear relationship between remuneration and firm performance, and the 
importance of investors understanding the policy underlying executive 
remuneration payments (Hamilton, 2004). To demonstrate fair and 
responsible remuneration practices in accordance with Principle 9, boards 
are encouraged to define and disclose the company’s remuneration policies 
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 in a way that enables investors to understand the costs and benefits of those 
policies and the link between remuneration paid to directors and executives, 
and corporate performance. The board is also encouraged to establish a 
remuneration committee. To enhance investor understanding of 
remuneration, the structure of non-executive directors’ remuneration should 
be distinguished from that of executives, and the payment of equity-based 
executive remuneration is to be made in accordance with policies approved 
by shareholders (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003, pp.51-57). 
 
A survey of directors of ASX 100 companies undertaken by Ernst and Young 
suggests general support for the changes outlined in the ASX Corporate 
Governance Council principles (Matruglio, 2004). The directors interviewed 
indicated that new corporate governance regulation was needed. They 
embraced the spirit of the principles, feeling that they made good business 
sense. It was believed however, that they could lead to a focus on “merely 
ticking the boxes as opposed to fostering real, long-lasting change” 
(Matruglio, 2004, p.42). In a similar vein, both Kitney (2003) and Evans 
(2003) report that many business leaders are concerned about the new 
burden of additional corporate governance compliance requirements in the 
ASX guidelines, claiming they “unfairly put new burdens on directors at the 
expense of creating wealth for shareholders” (Kitney, 2003, p.1).  
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 2.4 Conclusion 
The disclosure of information concerning executive remuneration by 
Australian companies is influenced by a number of regulations. Since prior 
research examining Australian executive compensation practices was 
conducted, CLERP 9 has increased disclosure requirements relating to 
performance hurdles, demonstrating the link between firm performance and 
remuneration, and requires disclosure for an expanded group of executives. 
In addition, disclosure is required within a separately identified Remuneration 
Report, and shareholders have an increased input to the remuneration 
process by way of a non-binding vote on the Remuneration Report. 
Accounting standards have also increased disclosure requirements in the 
financial reports, and provided comprehensive guidance on share and option 
valuations. One major impact of international convergence is the requirement 
to expense share option payments.  
 
As a result of these recent, increased disclosure and recognition 
requirements, it is opportune to re-examine the components of Australian 
executive remuneration packages, and determinants of remuneration. It is 
likely that the mix of remuneration components used by Australian 
companies have changed as a result of regulatory amendments.  As such, 
the current study compares contemporary remuneration practices to results 
of prior work to assess the impact of the changing regulatory framework.  
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 Prior research, documenting the mix of compensation components, both 
within Australia and internationally, is reviewed in Chapter 3. It is also likely 
that economic and governance factors which relate to compensation design 
have now changed, to reflect changes in legislation. Factors identified in prior 
research to relate to executive remuneration level and structure are 
examined in Chapter 3, before hypotheses relating to expected indicators of 
remuneration design in the current Australian setting are presented in 
Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 3 
 
RESEARCH ON EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION 
 
 
This chapter reviews the body of evidence pertaining to both the structure 
and determinants of executive remuneration. It commences by outlining 
studies that detail the level and structure of executive compensation 
packages. Elements of remuneration found in prior Australian research are 
compared to those commonly used in US and UK firms. The limited body of 
research, restricted to the US environment, which has extended the analysis 
beyond CEOs to document remuneration of other members of the senior 
executive team, is then summarised.  
 
Research that evaluates determinants of executive pay is outlined in Section 
3.2. Firm performance, ownership structure, and board and executive 
characteristics, amongst other factors identified in prior research to relate to 
executive remuneration, are examined.  
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 The limited research which has documented how determinants of CEO 
compensation compare to those of other senior executives is discussed in 
Section 3.3. The final section concludes the chapter by reiterating the major 
findings of prior research, and its limitations, and how the current study 
contributes to the literature. 
 
3.1 Structure of Executive Compensation 
3.1.1 Structure of US CEO Compensation 
Jensen and Murphy (1990a) carried out an extensive study where they 
examined base salary and bonuses of 2,505 CEOs in 1,400 public 
companies from 1974 to 1988. They also gathered stock ownership and 
stock option data for CEOs in the largest 430 publicly held companies in 
1988. To aid in comparisons over time, the authors examined compensation 
data for executives in more than 700 US public companies for the period 
1934 through 1938. Jensen and Murphy (1990a) concluded that contrary to 
perceived opinion outlined in the press, CEOs were not receiving record 
salaries and bonuses. Although they increased over the latter 15 years of the 
study, salaries and bonuses were in fact just catching up to where they were 
50 years previously4 (Jensen and Murphy, 1990a, pp.138-139). When 
Jensen and Murphy (1990a) compared inflation-adjusted pay changes of 
CEOs to those of a randomly selected sample of 20,000 salaried employees, 
they found CEO compensation to be no more variable.  
                                                 
4 The authors noted that during the period 1934 to 1938, the average salary and bonus for CEOs of 
leading companies on the New York Stock Exchange was $882,000 (in 1988 dollars). For the period 
1982 to 1988, the average salary and bonus for CEOs of comparable companies was $843,000. 
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Murphy (1999) conducted one of the most comprehensive reviews of US 
compensation contracts to date. In doing so, he used data for CEOs from a 
variety of sources including: Forbes annual Compensation Surveys 1970-
1996, Compustat’s database covering CEOs in the Standard and Poor’s 
(S&P) 500, the S&P Mid-Cap 400 and the S&P Small-Cap 600 from 1992 to 
1996, in addition to a detailed survey of 1,000 large companies in 1992 and a 
Towers Perrin survey of bonus plans in 177 large companies conducted in 
1996 (Murphy, 1999, p.2488-2489).  
 
Although observing substantial heterogeneity in pay practices across firms 
and industries, the author confirmed most executive pay packages in the US 
contain four basic components: a base salary, an annual bonus tied to 
accounting performance, stock options, and long-term incentive pay. Base 
salaries of US firms are generally determined through competitive 
‘benchmarking’, based primarily on industry salary surveys. Using the Towers 
Perrin survey data for 1997, Murphy (1999) noted the pervasive use of bonus 
plans across the firms surveyed. Bonuses are paid to top executives 
annually, based on a single year’s performance. 
 
Murphy (1999) also examined the 1992 option-grant practices of the 1,000 
largest companies filing proxy statements between January and September 
1993. Of the total 1,000 firms, CEOs of 627 received option grants in 1992. 
Of the 373 companies not granting options to the CEO in 1992, 120 made 
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 option grants to other executives within the senior management team. 
Granting practice was relatively homogeneous across the sample, with most 
options having 10-year terms, with an exercise price equal to the fair market 
value at grant date. Only two firms included performance hurdles with their 
option grants. 
 
Murphy (1999) compared remuneration practices across four industry 
groups: mining and manufacturing; financial services; utilities; and other 
industries (including wholesale and retail, and service industries). The author 
observed that pay levels vary by industry, with CEOs in electric utilities 
earning significantly lower levels of compensation than those in other 
industries, while CEOs in the finance industry earn significantly higher levels. 
Murphy also noted a substantial increase in the level of compensation over 
the period under study, with pay levels of CEOs in manufacturing and 
financial services increasing more than 50 percent (in 1996 constant dollars) 
from 1992 to 1996. He attributed the increase in pay, to a large extent, to the 
increase in stock option grants which replaced base salaries as the largest 
component of compensation for all industries except utilities.5  
 
Data for almost 1,700 public companies, examined by Conyon and Murphy 
(2000), confirmed the increasing reliance on incentive pay in US 
compensation packages. Their study indicated that, in 1997, salary on 
                                                 
5 Consistent with other US studies reported, Murphy (1999) used a Black-Scholes option 
pricing model to calculate the value of share options for sample CEOs.  
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 average constituted 29 percent of overall CEO pay (Conyon and Murphy, 
2000, pp.F646-F647). In contrast, 63 percent of total compensation was 
variable, with stock options being the most prevalent type at 42 percent 
(Conyon and Murphy, 2000, pp.F646-F647). Lee (2002) cites evidence 
indicating equity-linked incentive pay has increased to such an extent in the 
US, that many US companies had given away 10 percent, and in some cases 
up to 30 percent, of their equity to executive directors and other staff over the 
previous five years. 
 
3.1.2 Structure of UK CEO Compensation 
Limited research has examined components of UK CEO remuneration 
payments. One exception is a study by Conyon et al. (2000). The authors 
noted the increasing disclosure of information relating to UK executive 
compensation contracts following the publication of the Greenbury report in 
1995,6 and sought to document the characteristics of CEO compensation 
contracts of 200 large UK companies in 1997.  
 
Cash bonus payments to CEOs represent approximately 20 percent of the 
total cash compensation. Although long-term incentive plans and share 
options form a significant component of executive compensation in the UK 
companies sampled, cash pay constitutes, on average, 80 percent of total 
compensation. This is a significantly higher proportion than US companies 
                                                 
6 Greenbury, R., 1995 Director’s Remuneration: Report of a Study Group Chaired by Sir 
Richard Greenbury, Gee, London. Prior to the Greenbury report, only the combined cash 
emoluments of the non-named highest-paid directors were disclosed (Conyon et al., 2000). 
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 examined by Conyon and Murphy (2000). While 98 percent of sample firms 
operated an option scheme, only 67 percent of CEOs participated in the 
scheme at that time. Consistent with prior US studies, Conyon et al. (2000) 
used the Black-Scholes option pricing model to determine a value for options. 
 
Conyon et al. (2000) noted that, unlike US CEO option contracts, the stock 
options received by the majority of CEOs of UK firms are subject to 
performance hurdles, not merely elapsed time, prior to vesting.7 While 
Murphy (1999) noted that US option contracts typically have an exercise term 
of 10 years, executive options for UK CEOs generally vest three years after 
grant date (Conyon et al., 2000). 
 
3.1.3 Structure of Australian CEO Compensation 
Limited data availability has led to a paucity of research examining 
components of executive compensation packages in Australia until recent 
years. As noted in Chapter 2, information outlining specific components of 
Australian managerial compensation packages was not publicly available 
until 1998.  
 
Deegan (1997) undertook a survey to determine the components of 
Australian management compensation packages, and the extent to which 
variation in compensation can be explained by specificity of firm resources 
                                                 
7 Conyon et al. (2000) found 62 percent of sample companies’ option schemes attach 
performance criteria, compared to only two of the 1,000 US firms in Murphy’s (1999) sample. 
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 and the managers’ human capital investments. Of the 61 useable responses, 
Deegan (1997) found that all respondents, with the exception of one, 
received a portion of their pay on a fixed basis. Twenty-seven respondents 
received all of their compensation as a fixed salary (Deegan, 1997, p.21). 
The remaining managers surveyed received bonuses tied to some measure 
of firm performance. In addition, a smaller proportion of managers held equity 
interests in the firm, usually as part of an employee share scheme. Only one 
respondent held share options.  
 
Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon (2006) indicated the increased importance of 
incentive pay in a more recent study of Australian pay contracts. In a sample 
constructed from the top 200 Australian firms across the period 1999 to 2002, 
the authors observed a decrease in the importance of salary to approximately 
60 percent of total pay. Cash bonuses contributed approximately 15 percent, 
and options approximately 20 percent to average executive pay. In valuing 
options, the authors relied on the Black-Scholes option pricing model where 
no value was reported by sample companies. 
 
Coulton and Taylor (2002b) presented further, more detailed evidence 
concerning Australian compensation practices. Their study was limited to the 
2000 financial year, and examined compensation data of 258 of the total of 
511 firms listed on the Connect4 Annual Report database.8 All sample firms 
                                                 
8 The study excluded managed funds, no-liability mining companies and listed trusts, which 
are subject to different reporting requirements. Firms reporting in a foreign currency; firms 
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 provided a base salary in 2000, with 51 percent of CEOs receiving a cash 
bonus. Thirty-one percent of sample CEOs were awarded options in 2000. A 
total of 153 sample firms (59 percent) had CEOs holding options at year-end. 
However, 72 firms did not award options during the year, confirming that 
options were not necessarily awarded every year. Average total 
compensation across the sample is $1,061,433. Salary comprises 65 
percent, bonuses 10 percent and stock options 11 percent, on average, of 
total compensation (Coulton and Taylor, 2002b). A value, determined to be 
25 percent of exercise price, was calculated to proxy for stock option value.  
 
Matolcsy and Wright (2006a) recognised the limited nature of prior evidence 
of CEO compensation structure in Australia, despite attention by the Federal 
Government and the business community to this issue. In doing so, they 
presented a comprehensive description of both the levels and structure of 
Australian CEO compensation, for a sample of ‘top 500’ firms for the years 
1999, 2000 and 2001. The authors documented remuneration practices of a 
final sample which comprised 227 firms for 1999, 224 firms for 2000 and 245 
firms for 2001.9 Consistent with Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon (2006), and 
with prior US research, option grants were valued using the Black-Scholes 
formula, but with adjustment for dividends. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
with a change in CEO during the year; and those which did not comply with section 300A 
reporting requirements, and instead presented banded disclosures, were also excluded. 
9 Matolcsy and Wright (2006a) used similar procedures to those adopted by Coulton and 
Taylor (2002b) to determine a final sample. 
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 Matolcsy and Wright (2006a) divided the total sample into two groups, based 
on compensation contract types – firms that provide cash to the CEO, and 
have no equity-based compensation schemes in place, and firms that provide 
a combination of cash and equity-based compensation to the CEO.10 Of the 
total sample, 238 firms (34 percent) offer cash-only compensation, while 458 
(66 percent) belong to the ‘equity’ group. 163 of the 458 equity firms (36 
percent) receive grants within the year in question. Matolcsy and Wright 
(2006a) noted that firms are stable in their choice of compensation structure 
during the sample period, as no firm switched between the cash and equity 
groups.  
 
In contrast to evidence presented by Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon (2006) 
and Coulton and Taylor (2002b), a small proportion of firms did not pay a 
base salary to CEOs.11 The use of cash bonuses was less than that 
observed by Coulton and Taylor (2002b), with 34 percent overall (compared 
to 51 percent) receiving a bonus. Firms in the equity group are more likely 
than cash firms to pay CEOs a bonus. When industry membership was 
examined, the authors noted both compensation contract types exist across 
all industries. The highest level of equity contracts is found in the 
manufacturing industry (70 percent). Evidence suggested the level and 
                                                 
10 Equity-based compensation schemes must be approved by the annual general meeting of 
shareholders. ‘Cash’ firms had no such scheme approved. Firms in the ‘equity’ group did not 
necessarily grant options to CEOs during the sample period, it was sufficient that they had 
an equity-based compensation scheme in place to be included in the group (Matolcsy and 
Wright, 2006a). 
11 One firm in the cash group and three firms in the equity group paid no base salary to 
CEOs during the sample period.  
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 design of compensation contracts differs across the two compensation 
groups and industry. Matolcsy and Wright (2006a) also found the majority of 
Australian option contracts have a term of five years. Performance hurdles 
were present in 34 percent of cases. 
 
3.1.4 Comparing the Structure of Australian and Overseas CEO 
Compensation: Evidence to Date 
Australian compensation contracts are more likely to resemble those used in 
UK firms than US firms. Salary and bonus, as a proportion of total 
remuneration, is similar, as is the proportion of share-based compensation. 
 
The use of stock options as a form of CEO compensation is much higher in 
the US than in Australia and the UK. Lee (2002) notes this is likely to be due 
to the favourable financial accounting and tax implications of stock options in 
the US.12 In addition, US accounting standards at the time of prior research 
effectively barred the attachment of any performance conditions to the 
vesting of stock options (Lee, 2002, p.72). However, in the UK it is common 
practice that executive stock options are only exercisable on the achievement 
of a performance condition (Bender, 2003, p.211). Australian firm use of 
performance hurdles appears to be more consistent with UK than US 
practices, although still not to the same extent as the 62 percent of UK 
companies observed by Conyon et al. (2000). 
                                                 
12 In the US, at the time of prior research, any expenses related to stock options were not required to 
be recognised in the financial statements for either accounting or tax purposes (Lynch and Perry, 
2003). As noted in Chapter 2, this situation has now changed. 
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Studies indicate that stock-based compensation is increasing in importance 
as a component of compensation packages in Australia. Coulton and Taylor 
(2002b) and Matolcsy and Wright (2006a) observed a greater incidence of 
stock-based compensation than prior research by Deegan (1997). Lee (2002) 
proposes the reason for this to be ‘globalisation’, whereby firms in other 
countries feel compelled to move towards a US-style of compensation in 
order to remain attractive employers, and to compete on the global labour 
market. 
 
Australian research was conducted at a time prior to regulatory changes 
resulting from international convergence, and before CLERP 9 changes to 
corporations’ legislation affected executive remuneration. As a consequence, 
it is uncertain what impact the increased demand for disclosure of 
performance hurdles, the requirement to expense stock options, and the 
requirement for shareholders to vote on the remuneration report has had on 
compensation practices. The current study addresses this issue by 
examining the structure and level of executive compensation in Australian 
firms during the 2005 fiscal year, when all reporting entities were subject to 
the new, expanded regulatory requirements outlined in Chapter 2. Results 
are compared to earlier Australian research to determine if, and how 
remuneration practices have changed. 
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 Resulting from limited disclosure of option values by sample firms, prior 
academic research in the US, UK and Australia has used a variety of 
methods to value options. With the exception of Coulton and Taylor (2002b), 
the majority (e.g., Murphy, 1999; Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon, 2006; 
Matolcsy and Wright, 2006a) used the option pricing model developed by 
Black and Scholes (1973). However, there is reason to question whether it is 
the most appropriate option valuation model to be used in research 
investigating the relationship between executive compensation and 
performance (McKnight and Tomkins, 1999). It should be noted at this point 
that these criticisms only relate to the use of the Black-Scholes model in 
academic research, not its use by companies in their valuation of options for 
reporting purposes (McKnight and Tomkins, 1999). One practical problem 
when using the Black-Scholes model in academic research of this type is that 
several of its parameters must be estimated by the researchers, and 
research results will be sensitive to the assumptions made by academic 
researchers about the components of the valuation model (McKnight and 
Tomkins, 1999; Murphy, 1999). These parameters include: the expected 
dividend yield for the remaining life of the option, the risk-free rate, the future 
volatility of the option, and the assumption that executives are believed to 
hold their options until expiration (McKnight and Tomkins, 1999).  
 
Valuations provided in company reports, as a requirement of the recently 
released AASB2 are likely to provide a more accurate measure of option 
values than those calculated by academic researchers using the Black-
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 Scholes model. Company-generated values, although still calculated using 
the Black-Scholes, or some other option pricing technique, consider the 
likelihood of early exercise, the appropriate risk rate, and other firm-specific 
factors not available to academics. As such, the current study relies upon 
firm-generated valuations for options, now required to be presented in annual 
reports, rather than estimating a value using a model such as that developed 
by Black and Scholes (1973).  
 
3.1.5 Structure of Non-CEO Executive Compensation 
Examination of the compensation packages of non-CEO executives has 
received only scant attention in the literature to date (e.g., Ryan and Wiggins, 
2000; Ang, Lauterbach and Schreiber, 2002). Ryan and Wiggins (2000) 
undertook the first comprehensive examination of the variation in pay 
arrangements between CEOs and lower-level executives. The authors 
examined both the structure and level of compensation across the top five 
senior executives. In a sample of 160 US firms in 1988, Ryan and Wiggins 
(2000) observed significant differences between the level of CEO 
compensation and that of lower-ranking executives, but found only minor 
differences in the level of compensation components between successive 
lower levels. The structure of executive compensation, however, did not vary 
between executive levels. The use of incentive-based pay methods, such as 
cash bonuses or options, was just as prevalent in lower-level executive 
compensation as in CEO remuneration. 
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Analysis of compensation structure across the top five-ranking executives in 
166 US banking firms, between 1993 and 1996, also indicated a significant 
variation in compensation levels between CEOs and other ranking executives 
(Ang, Lauterbach and Schreiber, 2002). However, there was little difference 
in the overall level of compensation between the other top five-ranked 
executives. CEO remuneration packages consist of significantly greater 
levels of performance-contingent incentive-based payments, such as options 
and awards based on multi-year goal achievement, than do lower-level 
executives. When Ang, Lauterbach and Schreiber (2002) considered the size 
of the bank, compensation levels monotonically increased with bank size. 
The form of compensation also varied with bank size, with the weighting of 
base salary as a proportion of total pay increasing as bank size decreased. 
 
There is no evidence that documents the components or levels of 
compensation beyond the CEO in Australia. Top executives, typically acting 
as a team, are responsible for implementing organisational strategy, and 
compensation schemes are an integral component of this implementation 
(Carpenter and Wade, 2002). Consequently, the current study examines 
variation of executive pay across the senior executive team, and compares 
both the level and structure of pay across the top five executives of 
Australian firms, in addition to the CEO, in a bid to better understand 
Australian executive pay practices. 
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 3.2 Determinants of Executive Compensation 
A considerable proportion of studies that examine executive compensation 
and its determinants focus on the association between firm financial 
performance and executive pay. Again, this research tends to be limited to 
CEOs. This body of research which, for the most part, has been undertaken 
in the US and the UK, is reviewed in the next section. Studies that posit 
additional explanatory variables, related to firm, governance and ownership 
characteristics, are discussed in Section 3.2.2. Limitations of prior work, and 
how the current study addresses these limitations are then outlined. 
 
3.2.1 Firm Performance 
Chapter 2 documented changes in the regulatory regime in Australia which 
serve to ensure companies place greater importance on justifying the link 
between executive pay practices and firm performance. The requirement to 
document the proportion of executive pay which is subject to performance 
hurdles, and the ability of shareholders to vote on the contents of the 
Remuneration Report all act to heighten the importance of portraying a link 
between executive pay and firm performance. Academic research has 
mirrored public debate, where extensive research, predominantly conducted 
in the US, has examined the correlation between executive pay and firm 
performance. The most recent research has particularly focussed upon the 
extent to which incentive entitlements are linked to company performance, 
and ultimately shareholder value (O’Neill and Iob, 1999). 
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 3.2.1.1 Firm Performance: Overseas Evidence 
A number of US studies examined the pay-performance relation in specific 
industries. Attaway (2000) studied the association between company 
performance and CEO compensation within the computer and electronics 
industry. The author measured CEOs cash-based compensation (salary and 
cash bonus) and compared it to return on shareholders’ equity for a sample 
of 42 CEOs in 1995. The study indicated a positive relationship between firm 
performance and CEO compensation. The CEO’s age, length of tenure and 
extent of stock ownership were also found to be significantly related to CEO 
compensation. 
 
Rupp and Smith (2002) performed a similar study in the US metals industry, 
but assessed the pay-performance relation in a sample of small, similar-sized 
companies. The authors observed a significant and positive association 
between CEO salary plus cash bonus, and firm performance, with firm 
performance, alone, explaining 56 percent of the variation in compensation 
across the sample. 
 
Murphy (1985) was critical of studies that measure compensation solely on a 
cash basis. By omitting potentially performance-sensitive compensation 
components, such as share options or other long-term incentives, any 
examination of the relationship between pay and performance is likely to be 
biased (see also Conyon and Sadler, 2001; Conyon, Gregg and Machin, 
1995). Murphy (1985) carried out a longitudinal study, where he examined 
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 data relating to 461 executives from 72 of the largest US manufacturing 
companies between 1964 and 1981. The results confirmed that long-term 
compensation, in addition to cash compensation, is sensitive to firm 
performance, measured by the rate of return realised by shareholders.  
 
Following on from Murphy’s (1985) conclusion that long-term compensation 
components are more likely to be performance-sensitive, Jensen and Murphy 
(1990b) undertook an extensive study of the pay-performance association for 
2,505 US CEOs from 1,400 companies over the period 1975 to 1988. The 
authors determined pay-for-performance sensitivities using both the change 
in salary and bonuses, as well as total compensation, which included long-
term incentives and share options. Consistent with Murphy (1985), Jensen 
and Murphy (1990b) used a market measure of firm performance – rate of 
return on common stock. The authors found substantial variation across their 
sample. For the 250 largest companies, every $1,000 change in the market 
value of a company related to a change of only 6.7 cents in salary and bonus 
over two years. When all sources of compensation were considered, a 
$1,000 change in corporate value corresponded to a change in CEO 
compensation of $2.59. Although statistically significant, the authors 
concluded this result indicates pay is not sensitive enough to firm 
performance, that is, the change in pay-level is small for an occupation where 
incentive pay is expected to play an important role. 
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 Research examining the relationship between executive pay and firm 
performance in the UK provided similar results to those in the US. Early 
studies (e.g., Main and Johnston, 1993; Gregg, Machin and Szymanski, 
1993) utilising cash-based compensation as a measure of CEO pay 
observed a weak positive link. Gregg, Machin and Szymanski (1993) noted 
that what statistical link did exist during the 1980s disappeared in the early 
1990s. Conyon and Sadler (2001) attributed this to the changing nature of 
executive compensation packages, where they moved towards using more 
stock-based compensation. As a consequence, merely studying cash as a 
measure of compensation is likely to bias against finding a result.  
 
Main, Bruce and Buck (1996) undertook the first UK study incorporating 
share options in the measure of CEO pay. Although the sample size was 
relatively small (60 large UK firms over the period 1983 to 1989), a much 
stronger relationship between pay and share performance was observed. 
McKnight and Tomkins (1999) reported similar results across a more 
extensive sample (109 companies over the period 1991 to 1995). They used 
both accounting (accounting profits) and market (total shareholder return) 
values of firm performance. The authors separately estimated regression 
models to assess determinants of salary, annual bonus and share options, 
and in so doing, found regression estimates to be dissimilar for each 
remuneration component (McKnight and Tomkins, 1999, p.237). Executive 
salaries are more likely to be related to firm size than economic performance. 
The authors observed only a weak positive link between cash salaries and 
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 their market measure of firm performance. Changes in the value of share 
options, however, were observed to be strongly and significantly related to 
shareholder returns over both the short and long term. 
 
In summary, both US and UK studies present consistent evidence that 
executive compensation is related to firm financial performance (Murphy, 
1985; Jensen and Murphy, 1990b; Main, Bruce and Buck, 1996; McKnight 
and Tomkins, 1999). Remuneration exhibits a stronger association with 
market measures of firm performance than accounting measures of 
performance, and this is more evident when share-based compensation is 
included (Murphy, 1985, McKnight and Tomkins, 1999). McKnight and 
Tomkins (1999) confirm that the connection varies when remuneration 
components are separately examined. 
 
3.2.1.2 Firm Performance: Australian Evidence 
Research examining the relationship between executive compensation and 
firm performance in Australia is limited. Defina, Harris and Ramsay (1994) 
examined changes in CEO pay for 89 of the largest Australian companies in 
1990. Remuneration was measured as cash-based compensation only. The 
authors found no evidence of an association between corporate 
performance, measured as a return to shareholders, and CEO pay.  
 
Izan, Sidhu and Taylor (1998) conducted a longitudinal study whereby they 
examined the link between CEO pay and both accounting (return on equity) 
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 and market (return to shareholders) performance measures of 99 Australian 
firms from 1987 to 1992. The authors were unable to find a relationship 
between pay and either accounting or market performance. 
 
Matolcsy (2000) noted that annual performance targets, used to determine 
cash compensation, are likely to be influenced by the state of the economy in 
addition to firm-specific variables. He predicted that the weak link between 
compensation and corporate performance observed by, for example, Defina, 
Harris and Ramsay (1994) and Izan, Sidhu and Taylor (1996), is expected if 
the research was undertaken during periods of economic downturn. Contrary 
to the majority of prior US work, Matolcsy (2000) utilised accounting 
measures of performance in his analysis. He argued that in contrast to the 
US, cash bonuses represent a greater proportion of variable compensation in 
Australian contracts, and cash bonuses are based on accounting measures 
of performance, not market measures (Matolcsy, 2000). He found, consistent 
with his expectations, no relation between cash measures of compensation 
and firm performance during periods of economic downturn. However, a 
positive association is evident during periods of economic growth. 
 
In contrast to the majority of prior Australian research carried out using data 
from the 1990s, Merhebi et al. (2006), consistent with prior US research 
(Jensen and Murphy 1999b), documented CEO pay-performance sensitivity 
to be positive and statistically significant. The authors constructed a sample 
of 822 CEOS from 722 public companies over the years 1990 to 1999. Again, 
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 only cash was utilised as a measure of CEO compensation. Consistent with 
Defina, Harris and Ramsay (1994) and Izan, Sidhu and Taylor (1998), CEO 
pay levels were estimated by the mid-point of the reported remuneration 
band. Both accounting and market measures of firm performance (total 
shareholder return, return on assets, and return on equity) were estimated. 
Measures of firm size and firm risk were also included in the analysis. 
Merhebi et al. (2006) found the extent of cash compensation to CEOs can be 
attributed to both firm size and market-based performance.  
 
Coulton and Taylor (2002b) recognised limitations with the majority of prior 
Australian research that only examined determinants of cash compensation 
of CEOs. The authors also noted the public debate directed at the 
questionable link between executive pay and firm performance, and whether 
awarding share options represented an appropriate method of aligning 
manager and shareholder interests. Coulton and Taylor (2002b), in particular, 
focused on the extent to which stock-based compensation relates to firm 
performance (measured as return on assets and total shareholder return), 
amongst other determinants. The authors observed no significant difference 
in total shareholder return between firms which offered equity awards 
compared to those which did not. However, the percentage of total 
compensation attributed to stock-based awards and bonuses was found to 
positively relate to total shareholder return as a measure of firm performance. 
Larger firms were also observed to reward CEOs using greater proportions of 
stock-based compensation than did smaller firms. 
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The most recent Australian study to examine the link between firm 
performance and executive compensation examined whether compensation 
structure, rather than level, was related to firm performance (Matolcsy and 
Wright, 2006c). Australia offers a setting where a substantial proportion of 
CEOs are compensated by cash only (Matolcsy and Wright, 2006a), when 
compared to the US, where equity-based compensation is routinely offered to 
CEOs (Murphy, 1999). The majority of prior research adopted the premise 
that equity-based compensation is an efficient method of maximising firm 
performance, and consequently shareholder value (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; Holmstrom, 1979; Smith and Watts, 1982). However, other studies 
have argued that risk-averse, undiversified managers, with a significant 
portion of wealth tied to share price, will value the equity proportion of 
remuneration less than market price (Beatty and Zajac, 1995; Meulbroek, 
2001).  
 
Matolcsy and Wright (2006c) proposed that it may not be efficient for all types 
of firms to award equity-based compensation to CEOs. They asserted that if 
compensation structures are set efficiently, based on the underlying 
economic characteristics of the firm (Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999; 
Bushman and Smith, 2001), then firm performance will be maximised. For 
some organisations this may entail the use of cash-only compensation. The 
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 authors used the same sample reported in Matolcsy and Wright (2006a),13 
and divided them into two groups based on contract type – firms which 
provide only cash compensation to the CEO, and those which have equity-
based compensation schemes in place. Both accounting and market-based 
measures of firm performance were calculated in order to compare firm 
performance across the two groups – return on assets, return on equity, and 
change in market value of equity adjusted for dividends. Results indicated 
little variation in firm performance between the two groups, with the exception 
of return on assets. The cash group had significantly higher return on assets 
compared to the equity group. Matolcsy and Wright (2006b) found return on 
assets to be positively related to the level of compensation in the cash group. 
These results, taken together, indicated that return on assets is likely to be 
used as a performance target when determining bonus-based remuneration 
for CEOs in the cash group, and the higher level of return on assets has 
translated into higher levels of remuneration.  
 
3.2.1.3 Summary of Findings: Firm Performance as a Determinant of 
Executive Compensation 
Results of prior research, both within Australia and overseas, indicate a 
positive association between pay and firm performance, however, this 
relationship is more evident when share-based compensation is examined. 
The majority of prior US research has measured firm performance using 
market measures (Murphy, 1985; Jensen and Murphy, 1999a), which is 
                                                 
13 Details of this study are reported in Section 3.1.3. 
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 thought to be particularly relevant in a setting where compensation payments 
contain a significant stock component (Matolcsy, 2000). Surprisingly, in the 
UK and Australia, where cash payments are more prevalent (Matolcsy, 2000; 
Conyon et al., 2000), research comparing accounting, in addition to market, 
measures of performance to compensation has elicited mixed results.  
 
Few studies have observed any relation to accounting performance. Matolcsy 
(2000) provided one exception, however, only in periods of economic growth. 
Matolcsy and Wright (2006c), as another example, found compensation of 
Australian CEOs who are paid only cash salary and bonus, to be related to 
return on assets. Overall, results appear to indicate that both cash and share-
based compensation is more likely to be related to market performance 
(McKnight and Tomkins, 1999; Coulton and Taylor, 2002b). When examining 
the pay-performance link, prior research found that determinants differ across 
the various components (McKnight and Tomkins, 1999). 
 
Since prior research has been carried out, as indicated in Chapter 2, the 
regime governing disclosure and recognition of remuneration has changed in 
Australia. As a result of changes resulting from CLERP 9, as indicated 
previously, companies are required to document the proportion of 
remuneration linked to performance targets. In addition, shareholders have 
more input to the remuneration-setting process by way of a non-binding vote 
on the Remuneration Report. In so doing, they can express their views as to 
the appropriateness of remuneration methods used, and how clearly they 
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 relate pay to performance. These changes are likely to ensure a closer 
alignment between executive pay and both accounting and market measures 
of firm performance. The current study examines performance as a 
determinant of executive pay in the context of this new regulatory regime, to 
assess whether a stronger relationship between pay and firm performance 
now exists in Australian firms. 
 
3.2.2 Firm Characteristics and Governance Mechanisms 
As a result of the failure of much of prior research to observe a strong 
relationship between executive pay and firm performance (Conyon and Peck, 
1998), a number of studies have assessed the additional explanatory power 
of a range of firm characteristics, governance mechanisms including board 
structure, and ownership structure, in clarifying CEO pay. The prior literature 
can be divided into two main streams – those which examine determinants of 
the level of CEO pay, and those which assess factors explaining pay 
structure. Both streams of research are reviewed. 
 
The economic characteristics of firms have been posited as important 
determinants of CEO pay. The size of firms, the complexity of their 
operations, and growth opportunities are considered to influence demand for 
higher quality executives, and therefore the level of compensation (Rosen, 
1992; Smith and Watts, 1992; Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999). 
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 The board of directors is the primary internal corporate governance 
mechanism responsible for setting management compensation, and 
monitoring senior executives (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Jensen, 
1993). The board also represents shareholders in an attempt to ensure 
managers make decisions that are in shareholders’ interests, and that 
increase firm value, and consequently shareholder wealth (Jensen, and 
Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1993). Prior research has sought to gauge the 
monitoring capacity of the board and its ability to ensure alignment between 
manager and shareholder interests, and reduce information asymmetry. 
 
Ownership attributes have also been investigated by a number of prior 
studies. Share ownership by CEOs is expected to influence the extent to 
which managers and shareholders interests are aligned, and the capacity of 
the board to monitor the actions of senior management (Core, Holthausen 
and Larcker, 1999; Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon, 1996). 
 
3.2.2.1 Firm Characteristics and Governance Mechanisms: Overseas 
Evidence 
Agarwal (1981) developed a conceptual model comprising both individual 
and organisational variables in an attempt to explain, more fully, variation in 
CEO remuneration (defined to include only salary and bonuses). The study 
only assessed determinants of cash compensation. However, it was arguably 
completed prior to the emergence of incentive compensation as a major 
component of executive pay. Agarwal (1981) stated that prior to his work, 
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 studies of executive compensation included only two predictors – profitability 
and company size, with limited success. Although prior research found a 
statistical relationship between company size and executive pay, the author 
noted that it is not entirely clear what this relationship means. That is, it is 
uncertain what aspect of company size is related for the level of executive 
pay.  
 
He sought to clarify prior results by examining two factors which he argued 
relate to firm size: job complexity, and employer’s ability to pay. Job 
complexity was measured as: the span of control (number of persons directly 
supervised), number of functional divisions, number of management 
divisions, and the geographical diversity of the operations. The employer’s 
ability to pay encompassed financial measures of profit and return on assets.  
 
The model was tested on data from 168 CEOs of US life insurance 
companies, with the data being collected using a mailed questionnaire. The 
respondents covered a wide range of firm sizes, which provided a setting 
likely to maximise variation in the extent of job complexity and employer’s 
ability to pay. Collectively, the independent variables accounted for almost 80 
percent of the variance in CEO compensation. Three of the four job 
complexity measures were positive and significant (the number of persons 
supervised, number of management divisions and geographic diversity), 
confirming that as executive jobs became more complex CEOs received 
higher levels of compensation. The measure of financial performance was 
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 also positively related to the level of CEO pay. The author confirmed that 
company size is closely related to job complexity and the employer’s ability to 
pay. Both these variables succeed in capturing the variance in executive 
compensation accounted for in prior studies as relating to company size. 
 
Sanders and Carpenter (1998) also considered organisational complexity, 
when they evaluated the success of the board’s monitoring ability in the 
context of increased complexity resulting from a firm’s degree of 
internationalisation. The authors argued there is a need for more complex 
managerial decision-making processes resulting from heterogeneous 
cultural, institutional and competitive environments, and the need to 
coordinate and integrate geographically dispersed resources. Consequently, 
firms operating internationally are more likely to require more stringent 
governance structures to deal with such complexity. Internationalisation, and 
reliance on foreign markets for customers and factors of production, means 
senior executives are required to process greater amounts of diverse and 
conflicting information (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Sanders and 
Carpenter, 1998). The ability to successfully operate at this level requires 
greater expertise, and is consequently likely to result in higher levels of 
compensation.  
 
Internationalisation increases executives’ specialist knowledge and 
information asymmetry between senior management and the board. The 
ability of the board to effectively monitor executives in an international 
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 context is therefore made more difficult (Sanders and Carpenter, 1998). 
Sanders and Carpenter (1998) sought to more fully understand the 
consequences of organisational complexity from internationalisation on 
governance mechanisms, including executive compensation and board 
structure.  
 
Assessing a sample of 258 large US firms, the authors observed that 
organisational complexity resulting from internationalisation did have an 
impact on governance and remuneration. As predicted, firms sought to align 
the interests of executives and shareholders and manage the information 
asymmetry issues arising from internationalisation, through higher, longer-
term CEO pay, larger top management teams and boards, and the 
separation of the roles of chair of the board and CEO positions. Contrary to 
expectations, however, the proportion of outside directors was positively 
associated with a firm’s degree of internationalisation. The authors attributed 
this to the need for increased governance measures in response to increased 
complexity. 
 
Conyon and Peck (1998) also examined board monitoring and governance 
structures in a bid to more fully explain CEO compensation levels. The 
authors examined the role of board control, board structure and remuneration 
committees, in determining executive pay of a sample of UK companies. 
Despite the important role company boards play in setting compensation, 
Conyon and Peck (1998) noted that there was little UK research, at that time, 
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 which examined this issue. The study was carried out at a time where there 
were substantial changes to executive pay and other governance 
mechanisms as a result of the Greenbury Committee report (Greenbury, 
1995).  
 
Conyon and Peck (1998) cited evidence that questions the ability of outside 
directors to effectively monitor CEOs and the top management team (e.g., 
Zajac and Westphal, 1994; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). Outside 
directors have a low financial stake and low equity holdings in the firm, 
resulting in reduced monitoring capability (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). 
In addition, the independence of outside directors who have recently been 
appointed by the firm’s CEO, or who are former members of the company’s 
management team, may be challenged. These situations are likely to lead to 
poor monitoring ability of the board, which is likely to result in increased 
executive compensation.  
 
The Greenbury Report (Greenbury, 1995) urged the adoption of 
remuneration committees, consisting solely of non-executive directors. 
Consequently, Conyon and Peck (1998) expected the existence of 
independent compensation committees to more clearly link executive 
remuneration to shareholders’ expectations for maximum return. In addition, 
the authors examined the extent to which remuneration levels are affected by 
CEO duality. CEOs, who also undertake the role of chair of the board, are 
likely to have more power or influence over the board it its deliberations over 
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 executive compensation (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Conyon and Peck, 
1998). 
 
Contrary to expectations, however, the authors observed board control had a 
limited effect on top management compensation. Neither the proportion of 
outside directors nor CEO duality was related to management compensation. 
Again, contrary to expectations, companies adopting remuneration 
committees, or with high proportions of outsiders on those committees, 
generally had higher levels of top management pay (Conyon and Peck, 1998, 
p.154). This result was attributed to the possibility of ‘collusion’ between 
executive and non-executive directors who sit on each others compensation 
committees and bid-up executive earnings (Ezzamel and Watson, 1997).  
 
Anderson and Bizjak (2003) also assessed the role of the compensation 
committee in determining executive pay, but in a US setting. Following 1992 
Securities and Exchanges Commission (SEC) regulations addressing the 
membership and role of compensation committees, the authors sought to 
ascertain a rationale for the government regulation. Tax legislation also 
changed at that time to require that compensation committees be composed 
solely of two or more outside directors, or performance-based executive pay 
in excess of $1 million was not deemed to be a deductible expense for tax 
purposes (Anderson and Bizjak, 2003). Examining a random sample of 110 
NYSE firms from 1985 to 1998, the authors found evidence that prior to the 
regulation taking effect, independent directors held 59 percent of 
 72
 compensation committee seats. By the end of the sample period (1998), 
inside directors were essentially absent from compensation committee 
membership, and independent directors held the majority of seats (on 
average 75 percent). 
 
While the regulations increased compensation committee independence, 
Anderson and Bizjak (2003) observed little evidence that the presence of 
outsiders on the compensation committee was advantageous. Firms with 
compensation committees comprising a greater proportion of outside 
directors used no more performance-based pay than those with less outside-
director representation. The authors also found no evidence that CEOs sitting 
on their own compensation committees receive higher levels of pay than 
CEOs who are not members of their compensation committee. In light of their 
findings, Anderson and Bizjak expressed reservations about the need to 
regulate the structure of the board’s compensation committee. They noted 
that the regulation could have unintended adverse consequences such as 
preventing founder CEOs from sitting on the compensation committee and 
providing input on subordinates’ pay packages. 
 
Hill and Phan (1991) examined the extent to which CEO tenure reflected the 
CEO’s influence over boards, and the likelihood that CEO compensation 
packages reflect CEO preferences, rather than providing evidence of the 
board as an effective monitoring process. The authors argued that the longer 
the tenure of CEOs, the more entrenched they were likely to become, and 
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 consequently the more power to pursue their own interests they were likely to 
have. Hill and Phan (1991) provided evidence that tenure gives CEOs time to 
build influence within firms and to tie compensation more closely to their own 
preferences. As the length of tenure increased, the relationship between pay 
and stock returns became weaker. The authors concluded this to be 
evidence of CEOs circumventing monitoring and incentive-alignment 
mechanisms to strengthen their positions, relative to shareholders. 
 
A recent UK study clarified the association between CEO tenure and 
executive compensation. McKnight and Tomkins (2004) extended the work of 
Hill and Phan (1991) by splitting the pay construct into three components: 
salary, bonus and share options. The authors argued that through increased 
tenure, an executive can build a proven ‘track record’ and develop 
relationships with key individuals, both within and outside the organisation 
(McKnight and Tomkins, 2004, p.28). This allows executives to acquire the 
respect and confidence of board members. As a result, an executive in this 
position is also likely to influence the appointment of board members who are 
sympathetic to his or her views and ideas. The CEO in such a position is also 
likely to gain control over, or influence, the pay-setting process and in turn 
design remuneration schemes to meet his or her preferences (Hill and Phan, 
1991; McKnight and Tomkins, 2004). 
 
Consistent with Hill and Phan (1991), results indicated CEO tenure had no 
impact on salary plus bonus. However, when performance bonus was 
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 examined alone, a significant yet negative association emerged (McKnight 
and Tomkins, 2004, p.33). This result justified segregating the pay 
components to provide some insight into direct relationships, and indicates a 
CEOs preference for more stable salary as opposed to variable bonus.  
 
An interesting result to emerge from the study was evidence of a curvilinear 
relationship between CEO tenure and the proportion of salary and bonus to 
total pay. The dominant component of the remuneration scheme shifted at 
about year six of tenure. The cash component (salary and bonus) increased 
as a proportion of pay, while the more risky long-term incentive component 
decreased at year 6. As such, the authors concluded length of tenure in 
some way enhances the CEO’s ability to influence the board decision-making 
process with regards to compensation structure in UK firms. 
 
Additional human capital characteristics of the CEO were combined with firm 
performance to examine determinants of executive pay in a sample of 125 of 
the largest UK firms in 1996 (Laing and Weir, 1999). The CEO characteristics 
which were investigated comprised: the age of the executive, the possession 
of professional or educational qualifications, the number of additional public 
company directorships held, whether the CEO was previously employed as a 
director on the company’s board, and the length of tenure. Laing and Weir 
(1999) expected each of these constructs to be indicative of the extent of 
influence over the board and its decision making processes, and the quality 
of the CEO in terms of experience and expertise. A positive, weak link was 
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 observed between both company size and performance, and executive 
remuneration. Although there was some evidence that human capital 
constructs play a part in determining executive pay, their impact was found to 
be statistically weak. Consistent with Hill and Phan (1991) and McKnight and 
Tomkins (2004), evidence indicated that the number of years in the post of 
top executive, as well as the number of years spent on the board of directors 
is seen as confirmation that job-specific experience leads to higher 
remuneration. 
 
Buchholtz, Young and Powell (1998) attempted to explain the variation in the 
strength of the CEO pay-firm performance link from two competing 
perspectives – managerial power and board vigilance. In justifying their 
study, the authors pointed to the unsuccessful efforts of prior research to find 
a strong relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance 
(e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990b); and limited attempts to identify 
moderators of the CEO pay-performance link (e.g., Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 
1989). The authors proposed that if CEOs dominate the compensation-
setting process, the link between CEO pay and firm performance will be 
reduced when CEOs have greater power or influence. However, if board 
members are vigilant in their monitoring role, there will be a greater alignment 
between CEO pay and firm performance when CEOs are more experienced 
and better able to improve firm performance, or when committee members 
are more experienced and better skilled at developing CEO remuneration 
plans (Buchholtz, Young and Powell, 1998, p.7).  
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The authors used various characteristics of CEOs, board and compensation 
committee members as proxies for their constructs, arguing these 
characteristics have served in prior studies as effective indicators of 
managerial power, and as predictors of strategic change and board 
involvement in restructuring (see for example Finkelstein, 1992). The 
characteristics utilised in testing included: CEO age, CEO tenure, the 
proportion of compensation committee members with CEO experience, and 
whether CEOs also chair the board of directors. They developed alternative 
hypotheses from their two opposing arguments relating to the extent to which 
managerial power or influence, as opposed to board vigilance, impact on the 
link between the level of CEO pay and firm performance.  
 
From the perspective of managers exerting power or influence over the 
board, older CEOs, with longer tenure in the role, or who are also chair of the 
board are expected to have greater ability to influence the board decisions 
relating to executive pay levels, and their link to performance. They are 
expected to be in a position of greater authority or trust than CEOs who may 
be younger, newer to the role or who do not also carry out the role of board 
chair. Consequently, the authors expected the link between pay and 
performance to be decoupled. 
 
From the board vigilance perspective, in situations where the CEO is older, 
has been in the role for longer periods, or where the CEO also holds the 
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 board-chair post, a stronger link between pay and performance is expected. 
The authors argued that in these situations, as life experience increases 
through age, or as CEOs are expected to have more experience or 
responsibility, there is an expectation that they will be held more accountable 
for their actions, and the board is going to place tighter restrictions in 
assessing performance by more closely aligning pay levels with firm 
performance. 
 
Buchholtz, Young and Powell (1998) gathered data from 1993 proxy 
statements of 277 of the US Fortune 500 in 1992.14 Results provided strong 
support for the board vigilance perspective, with CEO duality being the only 
result that was not significant. The authors concluded that as the ability of 
CEOs to control firm performance increases (evidenced by increasing CEO 
age and tenure), so too does the extent to which compensation is tied to firm 
performance. The link between CEO pay and firm performance also 
increases with the compensation committee’s ability to effectively establish 
that link (proxied by greater CEO experience amongst committee members). 
CEOs were not observed to use their power or influence to decouple the pay-
performance link. 
 
The moderating influence of a firm’s corporate governance structures on the 
pay-performance link was also the subject of study by Core, Holthausen and 
                                                 
14 1993 proxy statements were the first following significant changes in US remuneration 
disclosure.  
 78
 Larcker (1999). The authors sought to determine whether board composition 
and ownership structure induced optimal CEO contracting and firm 
performance. They noted that critics of CEO compensation practices argue 
that the board is influenced by the CEO, and as such does not structure the 
CEO’s compensation package to maximise shareholder value. By including a 
set of board and ownership structure variables in the compensation 
regression, the study examined whether: (1) the CEO compensation model is 
mis-specified and the level of CEO compensation is not adequately linked to 
firm performance; or (2) certain board and ownership structures are reflective 
of CEO entrenchment. CEO entrenchment is likely to be evident where the 
CEO determines the agenda and information given to the board, and the 
board members are unwilling to take positions in opposition to the CEO, 
especially concerning compensation (Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999, 
p.373). This is likely to occur where there is little equity ownership by 
directors on the board, boards are too large, or where the CEO is also the 
chair of the board. 
 
The authors gathered data for 205 US publicly-traded firms over a three year 
period. Compensation data were obtained from a major compensation 
consulting firm (originally gathered using a mail survey) from 1982 to 1984, 
and included both cash and share option components. Eight measures of 
board composition were used to proxy for the effectiveness of board 
monitoring. These included: evidence of CEO duality, size of the board, the 
proportion of inside director,; outside directors appointed by the CEO, and 
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 outside directors over the age of 69. Variables addressing ownership 
structure included: the proportion of stock owned by the CEO, the proportion 
of shares owned by non-CEO insiders, the percentage of stock ownership of 
each outside director, and the existence of outside blockholders.  
 
Results indicated that board and ownership structures are associated with 
the level of CEO pay, after controlling for the economic determinants of 
compensation. CEO pay is a decreasing function of the proportion of the 
board composed of inside directors, and an increasing function of board size, 
the proportion of the board composed of outside directors appointed by the 
CEO, whether the CEO is also the board chair, the percentage of outside 
directors over 69, and the proportion of the board who are grey outside 
directors.15 In relation to ownership structure, CEO compensation decreases 
as the CEO’s ownership stake increases. CEO compensation is lower when 
there is a non-CEO internal board member or external blockholder who owns 
at least five percent of the shares. The authors concluded that where firms 
have weaker governance structures, the CEO is likely to become entrenched 
and have more power or control over board decision-making, thus leading to 
greater levels of pay. 
 
Rather than examining factors that determine the level of CEO pay, a number 
of authors have attempted to establish factors that relate to the structure of 
                                                 
15 ‘Grey outside directors’ are not employees but have other dealings with the companies on 
whose boards they sit. These dealings could include offering legal or accounting advice to 
the firm (Lee, 2002; Cahan, Chua and Nyamiori, 2005). 
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 CEO pay contracts. For the most part, this research has concentrated on 
determinants of incentive pay, and particularly stock options as a proportion 
of total compensation. Top managers are portrayed in the literature as being 
risk-averse (Mehran, 1995). This implies that managers will want their 
compensation structured so as to bear less personal risk, thus leading to a 
preference for fixed cash over equity-based compensation (Mehran, 1995). 
Tying executive compensation to firm performance by way of increased 
equity pay is argued to encourage managers to maximise firm value by 
making value-maximising, riskier decisions than they would otherwise make 
(Holmstrom, 1979; Grossman and Hart, 1983). The importance placed on 
equity-based pay in US firms has led to research examining determinants of 
equity pay. 
 
Smith and Watts (1992) and Gaver and Gaver (1993; 1995) suggested that 
firms with valuable growth opportunities are anticipated to employ incentive 
compensation rather than fixed salary, in order to better align manager and 
shareholder interests. Growth firms have a relatively high degree of 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders (Gaver and 
Gaver, 1995). This arises because managers have private information about 
the value of future projects (Bizjak, Brickley and Coles, 1993; Gaver and 
Gaver, 1995), and it is difficult to observe managerial effort in growth firms 
(Smith and Watts, 1992). As such, they are likely to use greater proportions 
of incentive-based, rather than fixed, pay to encourage managers to act in 
the interests of shareholders. Consistent with expectations, Lewellen, 
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 Loderer and Martin (1987), Smith and Watts (1992) and, Gaver and Gaver 
(1995) all found that growth firms pay higher levels of total compensation to 
their executives, with a larger proportion of that compensation being in the 
form of long-term incentive remuneration. Executives in non-growth firms 
received a larger proportion of their pay as a fixed salary. 
 
Mehran (1995) examined the importance of board and ownership structure in 
determining the structure of compensation packages of 153 randomly 
selected US manufacturing firms for the period 1979 to 1980. Although 
restricted by industry, the study was not limited to large firms. Given one of 
the most important directors’ tasks is to set the level and structure of 
executive compensation (Fama and Jensen, 1983), the author examined how 
the composition of the board affects the structure of executive pay 
arrangements. He proposed that outside directors are more independent of 
top management, and are thus more likely to represent the interests of 
shareholders. Mehran (1995) also argued that external blockholders are in a 
position to monitor the board’s actions with regards to executive pay.  
 
Mehran (1995) found that firms with more outside directors have a higher 
percentage of their executive compensation in equity-based form. The 
proportion of executives’ pay that was equity-based was inversely related to 
their percentage of equity holdings, indicating that the board considers 
executive’s total incentives and risk in designing pay packages. Firms in 
which a higher percentage of the shares were held by outside blockholders 
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 used less equity-based compensation, suggesting that monitoring by external 
blockholders substitutes for incentive pay in encouraging executives to 
maximise firm value. 
 
Yermack (1995), noting that prior literature generally treated stock options as 
a minor part of a broader investigation, studied determinants of only stock 
option awards to CEOs of large US corporations between 1984 and 1991. He 
examined a comprehensive set of explanatory variables, comprising both firm 
and individual executive characteristics. Consistent with Mehran (1995), 
Yermack (1995) expected the incentives provided by stock option awards to 
decrease when CEOs hold large fractions of their own firm’s equity. He also 
hypothesised that incentives provided by stock options were likely to be 
larger in firms with valuable growth opportunities, consistent with Smith and 
Watts (1992) and Gaver and Gaver (1995). The age of the CEO and 
closeness to retirement, membership of highly regulated industries such as 
utility, banking and insurance industries, closeness to breaching debt 
constraints, and constraints on liquidity which affect the ability to pay cash 
salaries were also all proposed as determinants of the use of stock options 
by US firms. 
 
The results offered some support for the view that stock options are used 
less intensively in regulated industries. When liquidity is scarce, firms are 
more likely to move compensation away from cash towards stock options. 
Contrary to Mehran (1995), Yermack (1995) found companies do not 
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 consider the equity owned by CEOs when providing incentives from stock 
awards. While not consistent with Mehran’s (1995) result, the author noted 
that his results align with those of prior work by Lewellen, Loderer and Martin 
(1987) and Kole (1993). Firms are no more likely to increase incentives by 
offering stock option awards to CEOs as they approach retirement. Yermack 
(1995), in reconciling his results with prior work, noted that his measure of 
stock options, as the sensitivity of CEO wealth to changes in firm value, 
differed from the binary nature of other studies, where a 1/0 variable was 
used to indicate the presence or absence of stock option plans (e.g., Smith 
and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993), or the mix of pay between equity-
based plans used by Mehran (1995). 
 
Core and Guay (1999) considered whether firms set optimal levels of CEO 
equity incentives, and use new grants of equity incentives to correct 
deviations from these optimal incentive levels. In doing so, the authors took 
into account the CEO’s portfolio of stock and option holdings in determining 
equity incentive payments. They examined US CEO option and equity 
portfolios from 1992 through 1996 to assess, initially, the determinants of 
equity incentives. Core and Guay (1999) found that the CEOs’ portfolios of 
equity incentives are positively related to firm size, growth opportunities and 
CEO tenure. Contrary to Yermack’s (1995) results, incentive-based 
compensation did not appear to be used when firms had a cash liquidity 
problem. 
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 In the second stage of the study, Core and Guay (1999) used the residual 
from their incentive levels model as a proxy for the deviation between the 
CEO’s existing level of incentives and the CEO’s optimal incentive level. 
Consistent with their hypothesis, the authors found that new equity incentives 
to CEOs are negatively relating to this residual, indicating equity grants are 
used to ensure optimal contracting by bringing CEO equity incentive levels to 
that optimally suggested by firm characteristics. Core and Guay (1999) 
justified their differing results from Yermack’s (1995) research in terms of 
their research method. Rather than just concentrating on new equity grants, 
they considered the CEO’s portfolio of equity holdings in addition to new 
grants of equity incentives. 
 
Meulbroek (2001) questioned whether it was appropriate to weight 
compensation plans too heavily towards incentive-alignment in some 
situations. She argued that to properly align managerial incentives with those 
of shareholders using equity-based compensation, managers need to be 
exposed to firm-specific risks. However, concentrating the manager’s risk too 
heavily in the firm prevents optimal portfolio diversification. Managers are 
also exposed to risk through tying their human capital to the firm. Meulbroek 
(2001) argued that undiversified managers will value stock or option-based 
compensation at less than its market value. The author found that managers 
at average NYSE firms, who have their entire wealth invested in the firm, 
value their options at only 70 percent of their market value. The scenario is 
even more pronounced in rapidly growing, entrepreneurially-based firms, 
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 such as internet-based firms, where undiversified managers place a value on 
their options at, on average, only 53 percent of their market value. The author 
reported results of an earlier study (Meulbroek, 2000), which documented the 
impact of differing levels of risk on managerial behaviour. Meulbroek (2000) 
found that managers of internet-based firms were more likely to sell their 
holdings than managers of traditional firms. Managers frequently exercised 
their options early, indicating a short-term approach, rather than the long-
term focus upon which the options are generally issued. 
 
3.2.2.2 Firm Characteristics and Governance Mechanisms: Australian 
Evidence 
Fleming and Stellios (2002) utilised Core, Holthausen and Larcker’s (1999) 
methodology to assess the relationship between firm financial performance, 
various measures of governance structure, and CEO pay in Australian 
companies. The authors examined the hypothesised determinants of CEO 
remuneration of a randomly selected sample of 86 top 500 Australian listed 
companies for 1999. Consistent with Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999), 
Fleming and Stellios (2002) used a two stage process to estimate, initially, 
‘excess remuneration’. The authors hypothesised that where corporate 
governance measures do not operate efficiently, CEOs are able to influence 
the remuneration process to extract remuneration in excess of that deemed 
optimal. Excess remuneration was calculated by using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression methodology to estimate the relationship between total 
CEO remuneration and variables that proxy for demand both for high quality 
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 labour and human capital: firm size, growth, accounting and share 
performance, company risk, CEO age, and CEO tenure. Variables to control 
for industry effects were also included. This model explained approximately 
50 percent of the variation of CEO pay. Industry, firm size and the riskiness 
of the firm were found to be significantly related to the dependent variable. 
CEOs of manufacturing firms receive, on average, higher remuneration than 
those in other sectors, while finance CEOs receive lower pay compared to 
their manufacturing colleagues. Measures of firm financial performance were 
not identified as determinants of executive remuneration. 
 
The relationship between excess remuneration and certain board and 
ownership characteristics was then assessed. The estimated coefficients of 
the second model regressed the residual from Model 1 against board and 
ownership variables: total number of directors on the board, the proportion of 
non-executive directors, the proportion of non-executive directors classified 
as busy, whether the remuneration committee is independent of the CEO, 
and the proportion of firm shares held by the CEO. This stage of the analysis 
suggested that managers were less able to extract excess remuneration 
when the board has a higher proportion of non-executive directors, and when 
CEO interests are aligned through share ownership (Fleming and Stellios, 
2002, p.139).The study was limited to an assessment of determinants of 
remuneration in total, and did not examine how labour-demand factors, or 
board and ownership characteristics related to each component of 
remuneration. 
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Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon (2006) used more contemporary data when 
they also followed Core, Holthausen and Larcker’s (1999) method to 
investigate factors related to CEO compensation in the Australian context. 
Consistent with Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) and Fleming and 
Stellios (2002), the authors sought to determine whether the level of 
remuneration in Australian firms is optimal, reflecting a firm’s demand for high 
quality CEOs (referred to as ‘labour demand’), or whether the CEO’s level of 
compensation is excessive, reflecting the CEOs ability to extract additional 
benefits in excess of optimal compensation (known as ‘rent extraction’).  
 
Where Fleming and Stellios (2002) examined a one year cross-section in 
1999 only, Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon (2006) assessed the determinants 
(economic, governance and ownership) of CEO compensation over the 
period 1999 to 2002. The authors also improved on the study by Fleming and 
Stellios (2002) by differentially determining the various components of CEO 
compensation: salary, bonus, and share options and shares. 
 
Results indicated economic attributes significantly influence CEO 
compensation. Firm size was the only significant economic determinant of 
CEO remuneration for all components of pay, suggesting larger firms 
demand a higher quality CEO and pay for this quality. Consistent with 
expectations and prior research (Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 
1995), firms’ growth opportunities are positively associated with options and 
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 share-based compensation components. This reflects greater use of 
incentive-based pay to mitigate the difficulties of monitoring managers’ use of 
private information related to investment decisions (Chalmers, Koh and 
Stapledon, 2006). Contrary to Fleming and Stellios (2002), a link between 
pay and accounting performance was observed for all compensation 
components, with the exception of shares, in the multi-period setting. This 
link was not observed in prior Australian studies (e.g., Defina, Harris and 
Ramsay, 1994; Izan, Sidhu and Taylor, 1998). Results corroborate McKnight 
and Tomkins’ (1999) advice to disaggregate pay components in order to 
assess their differential determinants.  
 
After controlling for economic attributes, governance and ownership 
characteristics were found to play a role in determining CEO compensation, 
again, with a differential influence on CEO pay components. While the 
determination of fixed salary and share-based compensation reflected a 
firm’s demand for a high quality CEO, the CEO’s ability to extract rent 
through bonuses and options was evident for smaller firms or firms with 
above average performance.  
 
Matolcsy and Wright (2006b) referred to evidence that recognises the 
difference between the Australian and US settings with regards to the 
prevalence of equity-based compensation (Matolcsy and Wright, 2006a). 
They sought to assess the relation between firm characteristics and levels of 
CEO compensation across two different types of Australian remuneration 
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 contracts: contracts consisting of cash compensation only, and contracts that 
contain both cash and equity-based pay.  
 
Matolcsy and Wright (2006b) expected that the level of CEO remuneration, 
and cross-sectional variation in compensation, is based on the underlying 
economic characteristics of the firm that determine the relative demand for 
quality in the CEO. These economic characteristics include: firm size, the 
extent of growth opportunities, complexity of operations, and firm 
performance. If there is no relationship between the level of CEO 
remuneration and underlying economic characteristics, Matolcsy and Wright 
(2006b) argued that compensation contracting might not be efficient on 
average, and could reflect rent extraction by management (Bebchuk, Fried 
and Walker, 2002; Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon, 2006). 
 
The authors utilised a sample drawn from Australian firms in the top 500 for 
the years 1999, 2000 and 2001. The final sample comprised 227 firms for 
1999, 224 firms for 2000 and 245 firms for 2001. The study only assessed 
determinants of total compensation for sample firms, rather than examining 
determinants of differential components of compensation, which exist for the 
equity group. The level of CEO compensation in the total sample is 
significantly positively related to firm size, complexity and current market 
performance. These results are consistent with prior research by Chalmers, 
Koh and Stapledon (2006). 
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 When investigating the association across type of remuneration contract, 
evidence suggested that with the exception of firm size, the significance of 
the other firm characteristics differs across compensation groups. For the 
equity group, only firm size and current market performance exhibit a 
significant association with compensation level. For the cash group, 
complexity and both current accounting and market measures of 
performance are positively related to the level of pay. Matolcsy and Wright 
(2006b) concluded that rather than being randomly decided, CEO 
compensation contracts in Australian firms are related to various underlying 
economic characteristics of the firm. This is evidenced by the fact that 
determinants of the level of remuneration differ between groups. 
 
3.2.2.3 Summary of Findings: Firm Characteristics and Governance 
Mechanisms 
A range of firm, governance and ownership characteristics have been found 
to relate to the level, and/or structure of CEO compensation in both the US 
and UK. Research has documented, overwhelmingly, that compensation 
level increases with the size and complexity of the firm (e.g., Agarwal, 1981; 
Sanders and Carpenter, 1998; McKnight and Tomkins, 1999; Laing and Weir, 
1999; Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999), recognising the increased skill 
and quality of labour required to lead a large, complex organisation. There is 
some evidence that human capital characteristics determine the level of 
compensation: as CEO tenure increases, the CEO’s ability to influence 
remuneration also increases, and the CEO holds greater levels of expertise. 
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 This results in higher pay levels (Hill and Phan, 1991), and greater reliance 
on cash-based, as opposed to incentive-based pay (McKnight and Tomkins, 
2004). 
 
Whilst some studies concluded that the board is vigilant in ensuring a link 
between CEO pay levels and firm performance (Buchholtz, Young and 
Powell, 1998; Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999), board monitoring ability 
was not consistently observed to influence executive pay levels (see for 
example Conyon and Peck, 1998). Remuneration structure was observed to 
relate to growth opportunities, with high growth option firms being more likely 
to rely on incentive-based pay (e.g., Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and 
Gaver, 1995). There is some evidence that the extent to which CEOs already 
hold shares in the firm is considered by boards when determining 
compensation structure (Mehran, 1995). However, again, this result has not 
been consistently found (see for example Yermack, 1995).  
 
Differences in results are likely to relate to variation in how compensation is 
measured (including or excluding incentive compensation), and whether 
incentive pay is calculated by the researcher from data available (e.g., 
Mehran, 1995; Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999) or identified as a 
dichotomous variable indicating the presence or absence of incentive pay 
(Yermack, 1995).  
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 Australian research has been relatively sparse, until now, with the only 
evidence of determinants reflecting pay practices over a limited period 
between 1999 and 2002 (Fleming and Stellios, 2002; Chalmers, Koh and 
Stapledon, 2006; Matolcsy and Wright, 2006b). As indicated previously, 
these studies were conducted prior to recent regulatory amendments 
impacting disclosure and recognition of executive compensation. 
 
Consistent with US and UK research, firm size, reflecting demand for a high 
quality CEO, was observed to relate to the level of CEO pay (Coulton and 
Taylor, 2002b; Fleming and Stellios, 2002; Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon, 
2006; Matolcsy and Wright, 2006b). Similarly, Matolcsy and Wright (2006b) 
found firm complexity also impacts on pay for CEOs receiving cash 
remuneration. In contrast to overseas research, there is limited evidence that 
firms with growth opportunities utilise equity-based incentive pay, with only 
Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon (2006) finding any relation. 
 
The effectiveness of board and governance mechanisms was observed to 
limit CEO pay in a number of Australian studies. Outside directors (Fleming 
and Stellios, 2002), and grey directors (Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon, 2006) 
have been found to relate to the level of CEO pay. Consistent with overseas 
findings, a negative association between CEO share ownership and the level 
of CEO compensation has also been established (Fleming and Stellios, 
2002; Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon, 2006). 
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 In some instances, Australian research results differ from overseas work. 
While US studies found that the existence of external blockholders serves to 
limit compensation (Mehran, 1995; Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999), 
Australian research by Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon (2006) found no such 
association. 
 
A number of factors hypothesised to relate to the level and/or structure of 
CEO pay in US and UK research have not yet been investigated in the 
Australian context. This is likely due to reduced information availability when 
prior research was conducted. The proportion of external directors appointed 
by the CEO (Conyon and Peck, 1998; Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999), 
and additional directorships held by executives (Laing and Weir, 1999) have 
been found to relate to the level of CEO pay overseas. The current study will 
assess whether these factors determine CEO pay in Australia. 
 
3.3 Determinants of Non-CEO Compensation 
Limited research has investigated the determinants of compensation for non-
CEO executives, in addition to CEOs. Ryan and Wiggins (2000) analysed the 
determinants of compensation structure of the top five executives from 160 
US corporations for the fiscal year ended 1988. The authors established that 
factors observed in prior studies to explain the use of equity incentives in 
CEO compensation (growth opportunities, firm size) also explained the use of 
equity incentives for non-CEO executives, but with a declining explanatory 
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 power. The explanatory power was not high (R-squared ranging from 12 
percent for CEOs down to 4 percent for executives at level five). Results 
suggested that internal monitoring of lower-level executives by the CEO does 
not fully replace the need for incentive alignment (Ryan and Wiggins, 2000). 
Further, it confirms that both incentive mechanisms and monitoring are 
important components of effective corporate governance. 
 
Conyon and Sadler (2001) also included non-CEO executives in their 
examination of the pay-performance link. They determined pay-for-
performance sensitivity of 532 executives across 100 large UK companies for 
1997. The authors found the median pay-for-performance sensitivity was not 
constant within firms, but increased as executives move up the organisational 
levels of the firm. Conyon and Sadler (2001) concluded this to be related to 
the limited opportunities for further advancement, the higher executives move 
up the organisational hierarchy. Consequently, greater financial incentives 
are required. Consistent with prior research, a positive relationship between 
firm performance and ownership of share-based compensation was 
observed. 
 
No Australian study has examined the relative determinants of CEO and non-
CEO compensation. Consequently, the current study seeks to address this 
limitation. 
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 3.4 Conclusion 
Australian compensation contracts are more likely to resemble those used in 
UK firms than US firms. The use of stock options as a form of CEO 
compensation is much higher in the US than in either the UK or Australia. 
Studies indicate, however, that stock-based compensation is increasing in 
importance as a component of remuneration packages in Australia (Coulton 
and Taylor, 2002b; Matolcsy and Wright, 2006a). Australian firm use of 
performance hurdles appears to be more consistent with UK than US 
practices, although still not to the same extent as that observed by Conyon et 
al. (2000) in UK contracts. 
 
Results of prior research, both within Australia and overseas, show a positive 
association between pay and firm performance, however, this relationship is 
more evident when share-based compensation is examined. Overall, results 
appear to indicate that both cash and share-based compensation is more 
likely related to market-based measures of performance than accounting 
measures (McKnight and Tomkins, 1999; Coulton and Taylor, 2002b).  
 
A range of firm, governance and ownership characteristics have been found 
to relate to the level and/or structure of CEO compensation within Australia 
and internationally. Results indicate that demand for a high quality CEO, 
resulting from the size and complexity of the firm’s operations, leads to higher 
levels of remuneration (Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999; Chalmers, Koh 
and Stapledon, 2006; Matolcsy and Wright, 2006b). In addition, the 
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 proportion of both outside directors and grey directors on the board has been 
found to relate to the board’s ability to effectively control the level of CEO 
remuneration (Fleming and Stellios, 2002; Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon, 
2006), however, this was not the case internationally (Conyon and Peck, 
1998). The length of CEO tenure also relates to the level of remuneration, 
and a more heavy reliance on cash, as opposed to share-based pay (Hill and 
Phan, 1991; McKnight and Tomkins, 2004). The proportion of shares owned 
by CEOs has also been considered when setting incentive-based pay 
(Mehran, 1995; Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon, 2006). 
 
Limited US research examining the structure and determinants of 
compensation across the senior management team confirms that while the 
structure of pay is consistent across the team, the level of CEO pay is 
significantly greater than lower level managers (Ryan and Wiggins, 2000). 
Determinants of CEO pay (firm size, growth opportunities, and financial 
performance) also relate to both the level and structure of non-CEO 
executives in the management team, although the model has progressively 
decreasing levels of explanatory power. 
 
Since prior research has been carried out, as indicated in Chapter 2, the 
regime governing disclosure and recognition of remuneration has changed in 
Australia. It is likely that the expanded requirements for disclosure of 
performance hurdles, and the ability of shareholders to vote on the 
Remuneration Report, will have lead to a closer alignment between firm 
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 financial performance and executive remuneration. The current study 
investigates how the current structure of compensation, the link between 
executive pay contracts and firm performance, and effectiveness of corporate 
governance structures differ from those observed by prior research. Results 
of this research will inform the public policy debate and provide some 
evidence of the success, or otherwise, of regulatory changes in more closely 
aligning executive remuneration with shareholder interests. 
 
A number of factors, including the proportion of external directors appointed 
to the board subsequent to the CEO taking office and additional directorships 
held by the CEO, have been found by overseas research to relate to the level 
of CEO remuneration. These factors have not, to date, been examined by 
Australian research. The current study addresses this limitation. The 
influence that CEOs, who are also founders, have upon the strategic 
decisions of the company is another factor likely to explain the level of 
executive compensation across the management team. Although the 
influence of a CEO in this position has been alluded to in prior research (e.g., 
Anderson and Bizjak, 2003), it has not been examined as a potential 
determinant. The current study seeks to address this shortcoming.  
 
The factors examined as potential determinants of remuneration, together 
with the theoretical framework used in developing testable hypotheses, are 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 
A review of the body of evidence relating to the structure and determinants of 
executive remuneration was presented in Chapter 3. Empirical investigation 
has, to date, engaged agency theory as the predominant perspective in the 
development of testable hypotheses. Recently, the theory of managerial 
power, which emerges from the sociology and political science literatures, 
has been proposed as a theory which can assist in more fully considering 
behavioural aspects of managerial actions, in order to present a more 
comprehensive model of the determinants of executive compensation 
(Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 2002). Both agency theory and the 
theory of managerial power inform the work undertaken in the current study.  
 
The chapter commences with a discussion of the underlying tenets of both 
theories. Both agency and managerial power theories are then reconciled in 
terms of how they present similar and differing propositions regarding the 
determinants of executive compensation. Factors expected to determine the 
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 level, and in some cases the structure, of executive remuneration are then 
examined, with testable hypotheses being presented. 
 
4.1 Theory Development 
4.1.1 Agency Theory 
Corporate governance research and an examination of the agency 
relationship in particular, can be traced back to Coase (1937) who 
characterised firms as a ‘nexus of contracts’ amongst suppliers and 
consumers of factors of production (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). It is assumed that contracting is costly16 (Ball, 1989) and 
firms exist to the extent that these contracting costs are minimised (Coase, 
1937). Contracts into which the firm enters can take the form of agency 
relationships whereby a person, or group of persons, as principal, employs 
the services of another, as agent, to perform some activity on their behalf 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Whittred and Zimmer, 1992).  
 
An agency problem becomes evident because it is assumed that both parties 
are rational, utility maximisers and the agent will not always act in the best 
interests of the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The problem of 
inducing an agent to behave as if he or she were maximising the principal’s 
welfare gives rise to what Jensen and Meckling (1976) referred to as agency 
costs. Jensen and Meckling (1976) define these agency costs as: 
                                                 
16 Costs of contracting include the cost of searching for a party interested in contracting, 
negotiating a contract, bonding one’s own performance and monitoring the other party’s 
performance (Ball, 1989, p.7). 
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 • Monitoring costs 
• Bonding cost 
• Residual loss 
 
Monitoring costs are incurred by the principal to measure, observe and 
control the agent’s behaviour. Bonding costs are expenditures incurred by 
the agent to guarantee they will act in the interests of the principal. The 
principal can also rely on price protection against agents taking actions 
divergent from the interests of the principal. Despite these controls, it is too 
costly to guarantee an agent will make decisions optimal to the principal at all 
times and in all circumstances. This additional divergence is referred to as 
the residual loss (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The principal is prepared to 
accept these agency costs up to the point where the benefit gained from the 
agency relationship still exceeds the costs incurred.  
 
Agency theory argues that in the modern corporate environment, where 
share ownership is highly diversified, shareholders appoint managers as 
agents to act on their behalf in operating the corporation in such a way that 
maximises shareholder value. In perhaps the first work addressing the 
separation of ownership and control of the modern corporation, Berle and 
Means (1932) argued that whilst shareholders had legal control of large US 
firms, it was management that exercised effective control. However, 
shareholders entrust the management of their funds to self-interested 
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 managers in the belief that these managers have superior skill or information 
in managing the firm and making investment decisions (Murphy, 1999). 
 
Differences in owner and manager incentives regarding firm policies and 
objectives reflect a number of specific problems including: information 
asymmetry, differences in time horizons, differences in the extent of risk 
aversion (Smith and Watts, 1982; Lewellen, Loderer and Martin, 1987), and 
dispersion of equity owners (Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 2002). The 
problem of information asymmetry refers to the differences in the amount and 
quality of information managers hold, when compared to owners, about firm 
performance and activities. As such, managers are able to act 
opportunistically and make decisions that are potentially to the detriment of 
shareholders. Because of their superior information and shareholders’ lack of 
full observation, managers may take actions that will maximise their rewards. 
However, their actions could harm firm performance and result in losses to 
the principals in the long-run (Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 2002). 
 
Managers and owners will have a different time horizon with respect to the 
firm. Shareholders, arguably, are interested in long-term performance and 
changes in shareholder wealth. Managers, on the other hand, are interested 
in firm performance only for the period they expect to stay with the firm, or for 
the period of their current contract. This is expected to become more of an 
issue as the manager ages. The horizon problem leads to managers 
attempting to maximise short-term firm values at the expense of long-term 
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 gains. Managers prefer less risk than owners, as owners have the ability to 
diversify their risk across a large portfolio of shares. Managers, however, 
have significant amounts of undiversified human capital invested in the 
corporation. Finally, the dispersion of equity-holders means that shareholders 
are not likely to join together to enforce the agency contract (Grabke-Rundell 
and Gomez-Mejia, 2002). 
 
While the level of output from managerial effort is observable by the owners 
and managers, the level of effort is observable only by the manager. 
Although the manager’s effort-level is not observable by the owners as 
principal, owners attempt to mitigate the differing incentives of managers and 
owners by designing a remuneration contract that provides the right incentive 
for the manager to exert optimal effort (Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet, 1985).  
 
Agency theorists (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976) argue that salary by itself 
does not promote the alignment of managers’ interests with those of owners. 
Consequently, managerial remuneration contracts commonly include a 
number of measures to attempt to align managers’ interests with owners. As 
noted in Chapter 3, bonuses that reward managers in line with various 
measures of firm financial performance or changes in share price are 
commonly included (Murphy, 1999). Granting of share ownership or share 
options is another way compensation contracts attempt to align manager and 
owner incentives. The use of different performance measures is likely to be 
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 determined by the underlying economic characteristics of the firm (Bushman 
and Smith, 2001).  
 
Linking a manager’s compensation too closely to firm performance may lead 
to risk-avoiding behaviour on the part of the manager (Beatty and Zajac, 
1994). Fama (1991) notes contingent or incentive-based compensation might 
seem to have desirable incentive and motivational properties, but it could 
also cause a manager to bear risk that could more efficiently be borne by 
diversified shareholders. The underlying assumption is that managers, unlike 
owners, have already invested most of their non-diversifiable and non-
tradable human capital in the firm and that the agent is relatively risk averse, 
while the principal remains risk neutral. This will lead to the likelihood that it is 
too costly and too difficult for the principal to have the agent bear this risk 
(Fama, 1991). Because the risk cannot be diversified, companies are likely to 
be under pressure to pay their executives disproportionately more in total 
compensation so they are compensated for bearing this non-diversifiable risk 
(Scholes, 1991; Beatty and Zajac, 1994). Meulbroek (2001) supports this 
view where she argues that undiversified managers value shares or options 
at less than their market price. She found that an undiversified manager in a 
NYSE firm values option-based compensation at approximately 70 percent of 
the cost to the firm, while an undiversified manager at a riskier, internet-
based firm values option-based compensation at approximately 53 percent of 
the cost of the options to the firm. 
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 The agency literature notes that while an efficient contract is the preferred 
solution to the agency problem that exists between owners and managers 
(Beatty and Zajac, 1994), in the absence of perfect alignment of incentives, 
monitoring by the board is argued to improve this alignment (Fama, 1980; 
Beatty and Zajac, 1994). The optimal level of monitoring will depend upon the 
magnitude of the gap in incentive alignment between principals and agents. 
The magnitude of this incentive problem has traditionally been defined, in 
part, by the level of a top management team’s equity interest in the firm 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). A higher level of monitoring is required when 
management do not accept an adequate level of compensation risk tied to 
firm performance, or when there is a minor equity position in the firm (Beatty 
and Zajac, 1994). Aspects of board structure argued to contribute to the 
success of monitoring include: the proportion of outside directors on the 
board (Fama, 1980), the presence of blockholders (Beatty and Zajac, 1994), 
and CEO duality (Beatty and Zajac, 1994). 
 
4.1.2 Managerial Power 
The theory of managerial power derives from the sociology and political 
science literature. Finkelstein (1992, p.506), consistent with Hickson et al. 
(1971) and Pfeffer (1981) defines power as “the capacity of individual actors 
to exert their will”. Although power may be exercised in a number of settings 
(Pfeffer, 1981; Finkelstein, 1992), power is argued to be a relative concept 
that can only be understood in a particular context (Finkelstein, 1992). The 
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 theory can be applied to the setting of managerial compensation contracts 
(Lambert, Larcker and Weiglet, 1993; Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 
2002). Lambert, Larcker and Weiglet (1993, p.441) assume that managers 
prefer higher levels of pay to lower levels of pay, and define power as “the 
ability of managers to influence or exert their will or desires on the 
remuneration decisions made by the board of directors or perhaps the 
management compensation committee of the board of directors”.  
 
The theory of managerial power has grown from French and Raven’s (1959) 
initial development of a typology of power. In their original work, French and 
Raven (1959) identified five power types: reward, coercive, legitimate, expert, 
and referent.17 Raven (1974) subsequently added information power to their 
list. Since then, many researchers have attempted to refine the number and 
definition of power types (see for example Mintzberg, 1983; Kalbers and 
Fogarty, 1993). Although complete agreement does not exist (Kalbers and 
Fogarty, 1993), there is effective consensus that power represents: control 
over resources (reward, coercive), control over information and its content 
(information), personal attributes (expert, referent), and formal mandates 
(legitimate) (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993). 
 
Although understanding of the power phenomenon has advanced, these 
frameworks were not specifically developed with top managers in mind 
(Finkelstein, 1992), reducing their usefulness in the current context. In 
                                                 
17 These power typologies are further explained in Table 4.1. 
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 addition, the earlier typologies of power were developed with limited concern 
for measurement (Finkelstein, 1992; Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993).   
 
As a result, Finkelstein (1992) assimilated the power literature and produced 
possibly the most useful exposition of power in the context of top managers 
to date (Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 2002), with the purpose of 
developing objective indicators of executive power that are able to be 
operationalised in multiple settings (Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 
2002). 
 
Recognising the multidimensional nature of power, Finkelstein (1992, p.508) 
outlined four dimensions that can accrue to those executives who can 
manage these uncertainties: structural power, ownership power, expert 
power, and prestige power. A manager’s structural position and share 
ownership are factors that are argued to enable an executive to deal with 
uncertainties stemming from the firm’s internal environment. Expertise and 
prestige are posited to reduce uncertainty as a consequence of the 
organisation’s external environment (Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 
2002). Internal sources of uncertainty stem from other top managers and 
boards of directors, and major external sources of uncertainty arise from the 
firm’s institutional environment: customers, suppliers, competitors, and 
government (Finkelstein, 1992; Conyon and Peck, 1998). 
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 Structural power is based upon formal organisational structure and 
hierarchical authority (Finkelstein, 1992). Position in the corporate hierarchy 
can result in the right to exert influence (Finkelstein, 1992) or control over 
information (Lambert, Larcker and Weiglet, 1993). CEOs are likely to have 
higher structural power over other members of dominant coalitions because 
of their formal position within the organisation (Finkelstein, 1992). CEOs, or 
other top managers, can accumulate power by using their position to 
influence the selection of the board of directors (Lambert, Larcker and 
Weiglet, 1993). 
 
Finkelstein (1992) views ownership power as the ability to influence board 
decisions through the managers’ ownership of firm shares. Tosi and Gomez-
Mejia (1989) support the view that top managers who hold greater equity 
positions in their firm will be more powerful than managers who have a 
smaller equity stake. As legal owners of the firm, shareholders are given the 
rights to vote and affect strategic decisions, an influence that increases with 
the proportion of shares owned (Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 2002). 
 
The ability to deal with environmental contingencies such as customers, 
suppliers, competitors and government is an important source of power 
(Hambrick, 1981; Finkelstein, 1992). Managers who have higher levels of 
expert power, derived from their expertise, are likely to earn higher levels of 
compensation, both due to the demands of their job, and the fact that the 
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 supply of managers with high levels of expertise may be relatively scarce in 
the managerial labour market (Agarwal, 1981). 
 
Finkelstein’s (1992) fourth and final dimension of managerial power is 
prestige power, or power derived from the status or reputation of the 
manager. Power is gained from external contacts, which may provide 
valuable information to the organisation (Finkelstein, 1992). Executives who 
are often referred to as having prestige are those who hold prominent 
positions within society. Prestige portrays to others that the executive has 
powerful connections and can obtain information from important external 
sources (Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 2002). 
 
A synthesis of the power literature, indicating how Finkelstein’s (1992) 
typology assimilates with the power types identified in earlier literature, is 
presented in Table 4.1. 
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 Table 4.1: A Synthesis of Power Types 
Finkelstein’s 
Power Typologies Description 
Structural Power 
 
Based on position and authority within formal 
organisational structure, control over information and right 
to exert influence (Finkelstein, 1992) 
 
Integrates Legitimate Power (the ability to act based upon 
a mandate from a widely accepted authoritative source); 
and Information Power (highlights the importance of 
organisational position and access to vital communication 
flows; it is not identical to expert power) (French and 
Raven, 1959; Raven, 1974; Mintzberg, 1983; Kalbers and 
Fogarty, 1993) 
 
Ownership Power 
 
The extent of ownership, leading to the ability to influence 
board decisions. As legal owners, shareholders are given 
rights to influence strategic decisions and vote (Finkelstein, 
1992; Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 2002) 
 
Does not correlate to any power types reflected in prior 
typologies 
 
Expert Power 
 
Ability to deal with environmental contingencies such as 
customers, competitors and government. Stems from 
length of experience, knowledge, and quality (Hambrick, 
1981; Finkelstein, 1992) 
 
Aligns with Expert Power (superior skills create power in 
circumstances of uncertainty) (French and Raven, 1959); 
Mintzberg (1983) describes this as ‘technical skills’ 
 
Prestige Power 
 
Power derived from status or reputation, and gained from 
external contacts, which provide valuable information and 
resources to the organisation (Finkelstein, 1992) 
 
Integrates Referent Power (personal qualities, leading to 
deferential behaviour of others, leadership skills) (French 
and Raven, 1959) and Sanctionary Power (referred to as 
‘control over resources’) (Mintzberg, 1983) 
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 Finkelstein (1992) focused his work on power within what he refers to as the 
‘dominant coalition’ of the firm (p.507). He argued that power relations in the 
top management team arise because of the interdependent nature of 
managerial work. As noted previously, power accrues from a manager’s 
ability to cope with internal and external sources of uncertainty (Grabke-
Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 2002; Finkelstein, 1992). Those managers who 
are best able to cope with uncertainty are likely to be in the best position to 
exert their will or preferences to obtain higher compensation. Managers with 
power are able to influence the level and structure of the pay they receive, 
and managers with more power are expected to be able to do so to a greater 
extent (Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, 2002).  
 
4.1.3 Reconciling Agency and Managerial Power Theories 
For the most part, the theories of agency and managerial power align in their 
expectations with regards to determinants of executive compensation, and 
the ability of managers to influence the compensation-setting process. 
Agency theory implicitly acknowledges the existence of power in the 
relationship between shareholders and managers (Grabke-Rundell and 
Gomez-Mejia, 2002). The agency contract is a concept that, by definition, 
pertains to the power relationship between executives and shareholders 
(Tosi et al., 1999; Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 2002). Under agency 
theory, compensation contracts are designed by the board for the purpose of 
minimising the level of divergence between owners and managers, that is 
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 alleviating the agency problem. Under both agency theory and the 
managerial power approach it is recognised that executives have the 
potential to influence their compensation contracts to extract rents18 
(Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, 2002). 
 
Both agency and managerial power theories note that compensation 
arrangements approved by boards often deviate from the optimal contract 
because directors could be subject to influence by management, sympathetic 
to management, or simply ineffectual in monitoring compensation 
arrangements (Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, 2002). Agency theorists 
acknowledge that managers, as agents, can nullify the influence of 
shareholders through information asymmetry, shareholder dispersion and 
entrenchment (Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 2002).  
 
The theories differ in one respect. Power, from the agency perspective, is 
defined as a cost to shareholders of managers pursuing their own agendas at 
the expense of shareholder welfare, or their ability to overcome the 
constraints of monitoring in order to increase self-interested behaviour 
(Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 2002). From the managerial power 
perspective, however, power is a more comprehensive, and potentially 
positive quality, which includes the ability to secure critical resources for the 
firm, cope with uncertainty, or network with the business elite (Hambrick, 
                                                 
18 Rent extraction refers to executives receiving pay in excess of the level that would be 
optimal for shareholders (Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, 2002). 
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 1981; Finkelstein, 1992; Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 2002). Overall, 
however, both agency and managerial power theories propose the same 
relationship between compensation and governance and ownership factors. 
 
The next section proceeds to present hypotheses, developed using both 
theoretical frameworks, where appropriate. 
 
4.2 Hypotheses Development 
4.2.1 Firm Performance as a Determinant of Compensation 
The separation of ownership and control in contemporary firms results in 
agency costs including: management deriving benefits from the resources 
they control, information asymmetry, and difference in time horizons between 
managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). The level and structure of remuneration contracts are one 
mechanism that can be utilised to minimise agency costs and maximise firm 
value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As noted previously, salary by itself does 
not promote the alignment of managers’ interests with those of owners (e.g., 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Consequently, managerial remuneration 
contracts that grant managers contingent, long-term incentives are likely to 
align managers’ interests with owners (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Contracts 
where bonuses are tied to measures of firm performance are more likely to 
induce managers to undertake activities that will maximise firm performance, 
and consequently firm value for shareholders.  
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Prior research, both within Australia and internationally, has observed a link 
between executive remuneration and firm performance (e.g., Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990; McKnight and Tomkins, 1999; Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 
1999; Coulton and Taylor, 2002b). It is hypothesised: 
 
H1 The level of executive remuneration is positively associated with firm 
financial performance. 
 
4.2.2 Firm Characteristics as Determinants of Compensation 
Firm Size 
The size of the organisation is likely to affect the expertise required from the 
top management team. Large firms are expected to have more hierarchical 
levels and be more decentralised, making the actions of mid-level managers 
less observable (Gaver and Gaver, 1995). Consequently, board members 
must place more reliance on the management teams’ dissemination of 
information to the board. Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) note larger 
firms are more likely to pay higher levels of compensation as a result of their 
demand for higher-quality managerial talent. 
 
The theory of managerial power proposes that the larger the firm, the greater 
is the expert power required of the top management team. Pay has generally 
been found to relate to firm size in the literature (Murphy, 1985; Rosen, 1992; 
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 Fleming and Stellios, 2002; Coulton and Taylor, 2002b; Chalmers, Koh and 
Stapledon, 2006; Matolcsy and Wright, 2006b). It is predicted that: 
 
H2 The level of executive remuneration is positively associated with firm 
size. 
 
Complexity of Operations 
Similarly, the complexity of an organisation can influence the required 
expertise of the top management team. More complex organisations require 
the top management team to hold expertise across a variety of functional 
areas and demands higher-quality management as a result (Core, 
Holthausen and Larcker, 1999; Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 2002). 
Compensation is expected to be higher for management in more complex 
organisations in order to attract and retain CEOs with greater skills and 
expertise. Prior research has found a positive link between the complexity of 
an organisation and the level of CEO compensation (Agarwal, 1981; Sanders 
and Carpenter, 1998; Matolcsy and Wright, 2006b). It is hypothesised: 
 
H3 The level of executive remuneration is positively associated with the 
complexity of a firm’s operations. 
 
Growth Opportunities 
Firms with valuable growth opportunities are likely to have a high degree of 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders (Gaver and 
Gaver, 1995). This information asymmetry arises because managers have 
private information about the value of future projects (Bizjak, Brickley and 
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 Coles, 1993; Gaver and Gaver, 1995) and because it is more difficult for 
owners to observe managerial effort in growth firms (Smith and Watts, 1992). 
As a result, growth firms reflect greater potential for managerial opportunism 
and higher agency costs. Executive compensation in growth firms is, 
therefore, expected to differ from that of non-growth firms (Gaver and Gaver, 
1995). 
 
Smith and Watts (1992) argue that, relative to non-growth firms, growth firms 
pay higher levels of remuneration to top executives. Higher levels of 
compensation can be expected because selection of investment projects 
demands a higher equilibrium wage than supervising existing assets-in-place 
(Gaver and Gaver, 1995). In addition, growth firms are likely to be riskier than 
non-growth firms (Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1995).  
 
H4a The level of executive remuneration is positively associated with the 
extent of growth opportunities. 
 
In order to reduce the agency costs associated with information asymmetry, 
growth firms are also likely to emphasise incentive compensation over fixed 
salary (Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1995). Without inside 
information and specialised knowledge that managers possess, shareholders 
are unable to assess the various investment opportunities available to the 
firm. In contrast however, the maintenance and supervision requirements of 
existing assets in non-growth firms are more observable (Gaver and Gaver, 
1995). As managerial actions are less observable in growth firms, 
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 shareholders are expected to rely on incentive compensation to align the 
interests of managers with those of shareholders (Gaver and Gaver, 1995). It 
is therefore predicted that: 
 
H4b The provision of incentive remuneration is positively associated with 
the extent of growth opportunities. 
 
4.2.3 Monitoring and Governance Determinants of Compensation 
Outside Directors 
Outside directors are viewed as more independent of the CEO than internal 
directors, and are consequently better able to represent the interests of 
shareholders. Where external board members are charged with monitoring 
managers’ actions, managers will not have to bear as much risk for the 
outcome of decisions as would otherwise be the case (Holmstrom, 1979). 
Consequently, the optimal compensation contract will be more efficient in 
terms of risk-sharing between the manager and the firm than when effective 
monitoring is not possible. When lower risk is imposed on the manager, 
therefore, the variability of compensation will be decreased and as a result 
the expected level of compensation will be lower (Holmstrom, 1979). 
Consequently, managers of firms whose boards have a higher concentration 
of external directors are likely to have lower risk imposed on them through 
their remuneration contracts. Consistent with findings by Fleming and Stellios 
(2002), this is likely to lead to lower levels of remuneration. It is predicted 
that: 
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H5 The level of executive remuneration is negatively associated with the 
proportion of outside directors on the board. 
 
Grey Directors 
The previous hypothesis addressed the monitoring role of the board of 
directors from the viewpoint that external directors are independent of 
management and more likely to effectively act in shareholders’ interests to 
monitor managerial actions. However, individual attributes of external 
directors are also an important determinant of their ability to be effective 
monitors, and of the manager’s ability to influence board directors. Grey 
directors, who have links with the firm through provision of services, or 
through past executive roles within the firm, are not in a position to effectively 
monitor managers’ actions due to their reduced level of independence. As a 
result, it is expected that managers will have greater influence over 
remuneration negotiations and decisions made by the remuneration 
committee, resulting in higher levels of remuneration. Core, Holthausen and 
Larcker (1999) confirmed that the existence of grey directors allows CEOs to 
influence outside directors whose level of independence can be questioned. 
 
H6 The level of executive remuneration is positively associated with the 
proportion of grey directors on the board. 
 
 118
 Busy Directors 
Being a director of other firms is likely to be beneficial to an external director 
in terms of offering a wider range of experience to draw on when evaluating 
managements’ performance and proposed actions. However, too many 
competing roles could be detrimental to the monitoring capacity of the 
director. The time and effort involved in fulfilling each directorship is likely to 
influence the ability to perform the role of director to the extent necessary to 
perform fully their monitoring role. As such, ‘busy directors’ are less likely to 
question managerial proposals and decisions. It is hypothesised: 
 
H7 The level of executive remuneration is positively associated with the 
proportion of busy directors on the board. 
 
Length of Board Tenure 
The ability to effectively monitor managerial actions is also likely to depend 
upon the experience-level of outside directors. Newly appointed directors 
could lack specific firm knowledge, which makes it difficult to evaluate 
managerial proposals. If increased tenure results in an enhanced ability to 
evaluate and monitor managerial action, the length of tenure of external 
board members is expected to have an inverse relationship with levels of 
executive remuneration. It can be hypothesised: 
 
H8 The level of executive remuneration is negatively associated with the 
length of tenure of external board members. 
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 External Blockholders 
Significant external blockholders are also likely to fulfil a monitoring role. Hill 
and Snell (1989) propose that concentration of share ownership is important. 
If share ownership is concentrated, the board is more likely to take note of 
expectations of external blockholders with regards to managerial 
remuneration and performance (Mallette and Fowler, 1989). This is more 
likely to be the case under recently expanded Australian corporate 
legislation, where shareholders are permitted to vote on the contents of the 
Remuneration Report. 
 
Proposing that external blockholders are likely to substitute for the monitoring 
activities of the board, Mehran (1995) found a significant negative association 
between the existence of external blockholders and share-based 
compensation as a percentage of total compensation. Similarly, Lambert, 
Larcker and Weiglet (1993) found a significant negative association between 
the existence of blockholders and levels of management remuneration. It can 
be predicted that: 
 
H9 The level of executive remuneration is likely to be higher where firms 
have no significant external blockholders than where firms have 
significant external blockholders.  
 
CEO Duality 
Control over information can be utilised by top managers either to restrict, or 
to re-interpret, information passed onto the board of directors or 
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 shareholders. Managers who are in a position to restrict the board’s access 
to information are in a position to influence the compensation-setting process 
(Lambert, Larcker and Weiglet, 1993). While the position of chief executive 
legitimises power within the organisation, leading to subordinates deferring to 
the views of the CEO, it can be argued that CEOs who occupy the dual role 
of CEO and Chair of the Board are even more likely to achieve respect from 
other board members and those lower in the firm’s hierarchical structure 
(Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 2002). They are often consulted by other 
directors before board appointments and other decisions are made. The 
Chair is also able to control the dissemination of information to the board 
through the agenda for board meetings, and have their agendas approved. 
Executives in this position have greater structural power than CEOs who are 
not Chair, and are more likely to achieve their own objectives pertaining to 
remuneration. Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) observed that where the 
CEO occupied dual roles, CEO compensation was higher. As such it can be 
hypothesised: 
 
H10 The level of executive remuneration is likely to be higher where CEOs 
occupy the dual role of Chair of the Board than when they do not. 
 
Outside Directors Appointed after the CEO 
Structural power can eventuate through ‘control’ of the other board members. 
Herman (1981) and Pfeffer (1972) assert that managers dominate the 
director-selection process. Because board members are dependent on 
management, and particularly CEOs for their position on the board, board 
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 members are likely to be loyal to the manager who appoints them, to the 
possible detriment of shareholders. External directors who have been 
selected by incumbent managers are likely to be more supportive of the 
views or wishes of the CEO than those who were already in office prior to the 
CEO’s appointment. Because of their position on the board, CEOs are likely 
to be in a strong position to recommend internal directors or external 
directors who would knowingly be in favour of the CEOs preferences 
(Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 2002). As a result, directors who are 
selected by the CEO are less likely to question information provided to the 
board by the CEO. This is likely to lead to the CEO influencing the board 
decision-making process regarding executive remuneration payments. This 
hypothesis was confirmed by Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999). It is 
therefore predicted that: 
 
H11 The level of executive remuneration is positively associated with the 
proportion of outside directors appointed to the board after the 
appointment of the CEO. 
 
CEO Representation on the Remuneration Committee 
Members of the remuneration committee of the board of directors are directly 
responsible for setting the compensation of top management, so are in a 
position to have a greater influence on managerial remuneration than other 
directors. When the compensation committee is not composed entirely of 
external directors, it is likely that the internal member of the remuneration 
committee is the CEO. Although not being part of discussion regarding the 
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 CEO’s own pay, the presence of the CEO on the remuneration committee 
enables him/her to influence committee decisions of subordinates on the 
corporate hierarchy. Lambert, Larcker and Weiglet (1993) found that pay 
differences between hierarchical levels increase towards the top of the 
corporate ladder. The presence of the CEO on the remuneration committee 
is likely to enable the CEO to influence or exert pressure on the external 
board members to increase pay for lower tier managers. To the extent that 
pay levels within the firm are an increasing function of the position on the 
corporate hierarchy (Lambert, Larcker and Weiglet, 1993), this would likely 
result in an increase in the CEO’s own remuneration. As such: 
 
H12 The level of executive remuneration is likely to be higher where the 
CEO sits on the remuneration committee than when the CEO does not 
sit on the remuneration committee. 
 
CEO Tenure 
Expert power increases as the executive’s tenure within their role lengthens. 
The more relationships the executive has been able to establish throughout 
their employment with the firm, the greater the executive’s ability to secure 
resources and reduce uncertainty stemming from the firm’s external 
environment (Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 2002). Expert power from 
increased tenure is related in some ways to the agency theorists’ argument 
of information asymmetry. As a result of increased tenure, the executive has 
numerous experiences with the firm. Board members are likely to become 
more dependent on the executive for knowledge about the best use of the 
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 organisation’s resources (Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 2002). The 
executive can use the board’s dependency by portraying an efficient use of 
the firm’s resources to justify a higher remuneration package. 
 
Increased executive tenure is also likely to lead to increased levels of 
expertise across the wide range of organisational activities. As such, firms 
are more likely to support higher levels of remuneration to retain this 
increased expertise and high quality human capital within the organisation. 
As such, it can be hypothesised that: 
 
H13 The level of executive remuneration is positively associated with the 
length of the CEO’s tenure. 
 
CEO Representation on External Boards 
Expert power also accrues to executives who have made numerous contacts 
with the firm’s external constituents (Finkelstein, 1992). Senior managers 
who serve on external boards are likely to receive valuable information about 
business conditions facing the firm that the organisation might otherwise not 
be privy to. Service to the community through sitting on the board of a non-
profit organisation, or on industry boards is also likely to enhance the 
manager’s prestige power (Finkelstein, 1992). It is predicted that: 
 
H14 The level of executive remuneration is likely to be higher where the 
CEO sits on external Boards than when they do not. 
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 4.2.4 Ownership Determinants of Compensation 
As legal owners of the firm, shareholders are given the rights to vote and 
influence strategic decisions, an influence that increases with the proportion 
of shares owned (Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 2002). An executive 
who is also a shareholder has these same rights. Moreover, it could be 
argued that an executive shareholder is in a greater position of power, and 
able to influence board decisions and executive performance criteria in 
relation to remuneration. Additional executive power can be also gained 
through shares owned by the executive’s family members. Share ownership 
grants privileges to the executive, in addition to reducing uncertainty for 
shareholders by guaranteeing the executive’s interests are aligned with theirs 
(Sanders and Carpenter, 1998). Thus it is hypothesised: 
 
H15 The level of executive remuneration is positively associated with the 
proportion of managerial and family ownership of firm shares. 
 
Managers who are founders of the firm, or who have links to the founders of 
the firm, are also likely to hold more ownership power (Finkelstein, 1992). 
Through their long-term association and interaction with the board 
(Finkelstein, 1992) they are able to hold some level of influence or control 
over the board.  
 
H16 The level of executive remuneration is likely to be higher where the 
CEO is a founder or relative of founders of the firm than when they are 
not. 
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 Although alluded to as a factor that potentially explains the level of executive 
remuneration, this factor has not previously been examined in either 
Australian or international research. 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
Prior research has utilised agency theory to guide the examination of 
executive compensation and its determinants, both within Australia and 
internationally. The theory of managerial power, which stems from the 
sociology and political science literature, has recently been proposed as 
useful in being able to gain a richer understanding of the behavioural aspects 
of managerial influence on the compensation-setting process (Grabke-
Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 2002). Both theoretical perspectives were 
reviewed, and reconciled in the current chapter. They were then utilised in 
the development of hypotheses relating to expected determinants of 
executive remuneration in the current Australian reporting environment. 
Determinants of remuneration are hypothesised to relate to firm financial 
performance, firm characteristics, monitoring and governance mechanisms, 
and ownership factors. 
 
The research design, entailing the sample selection method, variable 
measurement, and statistical analysis to be employed to test these 
hypotheses, is presented in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 5 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
This chapter describes the research method and sample used to test the 
hypotheses developed in the preceding chapter. The chapter commences 
with details of the general research method adopted. Sample selection 
procedures and measurements of variables are then provided in Sections 5.2 
and 5.3, respectively, followed by an outline of the statistical tests performed. 
 
5.1 Research Method 
The design of the study is the ‘blueprint’ for the collection, measurement and 
analysis of data. This study adopts a quasi-experimental design: a design 
that approximates an experimental design but does not include a random 
assignment to conditions (Cook and Campbell, 1976). The quasi-
experimental design is appropriate to the current study as it can be used to 
assess whether an independent variable is an indicator of what causes the 
dependent variable to vary (Dane, 1990). The independent variables in the 
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 study represent, or proxy for, constructs (e.g., firm, governance or ownership 
characteristics) that are not otherwise able to be separately observed. 
 
An archival research method is the most appropriate method to gather the 
data required to test the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 4. Data available 
from archival sources provide more objective evidence about a larger sample 
of companies than that which could be obtained by surveying individual 
companies and managers. This results in improved generalisability of 
research results. Data are collected from secondary sources, these being the 
Aspect Huntley DatAnalysis and FinAnalysis databases in addition to 
corporate websites. The Aspect Huntley databases contain information 
provided to the ASX by all publicly listed Australian companies, and are 
updated from the ASX database daily. All items of information used to 
measure variables of interest were collected by hand. Approximately 100 
data-points, encompassing information required to measure both dependent 
and independent variables for each firm, were collected and entered into a 
computer database. In order to verify the objectivity and systematic nature of 
the data collection process, a sample of the collected data (approximately ten 
percent) was assessed against original data sources by an independent third 
party. No variation in recording was evident. 
 
The data used to test the hypotheses are drawn from the Standard & Poor’s 
ASX300, which represents the top 300 companies listed on the ASX. It 
reflects approximately 91 percent of the Australian share market, by market 
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 capitalisation. As a result, the study is not limited to large companies, and will 
therefore be able to draw conclusions as to the structure of pay and its 
determinants for medium size listed companies as well as larger 
corporations. 
 
The study takes a cross-sectional approach where remuneration disclosures 
for the 2005 fiscal year are examined. For the entirety of the sample period 
companies were required to comply with the changes in disclosure 
requirements resulting from the recent CLERP 9 initiative, and accounting 
standard amendments outlined in Chapter 2.  
 
5.2 Sample Selection 
Sample selection commenced with the Standard & Poor’s ASX300 as at 
September 2005.19 Twenty companies were deleted as share prices were 
not available, or share prices changed during the period of study due to a 
share split.20 Share prices are necessary to calculate a number of variables 
outlined in the next section. The CEO or managing director changed in 60 
companies, and consequently these firms were removed from the sample. A 
change in CEO or managing director is likely to lead to remuneration being 
affected by factors not captured by the independent variables under study. 
                                                 
19 Although referred to as the S&P ASX300, from time to time the number of firms included in 
the index varies slightly from 300. At the time of the current study 301 firms were included in 
the index. 
20 A share split occurred in two companies. The firms were deleted as the change in share 
price resulting from the share split meant it was difficult to calculate an average share price 
for the year. 
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 When a CEO leaves the firm, compensation generally includes some form of 
termination payout. Similarly, CEOs commencing with the firm often receive a 
sign-on payment. Remuneration level and structure, therefore, are likely to be 
related to factors other than those under consideration in the study.  
 
Fourteen firms were listed property trusts whose managers were 
remunerated by a parent entity already included in the sample, these trusts 
were removed from the sample. The head office for eight firms had an 
overseas registered address. Remuneration disclosures for these firms are 
more likely to be affected by legislation in their domicile country. Other 
reasons for removal of firms included: the firm was added to the ASX300 
after the period of the study (five firms); no financial reports were available 
during the period of the study (two firms); the firm suspended trading during 
the period of study (one firm); the annual report was presented in a foreign 
currency (two firms); and the year-end date changed during the period, 
resulting in the annual report including only six month’s performance data 
(one firm). A total of 113 companies were deleted from the sample, leaving a 
final sample of 188 firms. A comparison of the size (measured as market 
capitalisation) of deleted firms against firms remaining in the sample 
indicates no significant differences in average firm size between the two 
groups. The sample, therefore, is still representative of the range of firms in 
the original ASX300. Reasons for deleting companies from the sample are 
summarised in Table 5.1. 
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 Table 5.1: Selection of Sample Companies 
Total in S&P ASX300 at October 2005:  301
Minus: Share prices not available 17  
 Change in share price value via share split etc 3  
 Change of CEO or managing director 60  
 Newly added to ASX300 after period of study 5  
 Overseas registered company 8  
 No financial reports available for period of study 2  
 Suspended trading 1  
 Managers remunerated by separate parent entity 14  
 Annual report presented in a foreign currency 2  
 Changed annual report year end date  1 113
Sample Total:  188
 
 
Sample companies are representative of all industry categories as classified 
by their two-digit GICS code. Table 5.2 summarises the distribution of sample 
firms across industries. While firms are not clustered in any particular 
industry, the majority are spread across Materials, Industrials, Consumer 
Discretionary and Financial industries. 
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 Table 5.2: Industry Classification of Sample Companies 
2 Digit 
GICS Code Industry Frequency 
Percent 
(%) 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
Energy 
Materials  
Industrials  
Consumer Discretionary  
Consumer Staples 
Health Care 
Financials 
Information Technology 
Telecommunication Services 
Utilities 
17 
34 
28 
32 
9 
18 
26 
16 
1 
7 
9 
18 
15 
17 
5 
9 
14 
8 
1 
4 
Total 188 100 
 
 
5.3 Variable Descriptions and Measurement 
In order to test the hypotheses, a number of constructs need to be defined 
and measured. The dependent variable – the level of executive remuneration 
– must be measured. Measures of firm performance, and firm characteristics 
including size, complexity and growth opportunities also need to be 
determined. Measures are also documented for the various monitoring and 
governance characteristics, represented by: the proportion of external 
directors, grey directors, busy directors, directors’ tenure, the number of 
external blockholders, and evidence of CEO duality, amongst others. 
Ownership by managers must also be established. Table 5.3 summarises the 
study’s variable definitions and labels. 
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 Table 5.3: Variable Descriptions and Measurement 
Variable Label Measurement 
 
Panel A: Executive Compensation 
Fixed salary 
Annual bonus 
Long-term incentive payments 
Total compensation 
 
 
 
SALARY 
BONUS 
LTIP 
TOTALCOMP 
 
 
Dollar value of cash salary 
Dollar value of cash bonus 
Dollar value of long-term incentive payments 
Dollar value of total remuneration 
components including salary, bonus, long-
term incentive payments and options, other 
non-performance remuneration 
 
 
Panel B: Firm Performance 
Accounting performance 
 
Share performance 
 
 
 
ROA 
 
SHAREPERF 
 
 
Annual return on assets as measured by 
EBIT / average total assets 
One-year share return, incorporating capital 
gains and reinvestment of dividends 
 
 
Panel C: Firm Characteristics 
Firm size 
Complexity of operations 
 
 
Growth opportunities 
 
 
 
SIZE 
COMPLEX 
 
 
GROWTH 
 
 
Natural log of total assets 
Number of business segments across which 
the firm operates 
Alternate measure: number of subsidiaries 
Market to book value of assets 
 
 
Panel D: Governance Determinants 
Outside directors 
Grey directors 
Busy directors 
 
 
Length of board tenure 
 
External blockholders 
 
 
 
CEO duality 
 
Outside directors appointed after CEO 
 
CEO on remuneration committee 
 
 
CEO tenure 
CEO representation on external boards 
 
 
 
OUTDIR 
GREYDIRS 
BUSYDIRS 
 
 
DIRTEN 
 
BLCKHLDR 
 
 
 
CEODUAL 
 
POSTCEO 
 
REMCTEE 
 
 
CEOTEN 
EXTERNAL 
 
 
Percentage of external directors on the board 
Percentage of external directors who are grey 
Percentage of external directors holding more 
than 5 directorships, with the role of CEO 
counting as 2 directorships 
Average length of tenure of external board 
members (years) 
1 = the firm has one or more blockholders 
with greater than 5% share ownership 
0 = the firm does not have any blockholders 
with greater than 5% share ownership 
1 = CEO also holds position of Chair of Board 
0 = CEO does not hold both positions 
Percentage of external directors appointed 
after the CEO commenced in the role 
1 = CEO sits on the remuneration committee 
0 = CEO does not sit on the remuneration 
committee 
Length of CEO’s tenure (years) 
1 = CEO sits on external boards or non-profit 
boards 
0 = CEO does not sit on external boards or 
non-profit boards 
 
 
Panel E: Ownership Determinants 
CEO ownership 
 
CEO as founder 
 
 
 
CEOSHR 
 
FOUNDER 
 
 
Percentage of firm total shares owned by the 
CEO and relatives 
1 = CEO is a founder or relative of a founder  
0 = CEO is not a founder or relative 
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 5.3.1 Dependent Variable 
The study utilises a number of measures of the dependent variable 
‘executive remuneration’. Following Finkelstein’s (1992) views that the top 
management team, rather than just the CEO, work in coalition to manage the 
firm and information dissemination, remuneration is measured for both the 
CEO and the five ‘specified’ executives reported in the firm’s annual report.21 
Apart from the CEO, for the purposes of the study, the top five executives are 
ranked in order of total remuneration. The components of remuneration 
measured are: salary, cash bonus, long-term incentive payments and total 
compensation. 
 
The various compensation components are measured separately rather than 
simply relying on a measure of total compensation. McKnight and Tomkins 
(2004) and Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon (2006) found that each pay 
component is influenced by a diverse set of factors. The measurement of 
remuneration is limited to direct compensation paid by companies to their 
executives. 
 
Salary (SALARY) and cash bonus (BONUS) are measured as their dollar 
value reported in the notes to the financial statements. Long-term incentives 
(LTIP) are calculated as the dollar value of long-term incentive payments 
                                                 
21 In a number of instances remuneration data are reported for less than the required five 
‘specified executives’. ‘Specified executives’ are defined as the “five or more executives with 
the greatest authority for the strategic direction and management of the entity” (AASB1046, 
Para. 4.1). Specified executives are not limited to the most highly paid executives. 
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 including options.22 As previously outlined, valuations provided in company 
reports, as a requirement of the recently released AASB2 Share-based 
Payment are likely to provide a more accurate measure of option values than 
those calculated using an option pricing model such as that provided by 
Black and Scholes (1973). Company-generated values, although still 
calculated by firms using the Black-Scholes models, or some other pricing 
technique, consider the likelihood of early exercise, the appropriate risk rate, 
and other firm-specific factors not available to academics. As such, the 
current study relies upon firm-generated valuation of options and 
performance rights presented in annual reports. In addition, testing 
determines whether differing firm characteristics are evident between those 
firms which offer long-term incentive payments and those which do not. 
 
Total remuneration (TOTALCOMP) is determined as the dollar value of total 
remuneration components including: salary, bonus, long term incentive 
payments, and superannuation and other non-performance remuneration, 
which includes non-cash benefits such as travel and car allowances, car 
parking, and insurance. 
 
                                                 
22 A considerable proportion of sample firms combine both options and other long-term 
incentive share payments in one category called ‘performance rights/options’ or similar. As 
such, one total value for long term incentive payments is computed. 
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 5.3.2 Independent Variables 
5.3.2.1 Firm Performance 
Both share-based measures and accounting measures of firm financial 
performance are calculated, given each is likely to provide valuable 
information that the CEO took the desired action (Conyon and Sadler, 2001). 
In addition, both share-based and accounting measures are used by firms to 
varying degrees to determine the appropriate bonus or long-term incentive 
component of remuneration.  
 
Rate of return on total assets (ROA) is used to represent accounting 
performance (Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon, 2006). Market performance is 
measured as the one-year share return, incorporating capital gains and 
reinvestment of dividends (SHAREPERF). It is calculated as the natural log 
of (closing year share price plus dividends paid in the year) minus natural log 
of closing share price the previous year. This measure has been utilised in 
prior research examining determinants of executive compensation (see for 
example McKnight and Tomkins, 1999; Fleming and Stellios, 2002). A review 
of the financial reports of sample firms indicates that where performance 
hurdles based upon market measures of performance are set, total return to 
shareholders is a common measure utilised. 
 
Sensitivity analysis is conducted using lagged measures of firm financial 
performance. Changes in salary are generally lagged with respect to 
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 achievement (usually growth in the size of the firm) (McKnight and Tomkins, 
2004), which suggests a need to perform sensitivity analysis based on prior 
year measures of firm performance. Bonuses and long-term performance 
bonuses are generally contemporaneous with the relevant measure of 
performance (profit, return on assets etc) (McKnight and Tomkins, 2004). 
 
5.3.2.2 Firm Characteristics 
To test hypotheses 2 through 4 the following variables are determined: Firm 
size (SIZE) is measured as the natural log of total assets (Chalmers, Koh and 
Stapledon, 2006). The number of business segments across which the firm 
operates is calculated in order to provide the measure of firm complexity 
(COMPLEX). Consistent with Matolcsy and Wright (2006b), an alternative 
measure of the number of subsidiaries is also used in sensitivity testing. To 
test hypotheses 4a and 4b growth opportunities (GROWTH) are calculated 
as: Market to book value of assets, calculated as the ratio of (book value of 
liabilities + book value of preferred shares + market value of ordinary shares) 
to book value of total assets (Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 
1995). 
 
5.3.2.3 Monitoring and Governance Variables 
The influence of outside directors on executive remuneration (OUTDIR) is 
calculated as the percentage of external directors on the board. Grey 
directors (GREYDIRS) are determined as the proportion of external directors 
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 on the board who are ‘grey’. Grey directors are not employees but have other 
dealings with the companies on whose board they sit. These dealings could 
include offering legal or accounting advice to the firm (Lee, 2002; Cahan, 
Chua and Nyamiori, 2005). Alternatively, they could have been previously 
employed as executives of the firm. In accordance with guidelines issued by 
the Australian Shareholders’ Association Ltd Policy Statement 2005, and the 
construct used by Fleming and Stellios (2002), busy directors (BUSYDIRS) 
are determined as the percentage of external directors holding more than five 
directorships, with the role of CEO counting as two directorships. The 
average length of tenure of external board members, in years, is used to 
determine directors’ tenure (DIRTEN).  
 
The influence of external blockholders (BLCKHLDR) is measured as a 
dichotomous variable: 1 = the firm has one or more external blockholders 
with greater than 5% share ownership; 0 = the firm does not have any 
external blockholders with greater than 5% share ownership (Fleming and 
Stellios, 2002). CEO duality (CEODUAL) employs another indicator variable: 
1 if the CEO also holds the position of Chair of the Board; 0 if the CEO does 
not hold both positions. The percentage of external directors appointed after 
the CEO commenced in the role (POSTCEO) is used to determine the 
influence the CEO may have over the board of directors through appointing 
directors sympathetic to his or her ideas. CEO representation on the 
remuneration committee (REMCTEE) utilises a dichotomous variable: 1 = 
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 CEO sits as a member of the Remuneration Committee; 0 = CEO does not 
sit as a member of the Remuneration Committee. 
 
The final two governance variables relate to the length of the CEO’s tenure 
(CEOTEN), measured as the number of years in the role, and whether the 
CEO has developed connections external to the organisation by sitting on 
external boards (EXTERNAL), determined as: 1 if the CEO sits on external 
boards or non-profit boards, and 0 otherwise. 
 
5.3.2.4 Ownership Variables 
To assess the influence of managerial share ownership on compensation, 
hypotheses 15 and 16 require the measurement of CEOs’ and their family 
shareholdings in the firm (CEOSHR), calculated as a percentage of total 
shares on issue, and whether the CEO is the founder or related to the 
founder of the organisation (FOUNDER), using an indicator variable of 1 if 
the CEO is a founder, and 0 otherwise. 
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 5.4 Statistical Tests 
To test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 4, multivariate tests employing 
multiple regression techniques examine the relative explanatory power of all 
independent variables on the components of executive remuneration. The 
regression model is stated as follows: 
 
COMPENSATION = β0 + β1ROA + β2SHAREPERF + β3SIZE + β4COMPLEX 
+ β5GROWTH + β6OUTDIR + β7GREYDIRS + 
β8BUSYDIRS + β9DIRTEN + β10BLCKHLDR + 
β11CEODUAL + β12POSTCEO + β13REMCTEE + 
β14CEOTEN + β15EXTERNAL + β16CEOSHR + 
β17FOUNDER+ ε 
 
COMPENSATION in the above model represents the individual components 
of compensation identified in Section 5.3.1. Separate models are derived for 
each of the following measures of COMPENSATION: SALARY, BONUS, 
LTIP and TOTALCOMP. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter documented the relevant sample selection procedure, research 
design and method of statistical analysis employed in testing the hypotheses 
developed in Chapter 4. A description of each variable, and measures 
employed in testing were also outlined. Variable descriptive characteristics 
and results of hypotheses tests are presented in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
 
RESULTS 
 
 
 
The design for testing the hypotheses, developed in Chapter 4, was outlined 
in the previous chapter. This chapter reports the results of those tests. The 
structure of compensation for CEOs and the top executive team is described 
in Section 6.1. Descriptive characteristics of the independent variables used 
in hypotheses tests are then outlined in Section 6.2. The results of 
hypotheses tests, and some concluding comments, are presented in the 
remaining sections. 
 
6.1 Structure of Executive Compensation 
Table 6.1 details the main components of executive remuneration for CEOs 
and for the top five senior executives measured for the study. In addition, the 
average level of compensation for non-CEOs is reported. 
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 Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics of Executive Remuneration 
Variable Min Max Mean St Dev Mean % of Total 
CEO N = 188    
SALARY 
BONUS 
LTIP 
TOTALCOMP 
0 
0 
0 
6,404 
2,675,000 
5,180,786 
12,713,457 
18,553,566 
653,266 
436,689 
428,157 
1,673,163 
462,489 
721,803 
1,140,934 
2,133,789 
39% 
26% 
26% 
Average Non-CEO N = 188    
SALARY 
BONUS 
LTIP 
TOTALCOMP 
86,682 
0 
0 
92,558 
988,024 
2,256,664 
5,617,122 
8,258,576 
302,901 
141,003 
121,131 
646,481 
162,864 
250,757 
432,820 
768,485 
47% 
22% 
19% 
Executive 1  N = 188    
SALARY 
BONUS 
LTIP 
TOTALCOMP 
23,606 
0 
0 
122,615 
1,498,048 
5,640,500 
12,625,293 
18,220,097 
391,398 
253,200 
229,497 
1,019,468 
241,866 
639,152 
955,488 
1,648,160 
38% 
25% 
23% 
Executive 2  N = 184    
SALARY 
BONUS 
LTIP 
TOTALCOMP 
0 
0 
0 
61,333 
1,311,225 
2,825,657 
7,050,630 
10,347,232 
334,138 
163,311 
137,844 
712,862 
201,582 
282,023 
550,556 
916,102 
47% 
23% 
19% 
 
Executive 3  N = 175    
SALARY 
BONUS 
LTIP 
TOTALCOMP 
81,667 
0 
0 
95,550 
1,518,000 
2,720,437 
6,678,628 
9,728,727 
303,834 
128,720 
119,274 
630,906 
175,436 
249,136 
517,539 
846,700 
48% 
20% 
19% 
 
Executive 4  N = 169    
SALARY 
BONUS 
LTIP 
TOTALCOMP 
0 
0 
0 
70,220 
963,000 
1,484,000 
1,323,245 
3,094,000 
268,209 
102,407 
73,971 
512,789 
152,447 
179,489 
157,489 
462,641 
52% 
20% 
15% 
Executive 5  N = 158    
SALARY 
BONUS 
LTIP 
TOTALCOMP 
0 
0 
0 
35,477 
654,550 
938,000 
654,761 
2,146,000 
242,025 
85,338 
57,825 
437,393 
133,865 
138,424 
107,917 
360,415 
56% 
19% 
13% 
 
Note: Measures of SALARY, BONUS, LTIP AND TOTALCOMP are shown in dollars  
 TOTALCOMP includes ‘other’ remuneration such as consulting fees, superannuation 
and fringe benefits that are not separately listed. As such, mean percentages of 
SALARY, BONUS and LTIP do not add to 100% 
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 The mean total CEO compensation of $1,673,163 is lower than the average 
total pay of $1,887,880 reported by Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon (2006), but 
higher than the mean total compensation of $1,111,400 observed by Fleming 
and Stellios (2002), and $1,061,433 documented by Coulton and Taylor 
(2002b). The current study was undertaken in a more recent time period than 
prior documented research. As such, you would expect an inflationary effect 
to support an increased level of remuneration in the current study. The higher 
average total pay observed by Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon (2006) is 
interesting, given their study documents remuneration for the period 1999 to 
2002. Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon (2006) focused their study on the top 
200 Australian firms, which limits their analysis to a larger average firm-size 
than the current study, where the top 300 are examined. The association 
between firm size and compensation is examined in Section 6.3. 
 
While the majority of CEOs received a base salary, CEOs of three sample 
companies received no salary. One CEO received all compensation as 
consulting fees, while two CEOs were awarded bonuses, options and 
company shares. This is consistent with Matolcsy and Wright’s (2006a) 
observations. The lowest CEO total compensation of $6,404 consists of 
benefits only, awarded to the CEO of Collection House Ltd. The CEO, John 
Pearce, opted to receive no remuneration effective 8 April 2003. That request 
continued during the sample period. 
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 Consistent with prior research in both the US and UK, an increase in the use 
of bonus or incentive compensation is observed. Where the mean level of 
CEO long-term incentive compensation (options and shares) of $428,157 is 
relatively consistent with that observed by Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon 
(2006) ($397,941), cash bonus pay is higher ($436,689 compared to 
$299,297). 
 
There is substantial variation across sample firms with regards to the level of 
all components of remuneration, as indicated by the reported standard 
deviations. Mean salaries range from $242,025 for executives at the lowest 
level up to $391,398 for the executive immediately below the CEO. Total 
compensation ranges from an average of $1,019,468 down to $437,393. An 
examination of Table 6.1 shows that both cash bonuses and long-term 
incentives play a role in the average remuneration packages of non-CEO 
executives, however, to a progressively lesser extent down the executive 
hierarchy. 
 
Figure 6.1a provides a graphical representation of the relative proportions of 
compensation components for CEOs and average non-CEO executives, 
while Figure 6.1b presents a comparison across all executive levels. 
Supporting data are also presented in the final column of Table 6.1. On 
average, 39 percent of CEO total compensation consists of salary, with 52 
percent attributed to performance-based remuneration (on average 26 
percent to each of long-term incentive payments and short-term cash bonus). 
 144
 The remainder of CEO pay is made up of superannuation and non-incentive 
awards such as car and travel expenses. These results are consistent with 
the ‘equity group’ observed by Matolcsy and Wright (2006a), and represent 
an increased use of incentive and bonus pay when compared to that 
revealed in Coulton and Taylor’s (2002b) study, where salary constituted, on 
average, 65 percent of total compensation, while bonuses and options 
represented 10 and 11 percent of total compensation, respectively. The 
proportion of long-term incentive pay is slightly higher than that found by 
Conyon et al. (2000) in their study of UK firms, where 80 percent of 
compensation is, on average, cash-based. 
 
Although a slightly higher proportion of non-CEO executive pay is fixed salary 
(mean of 47 percent), on average, 41 percent of non-CEO executive 
compensation is in the form of incentive pay (22 percent short-term cash 
bonus and 19 percent long-term incentive compensation). As documented in 
both Table 6.1 and Figures 6.1a and 6.1b, the importance of bonuses and 
long-term incentive pay in the compensation contracts of non-CEO 
executives decreases down the executive hierarchy. Whilst bonuses and 
long-term incentives represent 25 and 23 percent of total compensation, 
respectively, for executives immediately below the CEO, this is reduced to 19 
and 13 percent of total pay for executives at level five. Similarly, salary as a 
proportion of total pay decreases in importance as executives move up the 
corporate hierarchy. While salary of executives at level five contributes, on 
average, 56 percent to total pay, this is reduced to 38 percent for executives 
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 immediately below the CEO. These results do not align with US evidence 
presented by Ryan and Wiggins (2000), who found no difference in the 
structure of executive pay across the senior management team. The results 
are consistent with Ang, Lauterbach and Schreiber’s (2002) observation of 
US banks, however, where CEOs receive higher proportions of long-term 
incentive-pay than other senior executives. 
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 Figure 6.1a: Components of Executive Remuneration – CEOs and 
Average of Non-CEO Executives 
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 Figure 6.1b: Components of Executive Remuneration by Level of 
Executive  
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 Preliminary testing examined the variation in remuneration across executive 
levels. A series of One-Way ANOVA tests was conducted to determine if 
there were significant differences in each category of executive pay. 
Significant differences in the level of salary (F Ratio 60.3, p<0.001), long-
term incentive payments (F Ratio 2.8, p<0.05) and total remuneration (F 
Ratio 42.2, p<0.001) were observed. Post hoc ‘least significant difference’ 
(LSD) and Tukey ‘honestly significant difference’ (HSD) tests indicated that 
CEO salary and total remuneration is significantly greater than all other 
executives. Similarly, both the salary and total pay of executives immediately 
below the CEO in the corporate hierarchy are significantly greater than lower-
level executives. In addition, long-term incentive remuneration of executives 
at level one is greater than that of executives at levels four and five in the 
senior management team. Executives at level five receive significantly lower 
levels of salary and total remuneration than executives at levels two and 
three on the corporate hierarchy.  
 
While Deegan (1997) found greater than one third of his sample received all 
their compensation as a fixed salary. Table 6.2 presents data which indicate 
that more than 80 percent of sample companies now use long-term incentive 
compensation payments to reward both CEOs and non-CEO executives. 
Cash bonuses are more prevalent as a compensation method for non-CEO 
executives, at 82 percent of the sample, than for CEOs, where only 68 
percent of sample firms use cash bonuses to reward CEOs. This also 
represents an increased use of incentive compensation than was observed 
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 by Coulton and Taylor (2002b), who found that 51 percent of their sample 
utilised cash bonuses to reward CEOs, while 31 percent utilised options in 
CEO pay contracts. Similarly, the results of the current study also represent 
an increased use of share-based incentive pay than was found by Matolcsy 
and Wright (2006a), where 66 percent of their sample had an equity-based 
scheme in place. These results clearly indicate the increased use of 
incentive-based pay across the senior management team following CLERP 9 
changes to the corporations’ legislation. 
 
Table 6.2: Frequencies of Firms Using Bonus and LTIP Compensation 
 Short-term Cash Bonus Long-term Incentive Payments 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
CEO 
Non-CEO Executives 
Firm Average 
127 
154 
156 
68% 
82% 
83% 
163 
158 
163 
87% 
84% 
87% 
 
 
Data summarising options granted by sample firms are presented in Table 
6.3. Of the total sample, 67 percent of firms have provision for option 
payments available to senior managers. This observation is consistent with 
Matolcsy and Wright’s (2006a) study, and slightly greater than Coulton and 
Taylor’s (2002b) results where 66 percent and 59 percent of sample CEOs, 
respectively, held options at year end. Of the 124 firms with provision for 
option grants, 43 (35 percent) granted options in the sample period. Again, 
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 this aligns with Matolcsy and Wright’s (2006a) findings, where 163 of their 
458 equity firms (35 percent) awarded equity grants in the year in question.  
 
Table 6.3: Option Grants by Sample Firms 
 Frequency Percent 
Panel A: Option Grants Across Total Sample 
Firms with provision for options 
Options granted in sample period 
Exercised in sample period 
124 
  43 
  40 
67% 
23% 
21% 
Panel B: Option Grants by Industry Group 
 Total Frequency Percent 
Firm with provision for options: 
Mining and energy 
Manufacturing and industrial 
Finance 
Other 
Options granted in sample period: 
Mining and energy 
Manufacturing and industrial 
Finance 
Other 
 
  16 
106 
  26 
  40 
 
  16 
106 
  26 
  40 
 
11 
68 
16 
31 
 
  7 
22 
  7 
  7 
 
69% 
64% 
62% 
78% 
 
44% 
21% 
27% 
17% 
 
 
While 124 firms in the sample provided options to senior managers, a 
comparison of Tables 6.2 and 6.3 indicates that other forms of long-term 
incentive payments are also awarded by sample firms. The remaining 39 
firms who award long-term equity incentives utilise performance rights rather 
than options as the primary method of awarding equity-based compensation. 
This appears to offer support for Ernst and Young’s (2006) recent 
observation that share options, although continuing to represent the most 
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 common long-term incentive plan type, are decreasing in prominence, with 
performance rights increasing in prevalence. 
 
In order to assess variation in option use across industries, firms were 
grouped in industry groupings in accordance with those used by Matolcsy 
and Wright (2006a) and Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon (2006). Results are 
again presented in Table 6.3. The use of options as a compensation method 
is relatively consistent across industries, and aligns with Matolcsy and 
Wright’s (2006a) results. Of the 68 percent of manufacturing and industrial 
firms with provision for option payments, only one third awarded options in 
the sample year. Firms in the ‘other’ category awarded a similar proportion, 
while both mining and financial firms were more likely to award options in the 
sample year. 
 
The proportion of sample firms awarding long-term incentive payments 
subject to performance hurdles is presented in Panel A of Table 6.4. A 
graphical representation is also provided in Figure 6.2. Of the total of 161 
sample firms utilising long-term incentive payments, an average of 66 
percent award long-term incentives subject to meeting some form of 
performance hurdle. This represents a significant increase of the use of 
performance hurdles since Matolcsy and Wright (2006a) carried out their 
analysis. A number of sample firms indicated the use of performance hurdles 
to be relatively new, with schemes approved by shareholders within the last 
year or two. Three sample firms, while not basing payment of long-term 
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 incentives on performance hurdles during the sample period, indicated in 
their annual reports that the board intended to present a revised incentive 
payment scheme to the next annual meeting of shareholders. The use of 
performance hurdles by Australian firms is consistent with that observed in 
the UK, where Conyon et al. (2000) found that 62 percent of option schemes 
attach performance criteria to the exercise of those options. 
 
Table 6.4: Long-term Incentives Subject to Performance Hurdles 
 Frequency Percent 
Panel A: Performance Hurdles Across Sample Using LTIP 
N = 161 
Firms using performance hurdles 
Firms not using performance hurdles 
 
106 
  55 
 
66% 
34% 
Panel B: Performance Hurdles by Industry Group 
 Total Frequency Percent 
Mining and energy 
Manufacturing and industrial 
Finance 
Other 
13 
92 
22 
34 
  7 
64 
15 
20 
54% 
70% 
68% 
59% 
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 Figure 6.2: Performance Hurdles for Total Sample 
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Both Table 6.4 Panel B and Figure 6.3 present data relating to performance 
hurdles across major industry groupings. Firms in both manufacturing and 
industrial, and financial industries are more inclined to utilise performance 
hurdles than those in mining and energy and ‘other’ industries. Seventy 
percent of manufacturing and industrial firms now make use of performance 
hurdles to award long-term incentives, while 68 percent of finance firms use 
hurdles in determining incentive pay. Greater than 50 percent of firms across 
all industries use performance hurdles in awarding incentive pay 
components. These figures represent a significant increase in the use of 
performance hurdles from prior Australian evidence presented by Matolcsy 
and Wright (2006a). 
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Figure 6.3: Performance Hurdles by Industry 
 6.2 Descriptive Statistics: Independent Variables 
6.2.1 Firm Performance 
Descriptive statistics for measures of firm financial performance used in the 
study are presented in Table 6.5.  
 
Average return on assets is 8 percent. It ranges from a high of 55 percent 
down to a low of -113 percent. This is consistent with the average return on 
assets observed by prior Australian research (see for example Matolcsy and 
Wright, 2006c; Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon, 2006). The mean measure of 
share return is 13 percent. 
 
Table 6.5: Descriptive Statistics of Measures of Firm Performance 
Variable Min Max Mean St Dev 
Accounting Performance Measure   
ROA -1.13 0.55 0.08 0.19 
Share Performance Measures   
SHAREPERF -1.00 22.56 12.96 6.51 
Note: ROA = Return on Assets as calculated by EBIT / average total assets 
SHAREPERF = ln(closing year share price + dividends paid) – ln(closing share price 
t-1) 
 
 
6.2.2 Firm Characteristics 
Table 6.6 presents the descriptive characteristics of the three economic firm 
characteristics utilised in hypotheses testing. 
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 Table 6.6: Descriptive Statistics of Firm Characteristics 
Variable Min Max Mean St Dev 
SIZE 
COMPLEX 
GROWTH 
12,794,000 
1 
0.40 
227,468,000,000 
6 
14.84 
5,835,444,513 
2.5 
2.16 
28,551,376,670 
1.47 
1.94 
Note: SIZE = dollar average total assets (note: the natural log of total assets is used in 
hypothesis testing. 
 COMPLEX = number of business segments the firm operates across 
GROWTH = (book value of liabilities + book value of preferred shares + market 
value of ord. shares) / book value of total assets 
 
 
The mean size of sample firms, as measured by the average total assets, is 
$5,835,444,513. Sample firms operate across an average of 2.5 business 
segments. An alternative measure used to indicate the complexity of a firm’s 
operations is the number of subsidiaries. The mean number of subsidiaries 
across sample firms is 42, with a minimum of zero, and maximum of 944. 
The standard deviation of 81 indicated greater variation in this measure than 
the number of business units. Primary hypotheses tests use the number of 
business segments. However, sensitivity testing assesses whether the use of 
the number of subsidiaries as a measure of complexity elicits different 
results. Mean market to book value of assets, as a measure of firm growth 
opportunities (GROWTH) is 2.16.  
 
6.2.3 Monitoring and Governance Variables 
Descriptive statistics relating to the 10 variables hypothesised to indicate 
effective board monitoring and governance are presented in Table 6.7. Panel 
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 A outlines descriptive characteristics of continuous variables, while Panel B 
details the dichotomous variables. 
 
Table 6.7: Descriptive Statistics of Governance Variables 
Panel A: Continuous Variables 
Variable Min Max Mean St Dev 
OUTDIR 
GREYDIRS 
BUSYDIRS 
DIRTEN 
POSTCEO 
CEOTEN 
25%  
0%  
0%  
1.17yrs 
0%  
0.25yrs 
92%  
100%  
75%  
18.11yrs 
100%  
27yrs 
75.18%  
16.36%  
11.04%  
5.45yrs 
60.11%  
7.30yrs 
13.10%  
20.71%  
16.36%  
3.03yrs 
33.76%  
5.60yrs 
Panel B: Dichotomous Variable     
Variable Code Frequency Percent 
BLCKHLDR 
 
CEODUAL 
 
REMCTEE 
 
EXTERNAL 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
162 
  26 
  15 
173 
  55 
133 
  86 
102 
86% 
14% 
  8% 
92% 
29% 
71% 
46% 
54% 
Note: OUTDIR = % external directors on the board 
 GREYDIRS = % external directors that are classified as ‘Grey’ 
 BUSYDIRS = % external directors holding more than 5 directorships 
 DIRTEN = average length of tenure of external board members in years 
 POSTCEO = % external directors appointed after the CEO commenced 
 CEOTEN = length of CEO’s tenure in years 
BLCKHLDR = 1= the firm has one or more blockholders with >5% share ownership 
0= the firm does not have one or more blockholders 
CEODUAL = 1 = CEO also holds the position of Chair of the Board 
 0 = CEO does not hold both positions 
 REMCTEE = 1 = CEO sits on Remuneration Committee 
 0 = CEO does not sit on Remuneration Committee 
EXTERNAL = 1 = CEO sits on external boards or non-profit boards 
 0 = CEO does not sit on external boards or non-profit boards 
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 An average of 75 percent of directors are outside directors, however, there is 
evidence of a minority of external directors in some sample firms (minimum 
25 percent). The average proportion of external directors who are classed as 
‘grey’ is 16 percent. However, in one firm, all outside directors have dealings 
with the firm such that their independence is compromised. On average, 11 
percent of non-executive directors are classed as busy due to the number of 
positions they hold on external boards. Average tenure of external directors 
is almost 5.5 years.   
 
On average, 60 percent of outside directors were appointed subsequent to 
the CEO commencing in the role, and CEOs have held office for an average 
of 7.3 years, with the maximum term of office being 25 years. 
 
External blockholders are evident in 86 percent of sample firms. Despite 
guidelines issued by the ASX Corporate Governance Council, eight percent 
of sample firms from the S&P ASX300 still have a CEO who holds the dual 
role of both CEO and Chair of the Board, and almost 30 percent sit as a 
member of the Remuneration Committee. Almost half (46 percent) of the 
sample company CEOs sit on either external company boards, non-profit 
boards, or both. 
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 6.2.4 Ownership Variables 
Descriptive statistics relating to the variables reflecting ownership 
determinants of compensation are presented in Table 6.8. Consistent with 
Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon (2006) CEOs hold, on average, 4.4 percent of 
the shares on issue. Share ownership by CEOs ranges from zero to 
approximately 48 percent. The variation of ownership is great at all levels of 
executive. The average proportion of shares, owned by other senior 
executives, ranges from 0.16 to 1.2 percent.  
 
In approximately 5 percent of sample firms (9 firms) the CEO owns greater 
than 25 percent of the shares. The variation in share ownership of executives 
at level one is essentially driven by one firm, where the executive owns 62 
percent of the shares. This executive was the founder of the company. In 
only three sample companies do executives at level one own greater than 10 
percent of the shares on issue. 
 
In 15 percent of sample firms the CEO is either a founder or a relative of the 
founder of the firm. 
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 Table 6.8: Descriptive Statistics of Ownership Variables 
Panel A: Continuous Variables 
Variable Min Max Mean St Dev 
CEOSHARE 
SHARE1 
SHARE2 
SHARE3 
SHARE4 
SHARE5 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
47.58% 
62.19% 
13.98% 
8.39% 
29.26% 
29.26% 
4.41% 
1.20% 
0.38% 
0.16% 
0.27% 
0.36% 
8.95% 
5.47% 
1.48% 
0.79% 
2.31% 
2.66% 
Panel B: Dichotomous Variable     
Variable Code Frequency Percent 
FOUNDER 
 
1 
0 
  29 
159 
15% 
85% 
Note: CEOSHARE = % of firm total shares owned by the CEO and relatives 
 SHARE1 = % of firm total shares owned by executive 1 and relatives 
SHARE2 = % of firm total shares owned by executive 2 and relatives 
SHARE3 = % of firm total shares owned by executive 3 and relatives 
SHARE4 = % of firm total shares owned by executive 4 and relatives 
SHARE5 = % of firm total shares owned by executive 5 and relatives 
 FOUNDER = 1 = CEO is a founder or a relative of a founder 
 0 = CEO is not a founder or relative of a founder 
 
 
6.3 Hypotheses Testing 
OLS regression was conducted to assess the relative importance of the 
hypothesised determinants of executive remuneration. The following model 
was tested on the various measures of compensation identified in Chapter 5: 
salary, cash bonus, long-term incentive payments and total compensation. 
The tests were conducted for both CEOs and average remuneration for non-
CEO executives.23 In addition, logistic regression was utilised to assess the 
                                                 
23 Average non-CEO compensation was used in testing rather than total measures to account for the 
number of sample companies who had less than five ‘specified executives’, which would potentially 
distort results.  
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 determinants of the decision to offer a short-term cash bonus and/or long-
term incentive payments.  
 
COMPENSATION = β0 + β1ROA + β2SHAREPERF + β3SIZE + β4COMPLEX 
+ β5GROWTH + β6OUTDIR + β7GREYDIRS + 
β8BUSYDIRS + β9DIRTEN + β10BLCKHLDR + 
β11CEODUAL + β12POSTCEO + β13REMCTEE + 
β14CEOTEN + β15EXTERNAL + β16CEOSHR + 
β17FOUNDER+ ε 
 
The testing for significance of estimated parameters in linear regression 
assumes the errors approximate a normal distribution. Natural logarithmic 
transformations were applied to all measures of compensation prior to 
modelling: this reduced heteroskedasticity. A number of zero measures were 
present in the data. As the natural log of zero is undefined, the value of 
0.0001 was added to the variables prior to transformation.  
 
Appendix 1 provides correlations for the independent variables. Tabachnick 
and Fidell (1989) indicate that multicollinearity is an issue if the correlation 
coefficient is greater than 0.70. An examination of the Tables in Appendix 1 
suggests no such issues for the data sample. In addition, variance inflation 
factors and tolerance levels calculated for each model indicate no 
multicollinearity problems. 
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The accounting and share measures of firm financial performance are not 
affected by multicollinearity. As such, both ROA and SHAREPERF are 
included in hypotheses testing to assess the relative importance of each. In 
addition, the various components of compensation (SALARY, BONUS, LTIP, 
TOTALCOMP) could potentially be influenced by different measures of firm 
performance. For instance it is possible that cash bonuses could be tied to 
accounting measures of performance, whereas long-term incentives could be 
more likely to relate to market performance measures. Including both 
measures in the regression models will enable their relative relation to 
compensation components to be determined. Case-wise diagnosis on all 
regression models indicates no significant outliers are present in any of the 
models.  
 
6.3.1 Determinants of CEO Compensation 
Table 6.9 provides results of testing relating to the determinants of CEO 
compensation. Models estimating salary, cash bonus, long-term incentives 
and total compensation are presented. All models have good explanatory 
power, with the R-squared ranging from 51 percent for the model explaining 
long-term incentive pay to 70 percent for the model estimating determinants 
of salary.  
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Table 6.9:  OLS Estimate of Determinants of CEO Compensation 
Salary Cash Bonus Long-Term Incentives Total Compensation Variable Hyp Pred. Sign 
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Firm Performance 
ROA 
SHAREPERF 
Firm Characteristics 
SIZE 
COMPLEX 
GROWTH 
Governance Determinants 
OUTDIR 
GREYDIRS 
BUSYDIRS 
DIRTEN 
BLCKHLDR 
CEODUAL 
POSTCEO 
REMCTEE 
CEOTEN 
EXTERNAL 
Ownership Determinants 
CEOSHR 
FOUNDER 
Constant 
 
1 
1 
 
2 
3 
4 
 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
 
15 
16 
 
 
+ 
+ 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
- 
+ 
+ 
- 
- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
+ 
+ 
+/- 
 
 0.262 
-0.003 
 
 0.257 
 0.034 
-0.017 
 
 0.568 
-0.164 
 0.271 
-0.002 
 0.078 
-0.030 
-0.172 
 0.047 
 0.024 
 0.047 
 
-0.019 
-0.114 
 8.113 
5.574***
-0.410    
10.070***
1.535*  
-0.560    
2.073** 
-1.112    
1.446*  
-0.361    
0.860    
-0.223    
-1.420*   
0.647    
3.015***
0.769    
-3.549***
-0.972    
16.575    
 
 0.119 
 0.053 
 
 0.452 
 0.118 
 0.159 
 
 1.255 
-0.891 
 0.542 
-0.003 
 0.261 
 0.187 
 0.037 
-0.069 
 0.001 
-0.325 
 
 0.048 
-0.855 
 1.222 
0.789    
2.334***
6.096***
1.967** 
1.897** 
1.429*  
-2.115** 
1.095    
-0.236    
1.022    
0.369    
0.118    
-0.358    
0.033    
-1.992** 
2.167** 
01.893** 
0.889    
 
 0.248 
-0.023 
 
 0.715 
 0.084 
 0.353 
 
-1.715 
 0.495 
-0.456 
-0.001 
 0.600 
-5.370 
 0.002 
-0.162 
-0.003 
 0.179 
 
 0.076 
 2.859 
-1.655 
0.752    
-0.405    
4.850***
0.701    
1.833** 
-0.938    
0.421    
-0.438    
-0.023    
1.014    
-1.906** 
0.003    
-0.355    
-0.048    
0.574    
0.977    
2.219** 
-0.557    
 
 0.268 
 0.001 
 
 0.442 
 0.046 
 0.121 
 
-0.653 
-0.136 
 0.421 
-0.001 
-0.025 
-0.138 
-0.042 
 0.113 
 0.023 
-0.183 
 
-0.029 
-0.522 
 5.765 
3.343***
0.112    
10.233***
1.217    
2.316***
-1.410** 
-0.539    
1.316** 
-0.156    
-0.162    
-0.608    
-0.202    
0.920    
1.656** 
-1.754** 
-3.211***
-2.654***
6.907    
R-squared 
F Statistic 
Significance 
  0.697 
18.101 
  0.000 
  0.647 
10.264 
  0.000 
0.507 
2.600 
0.006 
  0.663 
15.624 
  0.000 
*** significant at 1% (one-tailed) 
** significant at 5% (one-tailed) 
* significant at 10% (one-tailed) 
 There is support for the agency argument that the alignment of shareholder 
and managers actions is achieved by aligning remuneration with firm 
financial performance. Hypothesis 1 was supported where accounting 
performance (ROA) was positively associated with CEO salary and total 
compensation. Consistent with expectations, cash bonus was found to 
positively relate to the market performance measure (SHAREPERF). 
Contrary to predictions, long-term incentives were not associated with either 
accounting or market performance constructs. 
 
Results are consistent with Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon (2006), who also 
found a positive association between firm performance and all components of 
compensation except shares. The positive association between cash-based 
incentive pay and firm performance aligns with McKnight and Tomkins’ 
(1999) results. Sensitivity testing for all components of remuneration found 
ROA and SHAREPERF for the prior year to be insignificant, indicating that 
companies are complying with disclosure regulations and are reporting 
remuneration components payable based upon the current period’s 
performance. 
 
The study examined the association between three economic characteristics 
of firms and remuneration: firm size, complexity, and growth opportunities. 
Hypothesis 2, which predicted an association between firm size (SIZE) and 
remuneration, was supported for all components. This is consistent with prior 
overseas and Australian research (Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999; 
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 Laing and Weir, 1999; Murphy, 1999; McKnight and Tomkins, 1999; Coulton 
and Taylor, 2002b; Fleming and Stellios, 2002; Chalmers, Koh and 
Stapledon, 2006; Matolcsy and Wright, 2006b). This result supports the 
argument that demand for the higher quality labour required to successfully 
run a large corporation is rewarded by both higher salary and incentive 
compensation.  
 
Consistent with Agarwal (1981) and Matolcsy and Wright (2006b), hypothesis 
3, which predicts an association between the complexity of the firm’s 
operations and remuneration is supported for both the level of salary and 
cash bonuses paid to CEOs. Sensitivity testing examining the relation 
between the alternative measure of complexity (number of subsidiaries) and 
remuneration levels indicate no difference in results. 
 
Firms with higher growth opportunities (hypothesis 4) are also likely to pay 
higher cash bonuses and long-term incentive payments to CEOs. This result 
is consistent with the observations of Gaver and Gaver (1995) who propose 
that growth firms are more likely to use incentive compensation. The finding 
also supports prior Australian research undertaken by Chalmers, Koh and 
Stapledon (2006).  
 
The relationships between a number of monitoring and governance 
mechanisms and remuneration were also assessed. While hypothesis 5 
predicted a negative relationship between the proportion of outside directors 
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 on the board (OUTDIRS) and remuneration, a positive association between 
OUTDIRS and CEO salary and, to a lesser extent, cash bonuses (significant 
at the 10 percent level) was found. This result is consistent with Core, 
Holthausen and Larcker’s (1999) finding. It supports a managerial power 
argument, where governance mechanisms could be weak, and external 
directors are influenced by the CEO rather than operating independently.  
 
The proportion of grey directors negatively relates to the level of cash bonus 
paid to CEOs. This result is contrary to that proposed by hypothesis 6, and 
prior results obtained by Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999. The finding 
may be attributed to CEO risk preferences and variations in compensation 
structures as a result of different governance structures (Chalmers, Koh and 
Stapledon, 2006), where the CEO is able to influence the board. Consistent 
with the expectations of hypothesis 7, the CEO is able to influence the board 
where there are busy directors. This influence manifests in higher salary and 
total remuneration levels. 
 
Hypotheses proposing an association between the length of directors’ tenure 
(hypothesis 8), the existence of blockholders (hypothesis 9), and the CEO’s 
representation on the remuneration committee (hypothesis 12) and 
remuneration were not supported. 
 
CEOs who hold the dual role of chair of the board have a preference for less 
risky compensation. Long-term incentive pay is more likely to be lower where 
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 the CEO undertakes both roles (hypothesis 10), than when they do not. 
Hypothesis 11 proposed that the CEO influences directors appointed 
subsequent to taking office in remuneration decisions. Contrary to 
expectations, however, salary levels were likely to be lower when directors 
were appointed after the CEO, however, support was limited at only the 10 
percent level of significance. 
 
As expected, the length of the CEO’s tenure (hypothesis 13) was positively 
associated with total remuneration, in addition to the extent of salary on offer. 
This result is consistent with prior research by Attaway (2000), McKnight and 
Tomkins (2004) and Buchholtz, Young and Powell (1998). It offers support 
for the argument that as the CEO’s tenure increases, the executive builds a 
proven ‘track record’ (McKnight and Tomkins, 2004), and develops 
relationships both within and outside the organisation, thus acquiring the 
respect and confidence of board members. The firm is more likely to reward 
such expertise to retain it within the organisation.  
 
CEOs who sit on external boards or non-profit organisations are likely to 
receive lower levels of cash bonus. Again, this contradicts the positive 
association predicted by hypothesis 14. This could mean that CEOs 
undertaking roles external to the firm are not meeting performance targets 
within the organisation, and so do not maximise their cash bonus 
opportunities. 
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 CEOs who own shares in the firm have a clear preference for incentive-
based compensation in comparison to salary. This finding appears to 
contradict Mehran’s (1995) observation that total equity holdings are 
considered when determining incentive-based compensation. Where CEOs 
hold increasing levels of shares they are likely to rely less on salary. CEOs of 
two sample firms receive no salary, but hold higher than average levels of 
shares. CEOs in these companies are more likely to have greater alignment 
with owners in their decision-making practices. Contrary to the expected 
prediction of hypothesis 16, the payment of cash bonuses is lower for firms 
where the CEO is a founder, or a relative of the founder of the company. The 
hypothesis is supported in relation to long-term incentive pay, however, 
indicating CEO founders have a preference for market-based incentives for 
their own remuneration.  
 
Hypothesis 4b proposes that the provision of incentive remuneration is 
positively associated with the extent of growth opportunities. Two logistic 
regression models were developed to assess the determinants of the 
decision to pay (1) cash bonuses and (2) long term incentive compensation, 
respectively. In the first model the dependent variable was categorised as ‘1’ 
for firms that pay a cash bonus to executives and ‘0’ for firms that do not pay 
a cash bonus. Although the R-squared indicates a significant model (Cox and 
Snell R-squared = 0.272) firm size is the only positive significant indicator. 
However, the decision to offer long-term share-based compensation appears 
to be made on the basis of factors not considered in the study. Logistic 
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regression models provide no explanatory power (Cox and Snell R-squared 
is 0.121). Contrary to expectations indicated in hypothesis 4b, growth firms 
are no more likely to utilise incentive-based compensation as a method of 
compensation CEOs than non-growth firms. 
 
6.3.2 Determinants of Non-CEO Compensation 
The results of hypotheses tests assessing the determinants of non-CEO 
compensation are presented in Table 6.10. As with the CEO results, all 
models have good explanatory power. R-squared ranges from a low of 52 
percent for the long-term incentives model to 69 percent for salary and 72 
percent for the model explaining determinants of total compensation. 
 
All components of non-CEO compensation are found to positively relate to 
ROA, the accounting measure of firm performance. This support for 
hypothesis 1 is a stronger result than that indicated by the CEO models. 
Again, sensitivity testing indicates no relationship between measures of prior 
year’s financial performance and remuneration components of non-CEOs. No 
remuneration components of non-CEO executives are determined by market-
based performance measures. 
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Table 6.10:  OLS Estimate of Determinants of Non-CEO Compensation 
Salary Cash Bonus Long-Term Incentives Total Compensation Variable Hyp Pred. Sign 
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Firm Performance 
ROA 
SHAREPERF 
Firm Characteristics 
SIZE 
COMPLEX 
GROWTH 
Governance Determinants 
OUTDIR 
GREYDIRS 
BUSYDIRS 
DIRTEN 
BLCKHLDR 
CEODUAL 
POSTCEO 
REMCTEE 
CEOTEN 
EXTERNAL 
Ownership Determinants 
CEOSHR 
FOUNDER 
Constant 
 
1 
1 
 
2 
3 
4 
 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
 
15 
16 
 
 
+ 
+ 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
- 
+ 
+ 
- 
- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
+ 
+ 
+/- 
 
 0.124 
 0.001 
 
 0.216 
 0.040 
 0.004 
 
 0.105 
-0.138 
-0.260 
-0.001 
 0.188 
 0.066 
-0.109 
-0.090 
 0.006 
-0.002 
 
 0.008 
-0.163 
 8.157 
3.433***
0.135    
11.065***
2.326** 
0.182    
0.504    
-1.213    
-1.799** 
-0.279    
2.698***
0.643    
-1.174    
-1.627*  
0.973    
-0.052    
1.932** 
-1.837** 
21.632    
 
 0.468 
-0.027 
 
 0.581 
 0.086 
 0.031 
 
 0.606 
 0.244 
 0.558 
 0.006 
-0.159 
-0.247 
-0.035 
-0.045 
 0.015 
-0.061 
 
 0.014 
-0.372 
 0.137 
3.743***
-1.372    
9.357***
1.646** 
0.394    
0.808    
0.634    
1.246    
0.445    
-0.724    
-0.674    
-0.122    
-0.251    
0.766    
-0.422    
0.945    
-1.207    
0.118    
 
 0.414 
-0.033 
 
 0.794 
-0.065 
 0.066 
 
-1.578 
-0.614 
-1.079 
 0.017 
 0.428 
-0.250 
 0.495 
-0.005 
-0.006 
-0.185 
 
 0.019 
 0.578 
-3.327 
2.246** 
-1.276    
9.185***
-0.861    
0.625    
-1.530*   
-1.109    
-1.617*   
0.454    
1.347*   
-0.446    
1.090    
-0.021    
-0.178    
-0.890    
0.894    
1.277    
-1.938    
 
 0.196 
-0.006 
 
 0.368 
 0.054 
 0.042 
 
-0.300 
-0.100 
-0.122 
-0.003 
 0.116 
-0.043 
 0.033 
-0.056 
 0.008 
-0.087 
 
 0.003 
-0.136 
 6.106 
3.885***
-0.776    
13.560***
2.297** 
1.296    
-1.032    
-0.632    
-0.605    
-0.455    
1.204    
-0.304    
0.255    
-0.721    
0.952    
-1.334    
0.521    
-1.100    
11.644    
R-squared 
F Statistic 
Significance 
  0.691 
17.764 
  0.000 
  0.606 
10.495 
  0.000 
0.522 
7.080 
0.000 
  0.723 
20.771 
  0.000 
*** significant at 1% (one-tailed) 
** significant at 5% (one-tailed) 
* significant at 10% (one-tailed 
 Firm size (hypothesis 2) and complexity (hypothesis 3) are also positively 
associated with remuneration. Complexity does not relate to the level of long-
term incentives, however. Contrary to expectations of hypothesis 4, firms with 
higher growth opportunities do not pay higher level of remuneration to non-
CEO executives. This result differs from the findings of the CEO models. 
 
There is support for the proposition that monitoring and governance factors 
influence non-CEO executive compensation, although to a lesser extent than 
for CEOs. The proportion of busy directors on the board (hypothesis 7) is 
negatively related to the level of both salary and long-term incentive 
payments. This result indicates that directors who operate on multiple boards 
are likely to be more vigilant in assessing pay levels of the senior 
management team, and more likely to bring their experience relating to 
remuneration practices of other firms with which they are involved, to the 
remuneration decision. Similarly, support for hypothesis 5, which examined 
the monitoring role of outside directors, indicates board vigilance in ensuring 
lower levels of incentive-based pay, although only at the 10 percent level of 
significance. 
 
There is some evidence that the existence of external blockholders 
(hypothesis 9) relates to higher levels of non-CEO salary and long-term 
incentives. This result indicates blockholder preference for using incentive-
based pay as a reward mechanism to align managerial interests with those of 
shareholders. 
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CEOs who are shareholders were more likely to support higher salary levels 
for subordinate executives, indicating support for hypothesis 15. Interestingly, 
however, where CEOs are either a founder or relative of the founder of an 
organisation, non-CEO executive salary is lower. This appears to provide 
evidence of the increased power or influence of founders, where they control 
the salary of lower-level executives.  
 
Hypothesis 4b proposes that the provision of incentive remuneration is 
positively associated with the extent of growth opportunities. Again, two 
logistic regression models were developed to assess the determinants of the 
decision to pay (1) cash bonuses and (2) long term incentive compensation, 
respectively. In the first model the dependent variable was categorised as ‘1’ 
for firms that pay a cash bonus to executives and ‘0’ for firms that do not pay 
a cash bonus. Although the R-squared indicates a significant model (Cox and 
Snell R-squared = 0.297) firm size is the only positive significant indicator. 
The decision to offer long-term share-based compensation to non-CEO 
executives appears to be made on the basis of factors not considered in the 
study. Logistic regression models provide no explanatory power (Cox and 
Snell R-squared for the non-CEO model is 0.141). Contrary to expectations 
indicated in hypothesis 4b, growth firms are no more likely to utilise incentive-
based compensation as a method of compensation non-CEO executives 
than non-growth firms. 
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 6.4 Conclusion 
Ryan and Wiggins (2000) found that although the structure of compensation 
of CEOs aligned with that on non-CEO executives, the determinants of 
remuneration differed between the levels of executives. The current study 
indicates that in the Australian context the structure of CEO remuneration 
differs from that of non-CEO executives. As firms move progressively up the 
senior executive hierarchy, both short-term bonus and share-based 
incentives become more important as components of executive 
compensation than salary. Australian firms are increasingly subjecting 
executives to meeting performance hurdles prior to being awarded, or being 
able to exercise long-term incentive components of pay. Whilst firm size and 
complexity relate to executive remuneration for both CEOs and non-CEO 
executives, other factors that determine remuneration differ. Monitoring and 
governance factors, in addition to ownership measures, play a more 
important role in the determination of CEO compensation than they do non-
CEO remuneration. 
 
Results indicate executive remuneration is determined by a range of factors. 
Firm financial performance is associated with the level of all components of 
both CEO and non-CEO remuneration to varying degrees. However, with the 
exception of cash bonuses to CEOs, remuneration is more likely to be related 
to accounting measures of performance. The association between firm 
performance and remuneration was stronger than that observed by the 
majority of prior Australian research. 
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There is overwhelming support for the prediction that firm size and 
complexity determines the level of all components of remuneration for both 
CEOs and non-CEO executives. This result is indicative of larger, more 
complex firms demanding higher quality labour, and paying increased levels 
of remuneration as a result. Growth firms are more likely to pay higher levels 
of cash bonuses and long-term incentives to CEOs. 
 
Monitoring and governance mechanisms have an influence on remuneration 
components, although to a lesser extent than do firm performance and 
economic characteristics. Outside directors monitor the level of long-term 
incentive payments of non-CEO executives. Payments of long-term 
incentives to non-CEO executives were lower where the CEO also held the 
position of Chair of the Board. This result indicates a preference for less risky 
cash incentives, when CEOs are in a position to influence board decision-
making. In some cases, findings relating to board monitoring arguments 
verified the managers’ ability to influence remuneration, and weak corporate 
governance structures. For example, a greater proportion of external 
directors on the board results in higher rather than lower levels of salary. The 
longer the CEO has been tenured in the position, the higher the level of 
salary and total remuneration. 
 
Contrary to expectations, the proportion of shares owned by CEOs, and 
payment of both salary and total remuneration to CEOs exhibited an inverse 
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 relationship. This result appears to indicate that CEOs owning a higher 
proportion of shares operate as owners, and are more likely to rely on 
income from shares than salary.  
 
Finally, consistent with observations by McKnight and Tomkins (1999) and 
Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon (2006), factors impacting remuneration vary 
across the different components. While firm size influences the level of all 
components of remuneration for both CEOs and non-CEO executives, the 
impact of firm financial performance differs across pay components. The 
extent of growth opportunities is more likely to influence incentive pay, 
however, its effect is not limited to long-term incentive compensation.  
 
While the length of CEO tenure relates to the level of salary and total 
compensation, there is no association with either short-term or long-term 
incentive-based pay. The founder status of the CEO does not relate to CEO 
salary, however, does relate to incentive-based compensation. The existence 
of external blockholders, and busy directors is associated with the level of 
non-CEO executive salary, however, there is no such relationship with cash 
bonuses or long-term incentive pay. Similarly, the extent to which the CEO 
owns shares in the firm, and the founder status of the CEO correlates with 
non-CEO salary, but no other pay component. 
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Chapter 7 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
Section 7.1 reiterates the objectives of the study. A summary of the major 
research findings follows. The implications of the results are presented in 
Section 7.3, with the penultimate section indicating potential limitations of the 
work. Opportunities for future research are explored in the final section. 
 
7.1 Objectives of the Study 
Corporate governance has increased in prominence and importance in the 
business arena in recent years. With the collapse of Enron and, in Australia, 
other high profile companies including HIH, One.Tel and Harris Scarfe, there 
has been a call for improved corporate governance mechanisms (Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003; Lavelle, 2002; Thomas, 2002). Executive pay, in particular, 
has received increased attention from the media and government.  
The objective of the study documented in this thesis is to add to our 
understanding of both the components and determinants of Australian 
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 remuneration packages for the top management team, which are responsible 
for the strategic direction of the firm, under an expanded regulatory regime. It 
does so in four main ways. 
 
Firstly, the study examines the determinants of compensation of the top five 
senior executives in Australian firms, in addition to the CEO. With the 
exception of a limited number of US studies, the emphasis of prior research 
which examines the structure and determinants of compensation has been 
on CEO pay alone. No Australian research, to date, explores the structure 
and determinants of remuneration beyond the CEO. 
 
Secondly, the research is carried out in a contemporary setting and 
timeframe which is subject to expanded disclosure requirements, when 
compared to prior Australian research. The corporate reporting landscape 
relating to executive remuneration has experienced substantial change over 
the last 10 years. With the Australian Government’s CLERP program, and 
convergence with international accounting standards, requirements for 
disclosure and recognition of components of remuneration, and in particular, 
share-based payments have expanded considerably. With the requirement to 
disclose the proportion of executive compensation linked to performance 
hurdles, the ability of shareholders to indicate their views on remuneration by 
way of a non-binding vote on the remuneration report and the requirement to 
expense share-based payments that form part of remuneration, we now 
expect to find changes in the structure of remuneration. The link between 
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 measures of firm performance and executive remuneration is also expected 
to be strengthened. 
 
As a result of amendments to the regulatory regime governing remuneration 
disclosures, factors found in prior literature to relate to the level and 
components of executive pay could have changed. In addition, a number of 
factors found to relate to the level of CEO compensation in overseas 
research have not, to date, been examined in Australian research. Some of 
these were not previously able to be measured in the Australian context due 
to unavailability of data. The current study examines an expanded range of 
factors documented in overseas research as likely to relate to remuneration, 
some of which have not been previously examined in Australian work. 
 
Finally, the study reconciles the perspectives provided by both agency and 
managerial power theories in terms of how they present similar and differing 
propositions regarding determinants of executive remuneration. Empirical 
investigation within Australia and internationally has, to date, engaged 
agency theory as the predominant perspective in the development of testable 
hypotheses. Recently, the theory of managerial power, which emerges from 
the sociology and political science literatures, has been proposed as a theory 
which can assist in more fully considering behavioural aspects of managerial 
actions, in order to present a more comprehensive model of the determinants 
of executive remuneration. 
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 7.2 Major Findings 
Since prior Australian research was conducted, the structure of CEO 
compensation has changed to include a greater reliance on incentive pay 
components. Now, only 39 percent of CEO remuneration is attributed to base 
salary, with 52 percent consisting of performance-based remuneration. A 
greater proportion of Australian firms are now utilising incentive pay than was 
previously observed, with 87 percent of Australian CEOs and 84 percent of 
non-CEO executives receiving long-term incentive payments. The awarding 
of long-term incentives is subject to meeting performance hurdles in 
approximately 66 percent of these firms, with this proportion rising to 70 
percent in manufacturing and industrial companies. 
 
The current study indicates that in the Australian context the structure of 
CEO remuneration differs from that of non-CEO executives. As managers 
move progressively up the senior executive hierarchy, both short-term 
bonuses and share-based incentive pay become more important as 
components of executive compensation. Accordingly, salary decreases as a 
proportion of total pay. 
 
Firm financial performance relates to the level of all components of 
remuneration to varying degrees. Hypothesis 1 was supported, where 
accounting performance was positively related to CEO salary and total 
compensation and to all components of non-CEO executives’ remuneration. 
Cash bonus was found to positively relate to market performance, however, 
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 long-term incentive pay was not. The relation between firm financial 
performance and executive remuneration, as expected, was stronger than 
that identified by prior Australian research. This lends support to the 
argument that current disclosure regulation is serving to enhance the pay-
performance link in Australian firms. 
 
Associations between firm size (hypothesis 2) and complexity (hypothesis 3) 
and compensation were observed for both CEO and non-CEO executives. A 
strong, positive, relationship between the size of the firm and remuneration 
was found for all pay components and levels of executive. Cash bonuses are 
more likely to be attributed to the complexity of the organisation’s operations 
than other components of remuneration, for both CEOs and other executives 
in the senior team. Hypothesis 4 was supported in that growth firms are more 
likely to pay higher levels of incentive pay and total compensation to CEOs 
than non-growth firms. 
 
Executive remuneration is also found to relate to the strength of various 
monitoring and governance mechanisms, although to a greater extent for 
CEOs than other senior executives. While hypothesis 5 predicted a negative 
relationship between the proportion of outside directors on the board and 
remuneration, a positive association was observed between external 
directors on the board and CEO salary and, to a lesser extent, cash bonuses. 
This result indicates that where governance mechanisms are weak, external 
directors are influenced by the CEO rather than operating independently. 
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The proportion of grey directors negatively relates to the level of cash bonus 
paid to CEOs. Consistent with the expectations of hypothesis 7, the CEO is 
able to influence the board where there are busy directors. This influence 
manifests in higher salary and total remuneration levels. The length of 
directors’ tenure (hypothesis 8) and the CEO’s representation on the 
remuneration committee (hypothesis 12) were not found to relate to any 
component of CEO remuneration. While the existence of blockholders 
(hypothesis 9) received no support in relation to CEO pay, there was some 
evidence that external blockholders have a preference for using incentive-
based pay as a reward mechanism for non-CEO executives. 
 
CEOs, who also hold the dual role of Chair of the Board, have a preference 
for less risky compensation. Long-term incentive pay is more likely to be 
lower where the CEO undertakes both roles (hypothesis 10), than when they 
do not. Hypothesis 11 proposed that the CEO influences directors appointed 
subsequent to when the CEO takes office, in remuneration decisions. 
Contrary to expectations, however, salary levels were likely to be lower when 
directors were appointed after the CEO. 
 
As expected, the length of the CEO’s tenure (hypothesis 13) was positively 
associated with total remuneration, in addition to the extent of salary on offer. 
The result provides support for the argument that as the CEO’s expertise 
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 increases, the firm is more likely to reward that expertise in order to retain it 
within the organisation.  
 
CEOs who sit on external boards or non-profit organisations are likely to 
receive lower levels of cash bonus. This contradicts the positive association 
predicted by hypothesis 14, and could mean that CEOs undertaking roles 
external to the firm are not meeting performance targets within the 
organisation, and so do not maximise their cash bonus opportunities. 
 
CEOs who own shares in the firm have a clear preference for incentive-
based compensation in comparison to salary. However, where the CEO is a 
significant shareholder, subordinate salary is likely to be higher. Contrary to 
the expected prediction of hypothesis 16, the payment of cash bonuses to 
CEOs, and salary to other senior executives, is lower for firms where the 
CEO is a founder of the company. The hypothesis is supported in relation to 
long-term incentive pay, however, indicating CEO founders have a 
preference for market-based incentives for their own remuneration.  
 
In summary, the expectation that remuneration is now more strongly tied to 
firm performance is supported.  The size and complexity of the firm are also 
considered in determining the level of various components of both CEO and 
non-CEO executive compensation. Managers are able to influence the 
remuneration-setting process where governance structures are weak, or 
where they have greater influence. This is particularly evident, for example, 
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 where the CEO is the founder, or holds a greater proportion of shares, when 
they have been incumbent in their position for an extended length of time, or 
where outside directors have multiple board commitments.  
 
Consistent with Ryan and Wiggins’ (2000) US observations, in some cases 
factors relating to CEO compensation differ from those associated with 
compensation of lower-level executives. Monitoring and governance 
mechanisms play a lesser role than firm performance and economic 
characteristics in determining non-CEO remuneration. 
 
7.3 Implications of the Results 
The study documented in the current thesis provides a good understanding 
of the various components of contemporary managerial pay contracts in 
Australia, and how the mix of executive pay components has changed in the 
last five years. The results are generalisable to other publicly listed firms in 
Australia and are relevant to other jurisdictions, such as the UK, where 
similar pay components are utilised in remunerating top managers. Results 
relating to the use of options and other share-based payments are also 
relevant to other jurisdictions such as the US and the UK, following the move 
towards requiring firms to expense share-based payments internationally as 
a result of convergence. Consistent with observations in the Australian 
environment over the period of the current study, overseas firms are also 
likely to be reconsidering their relative use of stock options and performance 
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 rights. We would expect that in the US there will be reduced reliance on stock 
options in the coming years, due to the fact they are now required to be 
expensed over the vesting period. 
 
Findings indicate that board monitoring mechanisms are more likely to be 
beneficial in determining CEO compensation than that of non-CEO 
executives. This suggests that internal governance processes are likely to 
play a significant role in monitoring lower-level executives. However, internal 
monitoring by the CEO does not fully replace the need for incentive 
alignment, suggesting that incentive mechanisms and monitoring are both 
important components of effective corporate governance.  
 
Results offer support for both agency and managerial power theories. 
Agency proposals that executive remuneration aligns with firm performance 
are supported. The firm’s demand for quality labour to successfully manage 
larger, more complex firms, results in greater levels of remuneration. Results 
also indicate that managers exert power or influence over the compensation-
setting process when they have longer tenure (resulting in higher salary for 
CEOs), are founders of the firm, and own greater levels of shares (resulting 
in higher cash bonuses for all executives).  
 
The results have implications for Australian standard setters in their 
assessment of the success of increased regulation of remuneration practices 
and disclosure. Results offer support for the regulatory amendments, as they 
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 indicate a stronger association between firm performance and remuneration 
than previously observed in Australian research, indicating a greater 
alignment between managers’ and owners’ incentives. However, the lack of 
an association between market measures of firm performance and incentive 
pay components is surprising, particularly given the increased extent to which 
long-term incentive pay is now linked to performance hurdles. This may 
suggest that performance hurdles based on market performance measures 
are not having their desired effect of aligning the interests of managers with 
shareholders.  
 
Recently, hedging has been raised as a significant concern by investors and 
investor interest groups (Buffini, 2006b). Executives have been criticised for 
hedging unvested options, which effectively mitigates any risk attached to 
incentive-based pay components and undermines claims that equity 
incentives align the interests of managers and shareholders (Buffini, 2006b; 
West and Andrusiak, 2006). The ASX Corporate Governance Council has 
recently changed their best practice guidelines to request companies to 
disclose secret option hedging by executives (West and Andrusiak, 2006). 
However, Eric Mayne, the Chairman of the ASX Corporate Governance 
Council and ASX head of market supervision, said recently that any further 
action on the issue would require changes to corporations’ legislation (West 
and Andrusiak, 2006, p.19). Results of the current study, where no 
association between market measures of performance and long-term 
incentive compensation was observed, will also lend support to the argument 
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 that executive pay and firm performance are still not adequately aligned, 
potentially because of executive’s reducing their exposure to risk by hedging. 
 
Governance mechanisms such as the non-binding vote by shareholders, and 
the disclosure of performance hurdles appear to have had an effect on the 
structure of executive compensation. Reliance on incentive-based pay has 
increased, although the use of options as a pay method appears to be 
declining in favour of performance rights. Research by Meulbroek (2001) and 
Matolcsy and Wright (2006c) provide support for limiting the use of 
performance hurdles, and limiting the link between executive pay and firm 
performance in some circumstances. This is particularly relevant in industries 
where too much risk is borne by undiversified managers, who value 
incentive-based components of compensation at significantly lower levels 
than do firms. In such industries the use of cash-based incentives may be 
more appropriate. 
 
Results provide overwhelming support for the proposal that firm size and 
complexity are significant issues to be considered in designing executive 
remuneration contracts. These results are relevant to boards of Australian 
public companies in their assessment of appropriate mechanisms upon 
which to assess managerial performance, and attract high quality executives. 
Boards also gain an understanding of the success of the various governance 
mechanisms examined, in aligning managerial interests with those of owners 
in order to maximise firm value. Boards need to be aware that where 
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 governance mechanisms are weak, outside directors are more likely to be 
influenced by the CEO. Busy directors result in weaker monitoring, which is 
likely to manifest itself in higher salary and total pay levels. 
 
7.4 Limitations of the Study 
The agency theory and managerial power arguments presented in the thesis 
hold under the Anglo-US model of corporate governance. However, results 
cannot necessarily be translated to European and Asian models of 
governance where different power differentials may exist.  
 
Taking a cross-sectional approach limits the analysis of trends and the 
prospect that there is a one-off approach to remuneration (although nothing 
atypical is expected of 2005). Future research should take a longitudinal 
approach to examine the determinants of pay. A longitudinal study will also 
be able to assess determinants of the variability of executive pay 
components, rather than just focussing on levels. 
 
The relatively lower explanatory power of the model examining determinants 
of long-term incentive pay indicates there may be other plausible 
explanations that would provide a more meaningful understanding of 
incentive pay practices. Alternatively, the measures of firm performance may 
not have fully captured the performance measures upon which incentive 
compensation is based.  
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7.5 Future Research 
Future research could address the limitations identified. Examining the 
impact of differential power models that exist in European and Asian 
jurisdictions on executive pay practices would provide a richer understanding 
of the impact of power on executive pay. 
 
An examination of company reports indicates long-term incentive pay is 
determined by a range of performance measures, many of which are not 
related to financial performance, but to other indicators of managerial 
performance. Future research could develop a model to more fully 
understand long-term incentive payments by examining a greater range of 
performance measures, beyond the financial performance metrics utilised in 
the current and prior work. 
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Appendix 1 
CORRELATION MATRIX: INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
Pearson Correlation 
Significance (2-tailed) 
 ROA SHARE PERF GROWTH OUTDIR 
GREY 
DIRS 
BUSY 
DIRS DIRTEN BLCKHLDR CEODUAL POSTCEO 
ROA   
         
SHAREPERF .504 .000 
1         
GROWTH .339 .000 
-.382 
.000 
1        
OUTDIR -.043 .557 
.167 
.022 
-.122 
.096 
1       
GREYDIRS -.152 .039 
.027 
.716 
-.090 
.223 
-.051 
.492 
1      
BUSYDIRS -.007 .919 
.137 
.061 
-.090 
.221 
.113 
.124 
-.080 
.276 
1     
DIRTEN .054 .471 
.111 
.134 
-.149 
.045 
.094 
.205 
.037 
.624 
.010 
.888 
1    
BLCKSUM .000 1.00 
.004 
.953 
-.078 
.288 
.001 
.994 
-.115 
.117 
-.029 
.696 
-.092 
.216 
1   
CEODUAL .044 .546 
-.096 
.189 
.017 
.813 
-.275 
.000 
.053 
.471 
-.127 
.082 
.059 
.430 
-.053 
.473 
1  
POSTCEO .074 .316 
-.043 
.561 
.074 
.319 
-.333 
.000 
-.053 
.474 
-.190 
.010 
-.074 
.322 
.172 
.019 
.142 
.055 
1 
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Appendix 1 continued 
 
Pearson Correlation 
Significance (2-tailed) 
 REMCTEE CEO SHARE FOUNDER SIZE COMPLEX CEOTEN EXTERNAL 
ROA .048 .516 
.078 
.296 
.127 
.083 
.156 
.032 
.063 
.390 
.171 
.022 
.031 
.673 
SHAREPERF -.021 .772 
-.026 
.725 
-.056 
.449 
.532 
.000 
.277 
.000 
-.099 
.906 
-.048 
.517 
GROWTH -.101 .170 
.071 
.340 
.113 
.123 
-.416 
.000 
-.192 
.009 
-.046 
.545 
.038 
.608 
OUTDIR -.167 .022 
-.409 
.000 
-.301 
.000 
.409 
.000 
.198 
.006 
-.327 
.000 
.076 
.301 
GREYDIRS .029 .692 
.148 
.046 
.123 
.095 
-.173 
.018 
-.160 
.029 
.038 
.617 
-.114 
.123 
BUSYDIRS -.133 .068 
-.053 
.480 
-.050 
.501 
.224 
.002 
.057 
.436 
-.111 
.139 
.150 
.039 
DIRTEN .135 .067 
.007 
.927 
-.015 
.837 
.123 
.098 
.103 
.167 
.092 
.223 
.066 
.372 
BLCKHLDR .122 .095 
-.127 
.087 
-.041 
.574 
-.189 
.010 
-.020 
.790 
-.007 
.926 
-.065 
.3740 
CEODUAL .242 .001 
.357 
.000 
.254 
.000 
-.182 
.013 
-.099 
.175 
.425 
.000 
.084 
.250 
POSTCEO .190 .010 
.221 
.003 
.294 
.000 
-.210 
.004 
-.114 
.124 
.599 
.000 
-.020 
.784 
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Appendix 1 continued 
 
Pearson Correlation 
Significance (2-tailed) 
 REMCTEE CEO SHARE FOUNDER SIZE COMPLEX CEOTEN EXTERNAL 
REMCTEE 1  
      
CEOSHARE .237 .001 
1      
FOUNDER .210 .004 
.474 
.000 
1     
SIZE -.177 .015 
-.229 
.002 
-.248 
.001 
1    
COMPLEX -.057 .434 
-.018 
.805 
-.043 
.560 
.452 
.000 
1   
CEOTEN .287 .000 
.409 
.000 
.457 
.000 
-.176 
.018 
-.118 
.115 
1  
EXTERNAL .067 .363 
-.019 
.895 
-.129 
.080 
.097 
.184 
.076 
.299 
-.061 
.415 
1 
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